University of Denver

Digital Commons @ DU
Electronic Theses and Dissertations

Graduate Studies

1-1-2014

Winning Well: Civil Resistance Mechanisms of Success,
Democracy, and Civil Peace
Jonathan C. Pinckney
University of Denver

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/etd
Part of the Comparative Politics Commons, Peace and Conflict Studies Commons, and the Political
Theory Commons

Recommended Citation
Pinckney, Jonathan C., "Winning Well: Civil Resistance Mechanisms of Success, Democracy, and Civil
Peace" (2014). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 517.
https://digitalcommons.du.edu/etd/517

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate Studies at Digital Commons @ DU. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

Winning Well: Civil Resistance Mechanisms of Success, Democracy, and Civil Peace
__________

A Thesis
Presented to
the Faculty of the Josef Korbel School of International Studies
University of Denver

__________

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts

__________

by
Jonathan C. Pinckney
June 2014
Advisor: Erica Chenoweth

©Copyright by Jonathan C. Pinckney 2014
All Rights Reserved

Author: Jonathan C. Pinckney
Title: Winning Well: Civil Resistance Mechanisms of Success, Democracy, and Civil
Peace
Advisor: Erica Chenoweth
Degree Date: June 2014
Abstract
Several recent studies indicate that revolutions of non-violent civil resistance lead
to more democratic and peaceful political transitions than either violent revolutions or
elite-led political transitions. However, this general trend has not been disaggregated to
explain the many prominent cases where nonviolent revolutions are followed by
authoritarianism or civil war. Understanding these divergent cases is critical, particularly
in light of the problematic transitions following the "Arab Spring" revolutions of 2011.
In this paper I explain why nonviolent revolutions sometimes lead to these negative
outcomes. I show, through quantitative analysis of a dataset of all successful non-violent
revolutions from 1900-2006 and comparative case studies of the revolutions in Egypt and
Yemen, that the mechanism of success whereby the non-violent revolution achieves its
goals, such as an negotiation, election, or coup d’etat, has a significant impact on the
likelihood of democracy and civil war. Most centrally, mechanisms which involve pretransition capacity-building, civil resistance campaign initiative, and broad political
consensus are significantly more likely to lead to democracy and peace. This research
has powerful implications for understanding both the options available to non-violent
activists seeking revolutionary goals and the choices likely to lead to optimal outcomes
during the post-revolutionary transition.
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Introduction: When the Revolution Wins
As, in a quavering voice, the vice-president of Egypt officially announced that
Hosni Mubarak, authoritarian president of Egypt since 1981, was stepping down
immediately, the crowds in Tahrir Square erupted. For 18 days, despite repression and
concession, despite tear gas and thugs on camel-back, despite the regime repeatedly
assuring them that their demands had been heard and there was no point in remaining in
the streets, they had stayed. They were tired of assurances, tired of fear, tired of a
country where the most central facts were unemployment, poverty, and a criminal
government. And now, through their steadfastness, they had nonviolently ousted the
regime that had ruled longer than many of the protesters could remember. Around the
world commentators talked about the hope of Egypt, of a new prosperous society united
across social and religious divides, led by passionate young liberal technocrats from
Google.

Yet over the following months the military regime which replaced Mubarak,
headed by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), backtracked on their
support for the revolution. Thousands of civilians were arrested, sometimes tortured, and
sentenced in quick, secretive courts. Promises of democracy were hampered by
guarantees of military immunity and the continued preferential treatment of old regime
elites. And when Egypt’s first free and fair presidential election in history brought the
1

Muslim Brotherhood to power, conflict grew. Clashes between Christians and Muslims
in Egypt became increasingly common.
Finally in July 2013, after protests of an almost unprecedented size and scope,1
the military once again stepped in and ousted the elected government in a popularlybacked coup d’etat. This second coup has been followed by months of violent clashes
between brotherhood supporters and the military, with little indication of the possibility
of a long-term sustainable solution. As the third anniversary of the Egyptian revolution
passed, Amnesty International bleakly observed that “the revolt’s causes not only remain
but in some cases have grown more acute…the motto of the uprising, ‘bread, freedom,
social justice,’ rings hollow” (Amnesty International, 2014, 5). Three years of revolution
have left many Egyptians wondering what went wrong and if it any of it was worth the
sacrifices they endured to make it happen.

Many have speculated on what happened to that hopeful moment in 2011.
Perhaps it was an incompatibility of Islam with democracy, or the continuing influence of
authoritarian elements, or maybe the destructive history of the totalitarian regime which
preceded the revolution. But what much of this analysis misses is that Egypt, and
several similar cases from the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011, are part of a much larger
historical trend. Since the beginning of the 20th century there have been over eighty
successful nonviolent campaigns that have ousted a government, expelled an occupying
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Media estimates range from the millions to the tens of millions, numbers which, if
accurate, would account for almost a third of Egypt’s population and make the June 2013
protests among the largest in history.
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power, or seceded from a nation-state. Of these cases, over a quarter were followed by
major episodes of political violence, and more than a third failed to transition to
democracy.2 Why is this the case? Why are successful nonviolent revolutions sometimes
followed by autocracy and violence?

This historical trend is made more puzzling because several studies have shown
that political transitions initiated by revolutions of nonviolent civil resistance tend to
result in greater peace and democracy over the long term than other kinds of transitions.
Theorists of civil resistance contend that the dynamics of nonviolent struggle inherently
incline societies towards democracy since they diffuse power throughout many different
societal actors (Sharp 1973). Transitions initiated by nonviolent campaigns are more
likely to be democratic and internally peaceful than transitions initiated by violent
campaigns (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011), more likely to be democratic than transitions
orchestrated by elites (Ackerman and Karatnycky 2005) and more likely than violent
campaigns to lead to democracy than a new autocracy (Rivero Celestina and Gleditsch
2013). If these studies are accurate, what explains the widespread occurrence of
exceptions to this trend?

In this thesis I argue that the answer to this puzzle lies in how the civil resistance
campaign achieves its goals. These mechanisms of success play a central role in shaping
the nature of the political transition process which follows them as the various strategic
actors in the transition process respond to the initial stimulus of the mechanism of success

2

See Chapter 3 for an explanation of the data informing these figures.
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in consistent, path-dependent fashion. Like a chess game between grandmasters in which
the opening sequence shapes the rest of the game so mechanisms of success inform and
confine the strategic decisions throughout the transition process. These decisions in turn
dramatically shape the likelihood that the transition will be characterized by violence and
what political system will be established at its conclusion.

The first step in my argument is an examination of the previous literature on civil
resistance. I find that while the civil resistance literature convincingly argues for the
positive effects of nonviolent action on society its underlying theory of power, informed
by the work of Gene Sharp, makes it ill-equipped to consider the future effects of
successful civil resistance campaigns. In addition the empirical work on civil resistance
has been primarily concerned with explaining civil resistance success and has not
disaggregated the set of successful campaigns in order to understand the variation which
is clearly observed in their outcomes. Thus I find the extant literature to be insufficient to
answer my question.

Having established the necessity for my project based on these gaps in the
literature I then explain the nature of the various mechanisms of success and lay out the
essential characteristics which separate them from one another. Informed by theories of
nonviolent action as well as scholarly accounts and primary sources I present a six-tiered
typology of mechanisms of success which captures all of the variation in the historical
cases. I argue that transitions which are characterized by three factors: campaign
initiative, broad political consensus, and pre-success political capacity-building are likely
4

to initiate transition processes which will not lead to violence and which will result in
more democratic future societies.

This argument is not intended to be a generalized theory of either democratization
or political violence, but rather is limited in scope to the particular conditions following
the success of a civil resistance campaign. I do not preclude the possibility that
mechanisms of success may play an important role in other types of transitions.3 Studying
their effects in these different environments would doubtless be a fruitful avenue of
research. However, following the insights of Johnstad (2010) and Ackerman and
Karatnycky (2005) I consider successful civil resistance campaigns to have a distinct
transitional path, with its own dynamics dissimilar from the larger set of regime
transitions. Hence, because of this uniqueness, I limit the scope of my argument to
transitions following successful civil resistance campaigns.

I test my theory using an original dataset of successful civil resistance campaigns,
their mechanisms of success and future levels of democracy and violence. I find that,
while the small size of the dataset makes statistical results somewhat unstable, the data is
strongly suggestive of my theory. Mechanisms of success which possess my three
essential factors, namely negotiations and electoral victories, are significantly associated
with higher levels of post-campaign democracy and lower levels of violence. These
results continue to hold when a series of control variables informed by the literature on
democratization and civil war are included to test for alternate explanations.

3

For example see Geddes, Wright and Frantz 2014.
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I bolster my statistical findings through an examination of two contemporary
cases: the Arab Spring revolutions in Egypt and Yemen. Traditional explanatory
variables for democracy and civil peace would suggest that the transition in Egypt would
be more peaceful and democratic, while Yemen would be likely to be characterized by
violence and a return to authoritarianism. In contrast, while both transitions are
preliminary at this point, the Yemeni transition has been much smoother and more
inclusive and the Egyptian transition has resulting in authoritarian retrenchment and
increasing political violence. This difference can be explained in large part by the
difference in the two cases’ mechanisms of success.

Finally, I conclude by re-stating my argument in light of my findings and laying
out areas of research which remain to be examined and other crucial questions which can
be fruitfully pursued in this important area of research.

6

Chapter One: Civil Resistance, Democracy, and Civil Peace
In this chapter I review the major literature on civil resistance and its effects. I
follow this general review with a more in-depth analysis of the theoretical work of Gene
Sharp (1973, 2004) which has informed much of the civil resistance literature,
emphasizing the four mechanisms of success which Sharp postulates based on his theory
of power. I critique Sharp’s exclusive focus on the ability of civil resistance to degrade
existing structures of power without taking into account the new power structures which
must replace those degraded, a bipolar focus on struggle between the nonviolent
campaign and the regime which does not take into account other actors’ agency, as well
as the lack of empirical parsimony in his discussion of mechanisms of success. I propose
instead a more empirically-grounded theory of success mechanisms which connects the
initial insights of Sharp’s theory to the historical record of successful civil resistance
campaigns.

Civil Resistance: From Pacifism to Pragmatism
Nonviolent resistance has been a facet of many political systems for much of
human history, even as early as ancient Rome (Sharp, 1973, 75-76). Civil resistance has
played an important role in several struggles of national liberation (Bartkowski, 2013),
including the American Revolution (Conser Jr., McCarthy, Toscano, & Sharp, 1986).
More recently, civil resistance campaigns were a major factor in the end of the
7

Communist regimes of Eastern Europe (Garton Ash, 1990), the spread of multi-party
democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa (Bratton & van de Walle, 1997), and the overthrow of
authoritarian leaders in the post-Communist “color revolutions” (Bunce & Wolchik,
2011). Thus, understanding the occurrence and success of civil resistance is of central
importance for political scientists. However, the clear theoretical articulation and careful
scientific study of civil resistance has lagged significantly behind its historical
importance.

Early literature on civil resistance came primarily from ideological pacifists.
Henry David Thoreau articulated a theory of civil disobedience as “gumming the wheels”
of an unjust system (Thoreau, 2004). Adin Ballou, a Unitarian minister and anti-slavery
activist, wrote extensively on the ethical duty of Christians to reject the use of violence
based on Jesus’ teaching in the Sermon on the Mount to “not resist one who is evil”
(Matthew 5:39 English Standard Version) and argued for the potential of achieving
political goals through nonviolent means (Ballou, 2003). Ballou’s works were an
inspiration to the Russian novelist Leo Tolstoy, who drew on them in his writings on
pacifism; most famously The Kingdom of God is Within You (Tolstoy, 1927).
Tolstoy’s works in turn served as a central inspiration in the intellectual
development of the 20th century’s greatest theorist and practitioner of nonviolent
resistance: Mohandas “Mahatma” Gandhi. Gandhi and Tolstoy corresponded extensively
early in the Indian independence leader’s life (Gandhi, 1983). This correspondence,
8

along with The Kingdom of God is Within You, formed much of the basis for Gandhi’s
development of the idea of satyagraha, or “soul force,” whereby a nonviolent contender
willing to take on suffering for the sake of a goal is able to both undermine and win over
his opponent. Gandhi wrote extensively on Satyagraha in the context of the Indian
struggle for independence (Gandhi, 1958), and his example spawned its own literature,
with many works both in India and internationally drawing upon his ideas and practices. 4
Other well-known practitioners of civil resistance such as Vaclav Havel (2009) and Aung
San Suu Kyi (1995) have also written influential works which combine both normative
and pragmatic arguments on the use of civil resistance as a tool to fight political
oppression. Yet while these pacifist and practitioner works provide inspiring narrative
and compelling normative arguments in large part they fail to approach civil resistance
from an objective or scientific viewpoint and are more interested in advocating for
nonviolence rather than understanding it.

Academic literature on civil resistance largely springs from the work of Gene
Sharp. Sharp marries Gandhi’s strategic insights with insights into the nature of political
power from thinkers such as Machiavelli and Etienne La Boetie. He argues that power is
not a constant quality which a leader possesses but one which requires constant
replenishment through the consent and cooperation of the governed. Nonviolent action
overcomes powerful leaders and achieves revolutionary change through organizing
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See, for example Bondurant 1958, Dalton 1993, Klitgaard 1971, Sharp 1960, Sharp
1979, and Shridharani 1939.
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collective dissent which dissolves the leader’s power (Sharp 1973). Sharp outlines 198
methods of protest, non-cooperation, and nonviolent intervention which can all be used to
achieve this collective dissent.

Sharp and later Helvey (2004) particularly emphasize the ability of nonviolent
action to undermine the power of regimes through co-opting their “pillars of support.”
These “pillars” are the social and political institutions through which a political regime
maintains its power and through whom consent and thus political authority are channeled.
Armed struggle pursues a strategy of either annihilating the opponent’s “pillars” in order
to coerce them to surrender (traditional warfare) or of eliminating the leadership of the
regime through violence and assuming control over the pillars which remain (guerilla
warfare). These destructive strategies are necessary because violent resistance is likely to
consolidate regime opposition through a “rally round the flag” effect since most members
of the “pillars” are physically threatened by the armed struggle. In contrast, nonviolent
resistance pursues a bottom-up strategy of weaning the support of the “pillars” away from
the regime, dissolving its power.
Sharp’s theoretical work is very strongly focused on individual agency. His basic
argument is that nonviolent action has the potential to both occur and successfully
achieve change no matter the circumstances. Thus Sharp discounts the kinds of
preconditions which have been typically used to explain the occurrence of nonviolent
political contention such as an “open” political opportunity structure (Eisinger, 1973) or
10

pre-existing organizational networks (McAdam, 1982). He also is less concerned with
the challenge of revolutionary dissent as a collective action “rebel’s dilemma” which
requires incentive-based strategies in order to succeed (Lichbach, 1995). From Sharp’s
perspective, the inherent fluidity of power means that nonviolent action is possible and
may even succeed under any circumstances, even when objective political opportunities
may not exist (Kurzman, 1996). Sharp’s key scope conditions for limiting the possibility
of nonviolent action thus rest almost entirely on the action’s possible participants. If they
are able to prevent fear and adequately strategize for success then they are likely to
devise methods for organizing dissent and achieving political goals.
Sharp’s work was not particularly influential upon its publication but has stood
the test of time as one of the clearest formulations of how nonviolent methods of struggle
are able to achieve change, and has inspired several works which draw upon his insights.
Boserup and Mack (1974) use Clausewitzian strategic analysis to argue for the possibility
of the use of nonviolent “weapons systems” in national defense. Ackerman and Kruegler
(1993) develop a 12-point agenda of strategic factors which they find crucial for success
in six case studies of nonviolent action. Schock (2005) connects Sharp’s insights on the
nature of power with theories on mobilization and social movements from sources such
as McAdam (1982), Tarrow (1998) and Tilly (1978). Mattaini builds on Sharp’s insights
using behavioral systems science (Mattaini, 2013). Sharp’s work has also been used as a
source to develop a practical toolkit for civil resistance by practitioners seeking to
achieve political change (Popovic, Djinovic, Miliojevic, Merriman, & Marovic, 2007).
11

Others have critiqued Sharp’s approach for failing to take into account the structural
causes of consent (Burrowes, 1996), being overly dismissive of the importance of
“principled” nonviolence (Weber, 2003) or reinforcing an agenda of global neoliberalism
(Chabot & Sharifi, 2013).

Sharp has also been used as a foundation in the empirical literature on civil
resistance, which most frequently seeks to explain the onset of and factors of success in
civil resistance campaigns. The authors in Zunes, Kurtz and Asher (1999) use a wide
variety of cases to point to the geographical dispersion and frequency of campaigns of
nonviolent action. The authors in Bartkowski (2013) examine the role of civil resistance
in various national liberation struggles. The authors in Roberts and Garton Ash (2009)
similarly present a wide variety of cases to show the various forms that civil resistance
has taken around the globe. And Shaykhutdinov (2010) uses quantitative analysis to
show the superior ability of nonviolent resistance to successfully achieve territorial
autonomy arrangements. An extensive literature has also developed around particular
prominent cases of civil resistance, often with a regional comparative analysis
component.5

The most central question examined in the literature has been the factors in or
corollaries of nonviolent action which lead to its success. The literature’s primary task

5

See, for example: Ahmed and Stephan 2010, Boudreau 2004, Fukuda 2000, Martin,
Varney and Vickers 2001, Modzelewski 1982, Parkman 1990, Pearlman 2011, Schock
1999, Stephan 2009, Zunes 1999.
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has often been portrayed as overcoming a bias towards violence common in the broader
literature on political struggle and arguing that nonviolent action may be effective,
perhaps even more effective than violent action (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011). Various
authors have pointed to security force defection and elite division (Nepstad, 2011),
resilience and tactical innovation (Schock, 2005), relationships of direct dependency
(Summy, 1994)and broad, diverse participation (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011) as critical
factors in explaining success.

Most works have relied on simple case narratives or comparative case studies. In
contrast, Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) use a comprehensive dataset of the global
population of nonviolent and violent campaigns from 1900-2006 to show that nonviolent
campaigns are not only frequently successful but are, in fact, more than twice as
successful on average as violent campaigns. Critical in explaining this success is the
nonviolent campaign’s ability to achieve broad participation. Following Sharp and
Helvey, Chenoweth and Stephan argue that as higher levels of participation increase the
likelihood of members of the campaign linking to the opponent regime’s “pillars of
support” and thus undermining the regime’s power.

After Civil Resistance: The Puzzle
The contributions of this burgeoning literature on promoting a better
understanding of civil resistance cannot be overstated. However, this focus on strategic
success as the key dependent variable means that most of the literature has either failed to
13

explain the future effects of successful civil resistance campaigns. Exceptions to this rule
are Sharp (1973), Ackerman and Karatnycky (2005), Chenoweth and Stephan (2011), and
Rivera Celestino and Gleditsch (2013). All four of these argue that not only does civil
resistance work but its effect over the long run is positive. Sharp (1973) argues that the
participation in a civil resistance campaign has a power-diffusing effect across society.
This effect means that people in a society which has experienced a successful civil
resistance campaign are unlikely to allow new autocracies to arise. Ackerman and
Karatnycky, using data from Freedom House, show that political transitions which follow
successful civil resistance campaigns are much more likely than elite-led transitions to
result in democracy. Chenoweth and Stephan show through their dataset that successful
nonviolent campaigns tend to lead to much higher levels of democracy and civil peace
than violent campaigns. And Rivera Celestino and Gleditsch similarly find that
successful civil resistance campaigns have a positive effect on future levels of
democracy.

These findings contrast with arguments on democratic transitions from the
seminal work of O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986). While not directly addressing the
violence-nonviolence paradigm, O’Donnell and Schmitter’s insight from various
transitions from authoritarianism to democracy is that a peaceful transition with a
democratic outcome is most likely to occur through a “pacted” transition process.
Through this “pact” regime moderates come to an agreement with opposition elites to
gradually liberalize the political system. In exchange, regime moderates restrain “hard14

liners” while opposition elites suppress the rise of civil society and non-institutionalized
dissent. Collective mass dissent of the type imagined by Sharp and described by
Chenoweth and Stephan is seen as a dangerous hindrance to a smooth democratic
transition rather than a positive driving force towards peace and democracy.
Support for O’Donnell and Schmitter’s skepticism towards mass action can be
found in the multiple cases of successful civil resistance campaigns which have resulted
in significant levels of violence and reverted to autocracy. While the most prominent
case is the 1979 revolution in Iran, others that could be pointed to include the nonviolent
uprising against President Jaafar Nimeiry of Sudan or the student uprising against
President Syngman Rhee of South Korea. These and many other cases of successful
campaigns of civil resistance failed to follow the general trend of successful civil
resistance leading to democracy and peace. This extreme variance calls for
disaggregation of the subset of successful civil resistance campaigns to explain it. What
caveats are necessary in the civil resistance literature to explain why nonviolent activists
sometimes “win well” and sometimes fail to do so?
One potential explanatory variable comes from Bunce and Wolchik’s (2011) work
on the various “color revolutions” in the post-Communist world. As part of their
examination of this set of cases Bunce and Wolchik seek to explain the variation in future
levels of democracy. Among other factors, they find that the mechanism of success used
to overthrow the authoritarian regime had strong effects on future levels of democracy.
15

Their cases followed two types of transition mechanisms. First, elections, in
which the opposition ousted the authoritarian leader through a free and fair presidential
election (often obtained and ensured through the use of protests and other forms of civil
resistance). Second, elite coups, which Bunce and Wolchik describe as “extra-legal
seizures of power that did not use democratic methods to achieve democratic outcomes”
(Bunce & Wolchik, 2011, 324) The first led to more democratic outcomes, Bunce and
Wolchik argue, because preparation for the election required civil society mobilization
and opposition capacity building which were later critical in maintaining a successful
democracy. In contrast, elite coups led to a transition characterized by a weak civil
society and fractured opposition which was unable to consolidate its initial democratic
breakthrough.

If mechanisms of success are important, and may provide insight into solving the
puzzle of why successful nonviolent revolutions are followed by civil war and
authoritarianism, how can the civil resistance literature use this insight to solve this
puzzle? What tools currently exist within the literature to tackle this approach?
Sharp’s Mechanisms and the Need for New Mechanisms of Success
In the literature on civil resistance the question of transition mechanisms has been
most comprehensively addressed in the work of Gene Sharp, mentioned above. Sharp
addresses the question of transition mechanisms with a four-fold typology of
“mechanisms of success” whereby nonviolent movements can achieve their goals. His
16

typology flows directly from his consent-based theory of power and is best understood in
terms of that theory.
Sharp’s first mechanism of success is “conversion” (Sharp 1973, 2005), and is a
close corollary to Gandhi’s idea of Satyagraha as a tool not just to overcome an opponent
but to reconcile with them. In “conversion” the example of the nonviolent campaign
converts the opponent to their point of view. The opponent thus willingly grants the
campaign’s demands. Conversion can be achieved through a simple process of rational
argument but is more typically associated with the practice of self-suffering. The
members of the nonviolent movement take suffering upon themselves to show their
opponents the violence inherent in the system they support. This causes the opponent to
see the injustice of the system and leads them to willingly accede to the movement’s
demands.
Sharp’s second mechanism is “accommodation.” While the opponent remains
“unconverted,” the actions of the nonviolent campaign change the power dynamics such
that the opponent agrees to grant the campaign’s essential demands rather than “risk a
more unsatisfactory result” (Sharp 1973). This may take place for a number of reasons.
Violent repression may be seen to be impractical or inappropriate, the opponent may wish
to minimize political or economic losses, or they may seek to control potential defection
or dissension within their own ranks.

17

The third and fourth mechanisms, “nonviolent coercion” and “disintegration” are
closely related, distinguished largely by degree. In both, the actions of the campaign
have so degraded the capacity of the opponent that they lack the essential capacity to
accept defeat. Rather, defeat occurs without their consent as their structures of power no
longer sustain them. The distinction between the two comes in the effects of the
nonviolent action on the opponent group’s cohesion. In nonviolent coercion change
occurs while keeping the opponent’s essential political structures intact. In
disintegration, the opponent “simply falls apart.” Political structures have been so
fragmented and dismantled through the withdrawal of cooperation that they simply cease
to exist.
Sharp’s typology is helpful in understanding the various ways in which
nonviolent action may lead to political change. However, his typology has several
prominent shortcomings which limit its utility in using mechanisms of success as an
explanatory variable.

First, since Sharp is primarily concerned with explaining the potential effects of
nonviolent action rather than mechanisms of regime change, his model lacks
operationalizability. In the “people power” revolution of 1986, for example, which
mechanism of success led to the ouster of the dictator Ferdinand Marcos? The
unwillingness of soldiers to shoot at unarmed protesters may be seen as “conversion.”
Coup leaders’ negotiations with presidential candidate Corazon Aquino might be seen as
18

“accommodation.” As Marcos’ forces rapidly began ceasing to obey orders, his regime
doubtless seemed to be undergoing “nonviolent coercion” or “disintegration.” Simply
establishing which mechanisms took place would be a doubtful empirical challenge.
Making a further argument as to which mechanism was the critical causal factor in
achieving success would be an even greater challenge, perhaps impossible.
Second, Sharp’s mechanisms assume a binary perspective on how political
change occurs. In all four mechanisms the essential question is the power relationship
between the civil resistance campaign and its opponent.6 This binary perspective provides
helpful theoretical parsimony. However, as a way of understanding mechanisms of
success so as to empirically test their effects it is so divorced from reality that it fails to
be useful. In every political struggle multiple actors pursue their interests, engage in
strategic interaction, and seek to capture political power and authority. Even simple
theoretical models such as in Tilly (1978) incorporate the interactions of governments,
other members of the polity, challengers, and international actors. A comprehensive
view of mechanisms of success must go beyond the binary campaign-opponent
perspective.

Finally, Sharp is focused solely on the power-negative effects of nonviolent
action. He makes a detailed argument as to how civil resistance can degrade existing
power structures but has little to say on how new power structures fill the void left by that

6

Typically the government, though Sharp does not explicitly state this.
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degradation. As with his theory’s campaign-opponent dichotomy this emphasis on
degradation may be justified for the sake of theoretical parsimony. Sharp is not
attempting to empirically describe reality but rather to build a clear theoretical model of
the political power of nonviolent action. The theory is useful insomuch as it is used for
that purpose. But to understand mechanisms of success and apply them empirically to
understand future outcomes Sharp’s theoretical contribution is insufficient.

In order to use mechanisms of success to examine the puzzle of violence and
authoritarianism after civil resistance a new toolkit is necessary. While Sharp’s
theoretical contribution can still be fruitfully applied to understanding situational
dynamics, full-fledged political transitions require a typology of transition which is
empirically grounded, takes into account the possibility of significant action by third
parties, and shows not just how a mechanism degrades the power of the existing regime
but also sets in place new political structures. While other works, such as Bunce and
Wolchik (2011) mentioned above, have made strides at creating such a typology, no
comprehensive categorization which can apply to the global population of successful
civil resistance campaigns currently exists. In the following chapter I will lay out my
new typology of transition mechanisms and show how to apply them in answering this
thesis’s empirical puzzle.

20

Chapter Two: Mechanisms of Success
In this chapter I outline my typology for categorizing civil resistance mechanisms
of success as well as my argument for why particular mechanisms can be expected to
lead to varying outcomes related to democracy and civil peace. This typology is the
result of a careful study of the population of successful maximalist civil resistance
campaigns in the 20th and early 21st centuries, and captures all of the variation observed
in these campaigns’ mechanisms of success.

I divide mechanisms of success into six ideal types which and point out three
critical features of the various mechanisms: degree of consensus-building, campaign
initiative, and political capacity-building. I then lay out an argument informed by the
democratization and civil war literatures as to why the essential characteristics of these
different mechanisms of success would be expected to precipitate different outcomes.

Defining Terms
I will first briefly offer my working definitions of several central concepts. First,
I define “civil resistance” most broadly as the use of nonviolent and yet transgressive
methods of political struggle to achieve a political goal. This definition draws upon
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several definitions offered in the literature,7 as well as closely aligning with definitions of
“revolutionary protest” from sources such as Kim (1996) and Tilly (1978), and
parsimoniously captures civil resistance in its most essential aspect: its place in the
political space not accounted for either by traditional politics or by violent political
contention. It also helpfully serves to illustrate several things which civil resistance is
not, such as personal feelings or beliefs about nonviolence, “weapons of the weak,” or
passive acquiescence to political injustices. It is fundamentally a method of political
struggle.8

In this formulation civil resistance may be broadly used by any number of
different political actors for any number of political ends. Thus for the purposes of this
study I narrow the broad range of possible manifestations of civil resistance in two major
areas. First, since I am concerned with civil resistance campaigns which initiate a
political transition, following the lead of Chenoweth and Stephan (2011), I examine only
civil resistance campaigns with “maximalist” goals of regime change, expulsion of a

7

See for instance: Chenoweth and Stephan 2011, 12, Roberts 2009, 2, Schock 2005, xvi,
Sharp 1973, 64-66.
8

I also use the term “civil resistance” rather than “nonviolence” or “nonviolent action” to
express an instrumental, political frame of reference rather than a normative frame of
reference. As Bond (1988) points out, even the ostensibly solely descriptive use of the
word “nonviolence” can imply a certain moral prescriptiveness, with the “nonviolent”
being judged “good” and “violent” judged “bad.” I explicitly avoid this normative
discussion because it obscures the political focus of my research. Thus for the purposes
of this study I use the term “civil resistance” and attempt to maintain a strictly empirical
definition. Normative questions are certainly relevant to the study of violence and
nonviolence but are not the focus of my thesis.
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foreign occupation, or secession. Second, I limit my study to campaigns, where
individual acts of civil resistance are coordinated and sequenced in a purposive manner to
achieve the stated goal.

The second major concept to define is success. Following Nepstad (2011) I
define success as the negative removal or defeat of the opponent through the civil
resistance campaign’s actions. It is the moment when the dictator steps down, the
occupier leaves, or the state gives up its right to the secessionist territory.9 Observers
may point out that in many senses this moment of “success” is only the beginning of a
possibly much longer process of political struggle. Thus using the term success is
misleading. This insight, that the moment of victory over the original opponent is not the
end of a political struggle, is in fact one of the central inspirations for this work. Yet I
maintain that defining success in this way is analytically useful. It captures the
perspective of the campaigns themselves, whose goals and identities are typically defined
around this concept of success,10 and it allows us to clearly delineate between distinct

9

Another close corollary of this concept is “autocratic breakdown” in Geddes, Wright
and Frantz (2014).
10

Note, for instance, that the iconic motto of the Arab Spring was: “ash-sha’ab yirid isqat
an-nizam” – “the people want the downfall of the regime.”
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phases of political activity: the initial political struggle and the political transition. 11
Campaign success is the moment dividing these two phases.

The language of mechanisms of success or mechanisms of change originates with
Gene Sharp (1973, 2004). He uses this language to describe the four theoretical ways in
which nonviolent action can alter power dynamics and achieve victory. However, as laid
out in the previous chapter Sharp’s typology, while analytically helpful, becomes deeply
problematic when applied to real empirical cases. Thus, while I find the language helpful
I shift the definition to make it more applicable to my question. I define a mechanism of
success as the immediate causal antecedent of success.12 It is the final strategic action, by
the campaign or another strategic actor, which precedes success – the last strategic action
in the initial political struggle and the first in the period of transition. The mechanism of
success thus occupies a bridging position between the two phases.

Having defined civil resistance, success, and mechanisms of success, I now move
on to the six mechanisms of success observed in successful civil resistance campaigns.

The Six Mechanisms
The first mechanism of success is the coup d’état. I define a coup d’état as an
independent seizure of power by a group of regime elites, military or civilian. While

11

Similar to Rustow’s (1970) “preparatory phase” and “decision phase.”

12

As defined in the preceding paragraph.
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coups may be precipitated by certain indicators they are fundamentally unexpected events
from the side of the regime and often from the side of the civil resistance campaign as
well. A coup may follow the classic form of a military coup, with soldiers in the streets
assuming control over key government assets, or may take place in the corridors of
power, with coup leaders orchestrating the ouster behind closed doors. While coups are
typically initiated without the knowledge of the civil resistance campaign they act as a
mechanism of success by bringing about the self-defined goal of the campaign. The
regime which the campaign opposed is ousted and new leadership is brought to the fore.

Coups may engage with the civil resistance campaign in a number of ways. Coup
leaders may proclaim their action to be in solidarity with the civil resistance campaign, as
in Egypt in 2011. Coups may even be initiated after the campaign explicitly encourages
regime figures to seize control of the state, as in Guatemala in 1944. But their unifying
characteristics are an independent, unexpected seizure of power by regime elites.

The second mechanism is negotiations. In negotiated transitions the civil
resistance campaign engages in a bargaining process with the regime (often mediated by
domestic or international third parties) to establish the terms of the regime’s departure.
Negotiations may take place in pre-arranged institutional settings such as the roundtable
discussions between Solidarity and the Communist Party in 1989 or they may be more
informal yet nonetheless authoritative discussions between the regime and the campaign
leadership.
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I only consider negotiations to be a mechanism of success if the negotiation
results in the achievement of the campaign’s central goal. Negotiations may happen
often throughout the course of a civil resistance campaign, both before and after success,
and may be either a source of strategic progress or reversal. Negotiations may be a
stalling tactic used by the regime to blunt the campaign’s momentum or to satisfy critical
international observers. They may also be used by the campaign to meet intermediate
strategic goals or gain concessions. None of these negotiations are true mechanisms of
success since they do not directly lead to the achievement of the campaign’s goals. For
negotiations to be considered a mechanism of success they must result in the ouster of the
regime, the withdrawal of the occupier, or successful secession.

The third mechanism is elections and referenda. In this mechanism the campaign
achieves its goal through an institutionalized electoral process. In the case of regime
change this typically occurs through an election in which the incumbent regime is
defeated. This victory is often ensured through the threat, or sometimes actual use, of
civil disobedience if the regime fails to honor the terms of the election. Some of the best
examples of this transition mechanism are the various “color revolutions” of the early
2000s, though the defeat of Indira Gandhi by the Janata party in the 1977 election in
India is an early example which has been understudied.

As with negotiations, it is critical to distinguish elections which function as
mechanisms of success from elections which occur in the course of the civil resistance
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campaign or simply occur with relative regularity and predetermined results in “electoral
authoritarian” regimes around the world. An election or referendum only functions as a
mechanism of success if it is the direct cause of the achievement of the campaign’s goal.

The fourth mechanism is international interventions. Interventions may be
diplomatic (as in the Ruhrkampf in 1923) or military (as in East Timor in 1999). The key
distinguishing factor of an intervention as a mechanism of success is that the intervention
precipitates the achievement of the campaign’s goal and is a necessary component of the
success. Thus some international involvement may be involved in other campaign
situations as part of a negotiated transition process or international observers may enforce
the terms of a negotiated transition but are not decisive in the success of the process
itself.

While these definitional criteria contain some level of subjectivity, I maintain that
they are the most clear and parsimonious reasonably possible. International action either
by states or non-state transnational actors often plays a role in civil resistance
movements, but this role is rarely decisive in success (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011).
Thus I maintain an extremely conservative position in defining an international
intervention as a mechanism of success.13

13

Summaries of all my coding decisions which show this conservative process in practice
are included in the attached codebook (Appendix A).
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The fifth mechanism is resignations. In a resignation the regime relinquishes
power independent of an election, negotiation, or other previously institutionalized or
negotiated process. The leaders of the regime, perhaps fearing the consequences of
remaining in power, simply choose to leave. For example, this was the mechanism of
success in the East German revolution, as a string of resignations by members of the
socialist party led to the overthrow of the regime (Nepstad 2011).
Resignations are closest theoretically to “elite coups,” in which the civilian elites
in the regime force the top leadership out in an independent attempt to seize power. The
distinction between the two is in the mechanism’s initiative. Coups involve a
fundamental break in the upper echelons of the regime followed by a decisive seizure of
power by a particular regime faction. Resignations, though they may be preceded by a
certain degree of pressure from other members of the regime, are undertaken through the
initiative of the regime leadership.

Finally, the most dramatic transition mechanism is overwhelming. An
overwhelming represents the closest empirical approximation to what Gene Sharp
described as “disintegration” (Sharp 2005). Participation in the campaign reaches such a
high level and defection from the regime becomes so widespread that the organs of
government simply cease to function and the regime collapses. For instance in the 2005
Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan police ceased repressing the increasingly massive
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protests, protesters occupied the major government buildings in Bishkek, and
authoritarian president Askar Akaev simply fled the country.

Mechanism of Success Characteristics
The genesis of my transition mechanism typology is empirical, the result of a
study of the population of successful civil resistance campaigns since 1900. Having
confronted the problems of looking at mechanisms of success through the theoretical lens
offered by Sharp, I sought to strongly foundationalize my theory in the actual empirical
record, creating intuitively discrete categories. However, through this examination I have
generated a rudimentary theory of nonviolent transitions rooted in Gene Sharp, Robert
Helvey, Peter Ackerman, and others. These theoretical distinctions are rough, but do
provide essential guiding points for understanding the effects of the different mechanisms
on future outcomes.

As mentioned in the introduction, this theory of mechanisms of success is not
intended to be a comprehensive theory explaining democratization or the onset of
political violence. These larger questions are intimately related to my question and I
have sought to inform my theory with insights from these broader literatures. Yet at this
stage I intentionally limit the scope of my explanations to transitions following successful
civil resistance campaigns. Mechanisms of success may or may not be useful as an
explanatory variable in other cases of regime transition, and future expansions of this
work might fruitfully examine their effects in these other cases. However, I maintain that
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limiting the scope of the current study to transitions following successful civil resistance
campaigns is justified by the unique effects of civil resistance on regime transitions, as
shown in the studies described in the previous chapter.

The six mechanisms described above vary along three key metrics. First, they
vary in regards to initiative. The mechanism of success as a strategic action may be
initiated by any of several different potential actors. In overwhelmings, for instance, the
initiator is the civil resistance campaign. In resignations, the initiator is the leadership of
the regime. And in coups and international interventions the initiator is a third party,
domestic or international. Because mechanisms of success are at such a critical strategic
juncture this question of initiative may be crucial for determining the characteristics of
the transition process which follows them.
Second, the mechanisms vary in regards to consensus.14 The transition
mechanism may be a strategic action undertaken with mutual consensus by the various
strategic actors, as in a negotiation or an election,15 or may be independently imposed
(violently or nonviolently), as in coups or overwhelmings. This distinction is crucial in
understanding the framing narratives and political incentives which confront the various
strategic actors during the transition. A mechanism of success involving broad consensus

14

15

Thanks to Nils Petter Gleditsch for pointing this distinction out.

For elections, the “consensus” is centered on the mechanism itself, rather than the
outcome.
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from the major strategic actors is likely to facilitate framing narratives for all the actors
involved which legitimize the later transition process and discourage the use of political
violence.

Third, the mechanisms vary in the degree to which they require political capacitybuilding by the civil resistance campaign prior to the moment of success. As Bunce and
Wolchik (2011) focus on in their cases, certain mechanisms of success by definition
require a degree of political institutionalization and capacity-building in order to succeed,
while others, primarily through a reliance on outside actors, do not require the same
degree of capacity-building prior to success.

The six mechanisms may be categorized along these three lines as shown in Table
2.1.

Table 2.1 Transition Mechanism Characteristics
Mechanism
Consensus Capacity Initiative
Coups
No
No
Regime Insiders
Elections
Yes
Yes
Campaign/Regime
Negotiations
Yes
Yes
Campaign/Regime
International
No
No
International Actors
Resignations
No
No
Regime Leadership
Overwhelmings No
No
Campaign

This categorization represents ideal types. Mechanisms of success may be
characterized by lesser or greater degrees of these three characteristics. For example,
negotiated transitions may enjoy the participation of all or nearly all segments of the civil
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resistance campaign, as in the round table negotiations in Poland, or may be led by only
certain factions of the campaign, as in the GCC-led negotiation process in Yemen. I thus
expect the following arguments on the mechanisms’ effects on democracy and civil peace
to hold most closely when the mechanism most closely follows the ideal types on
consensus, capacity, and initiative shown above. I now consider how these essential
characteristics lead to the mechanisms’ varying effects on democracy and civil peace.

Democracy
As mentioned in the previous chapter, many studies on civil resistance have
focused on its advantages in promoting democracy. The association between the two has
been powerfully reinforced by major waves of successful civil resistance movements
such as the 1989 revolutions in Eastern Europe, the “Color Revolutions” of the early
2000s, and the “Arab Spring” of 2011, all of which were characterized by millions calling
for democratic rights. Yet as the literature on democratization shows,16 the process of
actual democratization is typically far less inspiring, much more complex, and often
deeply problematic. As Carothers (2002) points out, “transitions to democracy” are often
complete misnomers as countries rarely go on straight tracks from authoritarianism to
full-fledged democracy and instead often end up in “feckless pluralism” or “dominantparty democracy.”

16

See, for example: Geddes 1999, Geddes 2009, Linz and Stepan 1996, Whitehead 2002.
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In considering civil resistance campaigns, part of the problem is that campaigns
often articulate broad goals of “freedom” or “democracy” with little substantive
ideational content. Democracy may be the slogan presented for the media, but the
democratic master narrative presented by elites may have little connection to the actual
political attitudes of campaign participants (Beissinger, 2013). In other cases the
overthrow of the regime, even through civil resistance, may be pursued by actors
attempting to replace prior clientelist networks with their own (Bratton & van de Walle,
1997).Thus explaining democratization simply through the overthrow of an autocrat by
ostensibly “democratic” forces is insufficient.

Structural factors such as development, levels of education, and proportion of
democratic neighbors have all been pointed to as explanatory variables to account for
successful democratization. Yet despite the vast size of the literature, the effect of these
claims is disputed and uncertain (Geddes 2009). And the existence of numerous
exceptions to these general indicators suggests that the impact of any one of them, while
substantial, is neither necessary nor sufficient for explaining a democratic outcome.

In contrast, I explain democratization following successful civil resistance
through a dynamic model of strategic interaction between various players initiated by the
success of the campaign. This approach is similar to several seminal works on
democratization (Rustow, 1970; O'Donnell & Schmitter, 1986; Linz & Stepan, 1996).
Where I depart from these works is in my emphasis on the central role of bottom-up civil
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resistance movements as a key actor which engages in strategic interaction with the
government, other members of the polity, and extra-polity challengers (Tilly, 1978). The
mechanism of success informs how this strategic interaction takes place and thus
critically shapes the outcome. This influence is not deterministic, nor does it always
trump the general impact of the broader structural factors mentioned above. However, in
the majority of cases the mechanism of success will be a critical factor in leading to a
democratic outcome.

First, the aspect of consensus raised above is likely to be critical. A mechanism
of success such as negotiations and elections, which involve a degree of consensus and
shared understanding between the various actors: regime, campaign, and domestic third
parties, is more likely to initiate a democratic transition because it incentivizes actors to
work together and thus broadens the “winning coalition” which governs (Bueno de
Mesquita et al., 2003). With more power players involved before the transition begins it
is likely to be more difficult to exclude them once the transition is underway. While this
may not lead to a perfect democracy, at the very least it may lead to “consociational”
arrangements which move the country further along the democratic continuum.

Mechanisms of success which lack broad consensus, such as coups and
occupations, are likely to tilt the transition towards non-democratic outcomes. For the
coup, this inclination is more obvious. Coup leaders typically assume power not to
simply abandon it but to gain personal, political, or economic goals. Thus the coup
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leaders are more likely to attempt to maintain or even consolidate authoritarianism rather
than democratize. Even in coups which at least appear to be genuinely motivated by
concern and support for the civil resistance campaign such as the “October
Revolutionaries” in El Salvador the action of the coup itself has the effect of centralizing
power, at least temporarily, in the hands of a small cadre of plotters. This makes the
transition process vulnerable to capture by potential autocrats within the coup group.

Successful coups also inform the strategic calculations of other actors.
Participants in the civil resistance campaign may take the lesson that, while nonviolent
tactics may be useful in applying pressure for political action, the actions of a small group
of armed actors are really the only way to achieve power. Thus strategies for setting the
rules of the game during the transition period may involve centralization of power in an
armed wing which attempts to seize power through future coups and counter-coups.
Overwhelmings may appear to incline more towards democracy. Indeed, Sharp’s
theory would lead us to expect them to. One cornerstone of Sharp’s theory of civil
resistance is that successful civil resistance diffuses power throughout a society (Sharp
1973). Individuals, newly awakened to their capacity to overthrow existing power
structures, no longer fear new would-be autocrats and instead, aware of their new power,
continue to use tactics of civil resistance to achieve more open and democratic political
institutions. An overwhelming represents the purest form of this power diffusion since
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the transition is not mediated by a third party or campaign elite but comes directly from
the people.

While I do not deny the potential for a power-diffusion effect following a
successful civil resistance campaign this effect is insufficient to lead to democratization.
Stable democracy requires more than simply an awareness of power, it requires the
implementation of rules of the political game which check various actors against one
another and protect citizens from abuse by the state. The diffusion of power in an
overwhelming, rather than informing the transition process with a strong aspect of
“protected consultation” (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001), instead informs social actors
that victory is best achieved through a maximization of efforts and ratcheting up of tactics
to the extreme.

Because an overwhelming does not empower or even strictly require an
organizational leadership it is also likely to not develop leadership structures which
remain in place after the transition occurs. Thus it fails to promote the political capacitybuilding by the civil resistance campaign which can then maintain a pro-democratic
opposition after success occurs. With no “civil” leadership structure, or at least structures
which are weak, ethnic, religious, and other narrower entrepreneurs may more easily rise
to power.

The lack of consensus in the overwhelming also signals elite actors, both in the
regime and outside of it, that civil resistance is a dangerous tool that will not operate
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according to the rules of the political game. It thus may have the effect of creating an
authoritarian consensus among actors who otherwise might be inclined to democratize.
Thus, the overwhelming is likely to initiate a transition process characterized by former
regime elites struggling to maintain power by any means necessary, possibly supported at
least tacitly by more moderate extra-regime elites who fear the social consequences of a
resurgence of popular discontent.

Initiative is also likely to be critical in determining the direction of the democratic
transition process. In political transitions, the player who plays first is likely to have an
outsized impact on the transition process. This is the case because of the fundamental
uncertainties involved in political transitions. As O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) point
out, in transition processes structural factors fade into the background. The rules of
political life are up for grabs and intelligent strategic thinking and personal virtu is likely
to play a much more critical role.

Decisions prior to the transition moment are also likely to play an important part
in shaping the transition. From the point of view of Sharp’s work on civil resistance
every gain for the campaign represents degradation in the existing power structure and
thus an increased opening of the political space. Nonviolent resistance and the
withdrawal of consent involved in it thus slowly changes the political rules such that preexisting norms and institutions become less important and strategic decisions come to the
fore. However, the moment of transition still represents a critical jumping off point
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where the power position fundamentally shifts. The pre-existing power structure is no
longer simply degraded, but turned on its head. Thus the initiator of this particular
decision, this particular move, has special power.

The importance of initiative may be helpfully illustrated by examining coups. A
successful coup, such as the 2011 coup in Egypt (to which I will return in much more
detail in the case studies), places rule-making authority in the hands of a new actor: the
coup leaders. Coup leaders typical first action is to lay out their vision of the new rules
of the political game: what kind of political dissent will be allowed, what will be done
with the top leadership of the ancien regime, what place there will be for the leaders of
the civil resistance campaign, etc… This agenda represents the first frame of the political
transition, the point from which other actors must frame their own political agendas and
in the context of which other actors will have to formulate new political rules.

Resignations also provide a powerful illustration of the importance of initiative.
Resignations typically occur in large part through Sharp’s mechanism of
“accommodation” (Sharp, 1973). The leadership of the regime: the military junta, the
party politburo, or the tinpot autocrat, “sees the writing on the wall.” Perhaps there have
been rumblings about defection from the military or security services. Perhaps cabinet
ministers are resigning en masse and throwing their support behind the opposition.
Perhaps, as with Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines, their superpower patron will no
longer return their calls except with advice to “cut and cut cleanly.” For whatever reason,
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the regime’s top leadership no longer believes it has the capability to maintain power and
thus decides to try to shape the future political order as best as possible through
resignation. As with the coup, the resignation is often accompanied by an agenda of how
the following transition will take place: who will assume interim power, how future
leaders will be chosen (the terms and timing of a new election), which frames the
transition period.

The two examples above illustrate negatively what I believe to be the transition
mechanism characteristic for promoting democracy: initiative, at least in part, by the civil
resistance campaign. To achieve success a civil resistance campaign is likely to have a
wide, diverse base of support. Thus in order to satisfy the campaign participants who
have been integral in the campaign’s success the campaign is more likely to incorporate
the more open, democratic power structures.

Finally, as mentioned above, the degree to which the mechanism of success
involves building the civil resistance campaign’s capacity prior to the breakthrough is
critical. This is partially the case because, as Beissinger (2013) shows, civil resistance
campaigns are often based upon a “negative coalition” which is only able to overcome
collective action problems through its shared opposition to a particularly hated regime
institution or figure. If the campaign has not been able to build political capacity and put
in place organizational mechanisms for continuing to coordinate pro-democracy actions
prior to the ouster of the target of its “negative coalition” then it may fall apart once
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success occurs. In contrast, if the transition mechanism itself, such as an election or
negotiation, requires some degree of institutionalization, coordination, and campaign
capacity-building then the civil resistance campaign will be well-placed to continue to
coordinate politically-effective collective action for pro-democracy goals in the
transitional period.

Transitional Violence
Political violence is likely to occur during transition periods for two basic reasons:
either the main actors struggling to shape the new political regime use violence to achieve
political goals or other social or political actors use the state’s weakened monopoly on the
use of force to violently pursue their own agendas. These two challenges may be referred
to in short-hand as “politics by other means” and “opportunistic violence.” Both are
likely to be correlated with transitions following civil resistance campaign success. Thus
solutions to the problem of transitional violence must meet these two distinctive
challenges.
The challenge of “politics by other means” is essentially the problem of
reconciling disparate goals through nonviolent avenues. The downfall of a regime
through civil resistance creates a unique set of winners and losers who are likely to enter
the transition with widely varying objectives. The winners, i.e. the members of the civil
resistance campaign, typically desire radical changes in the fundamental political
structures of the state which will empower new groups. Furthermore, campaigns
40

typically desire that members of the old regime, in particular those involved in repressing
the campaign’s earlier contention, be punished. There are calls for corruption
investigations, purging of the ranks of the bureaucracy, and sometimes peremptory trials
and executions. The losers, such as members of the former regime, traditional elites, or
businessmen with connections to the state, desire the exact opposite. The ouster of the
upper echelons of the regime may have left many of their positions intact, but often with
reduced access to upper authority structures. And erstwhile regime supporters fear the
prospect of a setting straight of the wrongs of the former regime.

The influence of civil resistance on the initiation of this conflictual dynamic may
be significant; particularly if principled nonviolence has been a characteristic of the
campaign. The influence of figures such as Nelson Mandela and Desmond Tutu in South
Africa comes to mind. But more often than not either this ethic is absent or insufficient
to prevent the onset of violence.

This dilemma may be simply stated as follows: the winners must be incentivized
against using the fruits of their victory (power) to transgress against the defeated
opponent and the losers must be incentivized against violently counterattacking.17 The
two are, of course, related. A violation by one side is likely to trigger a response by the
opponent, with the potential for violence to continue until a new political regime arises
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Thanks to Oliver Kaplan for suggesting this particular formulation.
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which can ensure political order. However, if no initial action is taken the two sides may
very well hold back the dogs of war until a stable political order is established.

The importance of initial actions in sparking violence brings us back to the factor
of initiative. As with democratization, I argue that campaign initiative in the transition
mechanism, rather than initiative by the regime or a third party, is likely to reduce
incidences of politics by other means. This is the case because the campaign, by
definition, is an unarmed actor which does not use violence to achieve its ends. If the
transition mechanism follows campaign initiative it will thus begin the transition with a
nonviolent step, a step which may be iteratively followed to create a nonviolent transition
process.

In contrast, if an actor who relies on the use of violent force initiates the transition
process, violence or the threat of violence will be present in the transitional period from
the beginning. Other actors will thus be incentivized to respond with their own violence,
creating an escalation cycle.

Consensus in the transition mechanism is also likely to decrease the incidence of
“politics by other means.” If all or most of the major parties in the political system, from
the regime to the campaign, have been involved in the mechanism of success, or are
invested in the institutional framework which underlies it (as in elections) then it is likely
that they will perceive their interests as best pursued through the transition framework,
rather than through violence. Since the major strategic players already have experience
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that consensual regime change can occur, an appeal to consensus-building, nonviolent
methods of contention is more likely to be the first avenue pursued during the transition
process.

In contrast, non-consensual transition mechanisms are likely to be perceived as
illegitimate by the political actors not party to their shaping. While it is certainly possible
that groups who perceive the transition as illegitimate will attempt to shape the political
order through nonviolent methods, they may lack the popular support to make nonviolent
action effective (particularly if they come from groups privileged in the ancien regime)
and thus turn to violent contention as a preferable option.

The strategic lesson taught by a non-consensual transition mechanism is that one
can achieve maximalist political goals without taking into account the preferences of all
the major political actors. This counters the logic of civil resistance, which focuses on
achieving goals through broad, diverse participation, and instead inclines the political
conversation towards violent methods of political struggle, which do not require broad
participation but instead a small, highly-invested minority.
While addressing the possibility of “politics by other means” is central to solving
the problem of post-campaign violence, many incidences of violence which follow
successful civil resistance campaigns do not fall into this category. Instead, they can be
described as “opportunistic violence.”

After the downfall of a regime, the expulsion of

an occupation, or the successful secession of a particular region it may be difficult for the
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state to perform its function as the holder of a monopoly on the use of force. A lack of
state capacity – real or perceived – may create opportunities for various groups to pursue
social or political agendas through the use of violence.

The literature on failed or fragile states cites numerous examples of how this
general dynamic may come into play.18 Ethnic or religious entrepreneurs may use the
weakness of the state to assert demands for greater autonomy, settle ethnic scores, or
even attempt to capture the state in order to pursue their own narrow agenda. In a sudden
breakdown of state authority ethnic groups may also find themselves in a “security
dilemma” which leads to conflict (Posen, 1993), or rebel or criminal groups may seek to
take advantage of lootable natural resources. Breakdown in state coercive power may
also give space for insurgents or transnational terrorist groups. Preventing opportunistic
violence thus requires both the maintenance of at least some degree of state capacity and
also the incorporation of the general demands of aggrieved groups into the political
transition process so that these groups are not incentivized to use violence.
The “consensus” transition mechanisms of negotiations and elections are likely to
lead to the lowest incidences of opportunistic violence. This is first because by their
nature consensus mechanisms involve a degree of maintenance of state capacity. In both
cases the ancien regime participates in the transition as a strategic actor whose
fundamental structures have not been completely eliminated by the actions of the civil
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See for example: Fearon and Laitin 2004, Rotberg 2004, Krasner 2004.
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resistance campaign. Even if security force defections during the civil resistance
campaign have in fact degraded the ability of the state to respond to armed challenges
there is at least likely to be a perception, since the state continues to operate as a party in
the mechanism of success, that some degree of political continuity can be expected. Thus
the perceived opportunities for violence are lower. Consensus-based transition
mechanisms may also initiate systems of political practice which incorporate previouslyexcluded actors, significantly reducing the incentives for political violence.
Maximalist civil resistance campaigns over the 20th and early 21st century have
succeeded through the use of six empirically discrete mechanisms of success: coups,
negotiations, elections, international interventions, resignations, and overwhelmings. Out
of these six, two mechanisms – elections and negotiations – are characterized by broad
political consensus, campaign initiative, and pre-success political capacity-building.
These three characteristics make these two mechanisms of success much more likely to
lead to democratization and not be followed by political violence. Having laid out my
basic theoretical argument, I now turn to the quantitative testing of my hypotheses.
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Chapter Three: Testing the Effects of Transition Mechanisms
My research on the effects of mechanisms of success followed a two-stage
process, both quantitative and qualitative; in order to both establish the general
correlative trends associated with mechanisms of success and also to process-trace the
causal dynamics behind this correlation. The latter step, two comparative case studies,
will be addressed in the following chapter. In this chapter I explain my broader research
into the global population of successful civil resistance campaigns and present the results
of my quantitative analysis of that population.

Methodology
The first step in my research was a brief examination of each case of successful
maximalist civil resistance since the beginning of the 20th century. My set of civil
resistance campaigns was drawn primarily from the NAVCO 1.1 dataset created by Erica
Chenoweth (2011), 19 which contains consensus data on violent and nonviolent
campaigns from 1900-2006 including campaign duration, participation, and outcome.20

19

Campaigns are a series of sequenced tactics, distinguishing them from random riots or
isolated events. In order to be included in the dataset, campaigns had to have at least
1,000 members, maximalist goals (regime change, secession, or anti-occupation), and
persist for at least a week (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011).
20

Chenoweth codes campaigns as either “success,” “limited success,” or “failure.”
Campaigns are coded as successful if the campaign achieved its stated goals within a year
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This dataset was compiled using several comprehensive bibliographies of nonviolent
action as well as extensive consultation with leading experts. I augmented this list with
additional cases from later iterations of the NAVCO dataset (Chenoweth & Lewis,
2013),21 cases from the ongoing Major Episodes of Contention data project,22 and
additional cases from my own independent research. Aggregating these sources led to a
final dataset of 83 campaigns from 1900-2006.23
For each of these 83 cases I independently researched the cases’ mechanisms of
success. I relied primarily on scholarly accounts and narrative data found in sources such

of its year of peak activity. Campaigns are coded as “limited success” if they failed to
achieve their stated goals but were able to achieve significant concessions from an
opponent. For example, a secessionist campaign that fails to achieve full independence
but is able to gain significant levels of political autonomy. Campaigns are coded as
failures if they fail to achieve their stated objectives or achieve any significant
concessions.
21

This data is available for download at www.navcodata.com.

22

This project is ongoing and the data has not been publicly released as of the time of
writing. See
http://www.du.edu/korbel/sie/research/chenow_mec_major_episodes_contention.html for
more information.
23

Several additional cases, including the 2011 “Arab Spring,” have taken place since
2006 but were not included because of data limitations and the desire to measure
outcomes at least five years after the end of the campaign.
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as the Global Nonviolent Action Database (Swarthmore College, 2014), with occasional
augmentation from primary sources such as historical newspapers when necessary.24

I used the information gathered from this research to generate values for a
nominal variable describing the mechanisms of success based on the six-tiered typology
outlined in the previous chapter. These categories satisfactorily covered all 83 campaigns
in the study with conceptual precision and empirical discretion. In most cases the coding
was relatively straightforward, as the various sources consulted were in agreement on the
mechanics of success. However, in some cases sources were in disagreement on the
mechanism of success, or choosing the particular breakthrough moment to consider the
moment of success was unclear. For these more difficult cases I followed a three-step
process to ensure reliability. First, I consulted as many sources as could be feasibly
obtained in order to get as clear a picture of the transition as possible. Second, I
explained the rationale for my coding decisions in “methodological notes,”25 and third, I
included a dummy reliability variable in my dataset in order to run statistical tests both
including and excluding these more difficult cases. Out of my population of 83 cases, I
identified nine cases as “weak:” cases in which the impact of civil resistance in the
transition was unclear or the maximalist nature of the campaign was questionable. I also

24

For brief narratives of each transition and a complete list of references on individual
coding decisions see Appendix A: Civil Resistance Mechanisms of Success codebook.
25

Available in Appendix A.
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identified eleven cases as “uncertain:” cases whose inclusion in the dataset I was
confident in but which had some ambiguity in the coding of one or more variables.

I used pre-existing data from the Center on Systemic Peace (CSP) to generate
values for my dependent variables of democracy and civil peace. The Polity IV dataset
is a commonly-used tool to represent levels of democracy. It collects time series data on
a variety of political characteristics in a country in a particular year. This data is then
used to generate a score from

-10 (completely autocratic) to 10 (completely democratic)

(Marshall, Jaggers, & Gurr, 2011). I collected the polity scores of each country five and
ten years after the end of the civil resistance campaign to create two sets of three
variables: POSTPOLITY (the score itself), POLITYCHANGE (the change in polity score
from the year of the end of the campaign to five and ten years afterwards), and
POSTDEMOC, a dummy variable which captures whether or not the country was a
democracy five years after the end of the campaign (i.e. had a polity score of 6 or higher).
To represent the future outbreak of civil conflict I used data from CSP’s Major
Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV) dataset (Marshall 2010). MEPV collects timeseries data on various forms of political violence including international war, civil war,
and ethnic violence.26 I created two sets of dummy variables (POSTWAR) to capture
whether civil conflict occurred in the five years and ten years after the end of the civil

26

The MEPV dataset records data from 1946-2010. For the four cases in the NAVCO
dataset which ended prior to 1946 I used data from Gleditsch 2004. For country-years
from 2011-present I used data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Project (2014).
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resistance campaign. This variable was coded as a one if any of the five or ten countryyears had a value above 0 for any of MEPV’s civil conflict variables.

I also included several control variables to account for some of the most widelyaccepted structural causes of democracy and civil war. There is a widely-acknowledged
relationship between development and both democracy and civil war – positive for the
former (Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994, Lipset 1960, Geddes 2009) and negative for the
latter (Kalyvas, 2009; Hegre & Sambanis, 2006).27 As a proxy for development, I
include a measure of GDP per capita from the World Bank databank, a tool used in
several seminal quantitative studies (Hegre & Sambanis, 2006). Other studies have
indicated that a country’s location in a “democratic neighborhood” increases the
likelihood of democratization (Gleditsch & Ward, 2006; Kopstein & Reilly, 2000). I thus
include the proportion of neighboring countries which were democratic in the countryyears in question 5 years and 10 years after the end of the campaign.28 Population has
also been recognized as having a strong and consistent effect on the likelihood of civil

27

There remains significant scholarly disagreement on the precise effects of development
on democracy. Some, most prominently Przeworkski et al (2000), argue that
development has no effect on transitions to democracy but instead has strong effects on
the survival of democratic regimes, thus explaining the statistical correlation between
high levels of development and democracy. For my purposes whether development
initiates a transition or instead makes democratic stability more likely is largely
irrelevant. Either causal mechanism will lead to a higher likelihood that the country will
be a democracy five years and ten years after the transition mechanism and thus must be
controlled for.
28

The data on proportion of neighboring democracies is from Rivera Celestino and
Gleditsch 2013.
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war (Hegre & Sambanis, 2006), in my regressions on political violence I thus include
population data from the COW national material capabilities dataset, version 4.0 (Singer,
1987).29

The rich literatures on democratization and civil war have both offered a number
of additional potential explanatory variables for their respective outcomes. Yet the
“canonical” status of many of these variables remains contested, or their causal
mechanisms are poorly articulated, thus I exclude them. For instance, several studies
have found a significant negative relationship between democracy and large Muslim
populations (Barro 1999, Fish 2002). However, the causal mechanisms linking Islam and
authoritarianism are unclear (Teorell & Hadenius, 2007); particularly in the light of
relatively high support for “democracy” among Muslims (Tessler, 2002) and whether the
“Muslim effect” is simply an “Arab effect” remains contested (Stepan & Robertson,
2003).30 Others have argued that a heritage of British colonization is likely to lead to
more democracy (Weiner, 1987; Payne, 1993) but other studies find little empirical
support for this contention (Fish, 2002), and some find that Spanish colonies perform
better when colonialism is conceptualized holistically (Bernard, Reenock, & Nordstrom,
2004).

29

30

Thus I do not include additional control variables for democracy or civil peace.

The data on country-years post-2007 is from The World Bank 2014.

In addition, these studies do not take into account the still-unfolding effects of the
“Arab Spring” in 2011.
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In addition, considering the small size of the dataset, the multiplication of
explanatory variables would lead the regressions into severe degrees of freedom
problems. Thus, while including additional control variables might provide helpful
differentiation, the shape of the data precludes inclusion of a “grab bag” of explanatory
variables. This exclusion may make the statistical findings on their own problematic.
However, I address this issue through the use of the case studies in the following chapter.

Finally, I include dummy control variables to indicate whether the country was a
democracy or experienced a major episode of political violence in the five years prior to
the transition. Values of these variables were informed by the same datasets as the
POSTWAR and POSTDEMOC variables.

This dataset allowed me to perform a series of statistical tests framed around two
central hypotheses, explicated in detail in the previous chapter and stated formally as
follows:

H1: There is a positive, significant relationship between elections and negotiations
as mechanisms of civil resistance campaign success and future democracy.31

31

Throughout this chapter I will use “consensus-based” and “non-consensus-based” as
shorthand for the two categories of transition mechanisms that follow the scheme of my
hypotheses (“consensus-based” referring to elections and negotiations and “nonconsensus-based” referring to the four other mechanisms of success). This is purely for
the sake of stylistic convenience and is not meant to imply that the characteristic of
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H2: There is a negative, significant relationship between elections and
negotiations as mechanisms of civil resistance campaign success and future
political violence.

My primary means of testing these hypotheses was multivariate logistic
regression, using the binary measures of post-campaign democracy and civil conflict as
my dependent variables and using dummy variables to represent each category of the
transition mechanisms. I also used OLS regression for measures of the post-campaign
polity scores and levels of change in the polity score from before the campaign to five
and ten years afterwards. In each regression I excluded a single transition mechanism
category from the model. The resulting regression coefficients represent the effect of the
transition mechanism on the probability of democracy or violence relative to the excluded
transition mechanism. Because GDP per capita data was only available from 1960
onwards, excluding several cases from my dataset, I also ran models which did not
incorporate the GDP per capita control variable. Finally, I ran regressions of all the
dependent variables using a combined dummy variable representing both negotiations
and elections (i.e., a value of one if the transition mechanism was either of these
consensus-based mechanisms). I also ran each regression both including and excluding

consensus is more important than the characteristics of campaign initiative or pre-success
capacity building.
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the nine “weak” cases. All of these various categories of regressions added up to a total
of 176 regression models.32

Results: The Shape of the Data
The final dataset of 83 cases represented a truly global sample of country-years,
with almost even distribution of cases across all the major geographic regions.33 The
only region significantly under-represented is the Middle East and North Africa (MENA),
with only 3 cases of successful civil resistance. There are three reasons for this underrepresentation. First, the region is the smallest out of the five, with a much smaller
number of countries and thus an expected lower absolute numbers of cases. Second,
while several different forms of civil resistance have played a political role in the Middle
East (Stephan, 2009), the region’s authoritarian regimes have shown themselves to be
particularly resilient to popular challenges, an empirical fact for which a number of
explanations have been put forth in the literature.34 This resilience, whatever the
particular causes, means cases of successful regime change through any means are rare.
And finally, as mentioned above, the temporal scope of my dataset excludes the wave of
“Arab Spring” cases from 2011.

32

Tests were conducted using the SAS 9.3 statistical software, with confirmation of
selected tests using both SPSS and Stata. SAS Program with code for all tests available
from author upon request.
33

The dataset includes 18 cases from Africa, 20 from the Americas, 19 from Asia, and 23
from Europe and the former Soviet Union.
34

See, for example: Ayoob 2005, Fish 2002, Kamrava 1998.
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Since my theory aspires to be a global explanation, I address the underrepresentation of Middle Eastern cases in my selection of case studies in the following
chapter. However, this geographical limitation should be taken into account in the
following quantitative analysis.

In contrast to this relatively even geographic distribution, there is a strong
temporal trend towards recent cases, as shown in figure 3.1. While my data sources
begin their sampling of civil resistance campaigns in 1900 no successful cases take place
until 1923 and the numbers rise sharply over time. The peak decade is the 1990s,
although my data only goes until 2006, thus the total number of cases from 2000-2010 is
likely higher. This trend follows Chenoweth and Stephan’s (2011) finding that the rate of
success in civil resistance campaigns has risen over time. Thus a dramatic increase in the
absolute number of successful cases is to be expected. Better global media coverage and
scholarly attention to popular uprisings are also likely a factor.

Figure 3.1: Temporal Distribution of Successful
Civil Resistance Campaigns (Absolute Numbers)
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Out of the six transition mechanisms outlined in the previous chapter, four are
well-represented in the data (See Figure 3.2). Elections are the most common, with 27
cases. Resignations, coups, and negotiations are also well-represented, with between 15
and 20 cases of each. International interventions and overwhelmings are much rarer,
with only four cases of each.

Figure 3.2: Distribution of
Transition Mechanisms
Coups
Negotiations
Elections
International
Resignations
Overwhelming

Dividing the cases by transition mechanism and correlating with the data on
democracy and political violence five years after success yields initial support for my
hypotheses. As seen in figure 3.3 the rate of democracy in cases of both negotiations and
elections is over 70 percent, while resignations, the next highest, have only around a 50
percent success rate and coups are even lower. The relationship becomes even stronger
when weak cases are excluded, with elections in particular nearing a democracy rate of
80%. Aggregating the mechanisms into the “consensus-based” and “non-consensusbased” categories yield a similar strong division (see figure 3.4.
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Figure 3.3: Democracy Percentage by
Mechanism
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Figure 3.4: Democracy Percentage by
Mechanism (Aggregated)
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The data on political violence shows the expected inverse relationship. Rates of
post-campaign political violence are significantly lower in cases of negotiations or
elections, though, as with the democracy numbers, resignations perform unexpectedly
well – coming somewhat close to negotiations in their percentage of post-campaign
transitional violence (See Figure 3.5). The aggregated mechanisms show the distinction
much more clearly, with the combined political violence rate in consensus-based
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mechanisms just over a third of the rate following other transition mechanisms (See
Figure 3.6).

Figure 3.5: Political Violence Percentage by
Mechanism
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Figure 3.6: Political Violence Percentage by
Mechanism (aggregated)
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This relationship holds, and in fact becomes more prominent, when the successful
campaigns are disaggregated based upon the prior occurrence of major political violence.
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In cases with at least one major episode of political violence prior to campaign success,
consensus-based mechanisms had only a 25% rate of recurrence of violence. By contrast,
non-consensus-based mechanisms of success had an over 70% rate of recurrence (See
Figure 3.7). In cases with no prior political violence rates were low for both categories
(though marginally lower for the consensus-based mechanisms). This suggests that,
while the differential effects of the mechanism of success in sparking new episodes of
violence may be minimal, consensus-based mechanisms of success can have powerful
preventive effects in situations where violence has already taken place.

Figure 3.7: Political Violence Percentage
Disaggregated by Prior Violence
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Democracy and Political Violence Regressions
Regression analysis of the democracy hypothesis yielded mixed results. While
the logistic regressions of all cases using dummy variables for the individual mechanisms
of success all followed their expected signs, with negotiations and elections consistently
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showing positive coefficients relative to the other transition mechanisms, no coefficients
reached levels of statistical significance. This lack of significance is due in part to the
small size of the dataset, but does put the democracy hypothesis in question.

The relationship, however, does become significant when the cases identified as
“weak” are excluded from the dataset. The combined negotiations/elections variable was
significant in regressions which both included and excluded the GDP per capita variable,
with a 0.1 level of significance in the first and a 0.05 level of significance in the second.
In addition, in the model of all transition mechanisms excluding weak cases and the GDP
per capita variable the election coefficient had a positive, significant effect relative to the
coup d’etat coefficient.

As with the logistic regressions, OLS regressions of the polity score itself failed to
yield significant relationships, though the signs were consistently in line with their
expected direction. Interestingly, though, regression of the change in polity score showed
several significant relationships, with the combined election/negotiation variable having a
consistently positive effect. A selection of the relevant regression models is in table 3.1.35

The logistic regressions of the post-campaign political violence variable closely
followed the prediction of my hypothesis. Most strikingly, elections had a significant and
negative effect relative to both coups and overwhelmings. The combined

35

Coefficients and standard errors of all regression models available from author upon
request.
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election/negotiation variable had a significant negative effect across all variations of the
model at both the 5 and 10 year stage. The one exception was negotiations in the 5-year,
all cases model, with a small positive (though not significant) effect relative to
resignations. A selection of relevant regression models is in table 3.2.
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-0.7797 (1.4489)
-0.7759 (1.0231)
-16.0250 (447.5)
0.6888 (0.9478)
-0.5206 (1.2554)
2.6934*** (0.9328)

0.6691 (0.8057)
0.6152 (1.5097)
0.6190 (0.9424)
-14.6300 (447.5)
0.6888 (0.9478)
-0.5206 (1.2554)
2.6934*** (0.9328)

Elections

International
Resignations
Overwhelming

Prior Democracy

Prop Neighboring Dems

GDP per capita (logged)

2.6934*** (0.9328)

-0.5206 (1.2554)

0.6888 (0.9478)

-0.0539 (1.4523)
-0.0502 (0.8670)
-15.3000 (447.5)

-0.7258 (0.9261)

Estimate
-6.9376*** (2.4718)
-0.6691 (0.8057)

2.6934*** (0.9328)

-0.5206 (1.2554)

0.6888 (0.9478)

0.0038 (1.5071)
-15.2460 (447.5)

0.0539 (1.4523)

0.7797 (1.4489)

Estimate
-6.9916*** (2.2998)
-0.6152 (1.5097)

n = 82, Chi2 = 18.2068,
p > Chi2 0.0004, c = 0.788

Prop Neighboring Dems

0.9404* (0.5235)
1.1326 (0.1988)
2.4699*** (0.8576)

1.7365** (0.6840)

1.0782* (0.5908)
0.6228 (0.9207)
0.2637 (1.0608)

Estimate
-5.3072*** (1.8564)

* = p < 0.1, ** = p < 0.05, *** = p < 0.01

n = 67, Chi2 = 16.0616,
p > Chi2 0.0029, c = 0.786

Prop Neighboring Dems
GDP Per Capita (logged)

Intercept
Elections/Negotiations
Prior Democracy

Parameter

Estimate
-1.2313*** (0.4722)

Parameter

Intercept
Elections/Negotiations
Prior Democracy

Likelihood of Democracy 5 Years After Success, Weak Cases
Excluded.

Likelihood of Democracy 5 Years After Success,
All Cases.
(GDP per capita variable excluded)

2.6934*** (0.9328)

-0.5206 (1.2554)

0.6888 (0.9478)

-15.2490 (447.5)

-0.0038 (1.5071)

0.0502 (0.8670)

0.7759 (1.0231)

Estimate
-6.9878*** (2.4503)
-0.6190 (0.9424)

2.6934*** (0.9328)

-0.5206 (1.2554)

0.6888 (0.9478)

13.2490 (164.6)

13.2460 (164.6)

13.3000 (164.6)

Estimate
-20.2370 (164.6)
12.6300 (164.6)
14.025 (164.6)

1.1450** (0.5475)
0.9196 (0.9163)
2.1918** (0.8627)

Estimate
-1.2266** (0.4822)

n = 73, Chi2 = 15.8034,
p > Chi2 0.0012, c = 0.78

Prop Neighboring Dems

Intercept
Elections/Negotiations
Prior Democracy

Parameter

Likelihood of Democracy 5 Years After Success, Weak
Cases Excluded
(GDP per capita variable excluded)

Quasi-Complete Separation of Data Points (Overwhelming variable)
n = 75, Chi2 = 24.361, p > Chi2 = 0.002, c = 0.847

-0.7258 (0.9261)

1.3949 (0.9959)

Negotiations

Estimate
-6.2119*** (2.2025)
-1.3949 (0.9959)

Estimate
-7.6068*** (2.4713)

Parameter
Intercept
Coups

Likelihood of Democracy 5 Years After Success, All Cases

Table 3.1: Selected Democracy Regression Models (Logistic Regressions, standard errors in parentheses)
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-1.3283 (1.0864)
0.4285 (1.6461)
1.6115* (0.8435)
1.5243** (0.7327)
-1.2267* (0.6722)

Resignations
Overwhelming

Prior Political Violence
Population (logged)
GDP per capita (logged)

Parameter
Estimate
-2.8540 (2.7612)
Intercept
Elections/Negotiations
-1.5731** (0.6698)
Prior Political Violence
1.5038** (0.7075)
1.4278** (0.6367)
Population (logged)
GDP per capita (logged)
-1.3910** (0.6369)
n = 76, Chi2 = 28.1789,
p > Chi2 <0.0001, c = 0.869

Likelihood of Major Political Violence 5 Years
After Success, All Cases.

Estimate
-3.4165 (3.3490)

Parameter
Intercept
Coups
Negotiations
Elections
International

1.6115* (0.8435)
1.5243** (0.7327)
-1.2267* (0.6722)

1.3166 (1.1534)
3.0733* (1.6871)

Estimate
-3.3235 (3.5442)
-1.5714* (0.8819)
2.4424** (0.9608)
2.8937*** (1.0715)
-3.3196*** (1.045)

* = p < 0.1, ** = p < 0.05, *** = p < 0.01

n = 65, Chi2 = 34.6795,
p > Chi2 <0.0001, c = 0.944

Parameter
Intercept
Elections/Negotiations
Prior Political Violence
Population (logged)
GDP per capita (logged)

Likelihood of Major Political Violence 10 Years
After Success, All Cases.

1.6115* (0.8435)
1.5243** (0.7327)
-1.2267* (0.6722)

1.7567 (1.7390)

Estimate
-4.7447 (3.4760)
1.3283 (1.0864)
0.2680 (1.1306)
-1.3166 (1.1534)
1.2647 (1.9076)

1.6115* (0.8435)
1.5243** (0.7327)
-1.2267* (0.6722)

-1.7567 (1.7390)

Estimate
-2.9880 (3.7356)
-0.4285 (1.6461)
-1.4887 (1.7015)
-3.0733* (1.6871)
-0.4921 (2.2696)

Estimate
-2.6828 (2.9085)
-1.5517** (0.6924)
1.4336** (0.7196)
1.2874** (0.6479)
-1.2182* (0.6396)
n = 68, Chi2 = 24.8794,
p > Chi2 <0.0001, c = 0.86

Parameter
Intercept
Elections/Negotiations
Prior Political Violence
Population (logged)
GDP per capita (logged)

Likelihood of Major Political Violence 5 Years
After Success, Weak Cases Excluded.

1.6115* (0.8435)
1.5243** (0.7327)
-1.2267* (0.6722)

-1.2647 (1.9076)
0.4921 (2.2696)

n = 76, Chi2 = 31.2912, p > Chi2 0.0001, c = 0.882

1.6115* (0.8435)
1.5243** (0.7327)
-1.2267* (0.6722)

-0.2680 (1.1306)
1.4887 (1.7015)

Likelihood of Major Political Violence 5 Years After Success, All Cases
Estimate
Estimate
Estimate
-4.4767 (3.3083)
-6.0613* (3.5274)
-3.4800 (3.0062)
1.0602 (0.9986)
2.6448*** (1.0179)
0.0636 (1.7758)
-1.0602 (0.9986)
1.5846 (1.1212)
-0.9967 (1.8513)
-2.6448*** (1.0179)
-1.5846 (1.1212)
-2.5813 (1.8359)
-0.0636 (1.7758)
0.9967 (1.8513)
2.5813 (1.8359)

Table 3.2: Selected Political Violence Regression Models (Logistic Regressions, standard errors in parentheses)

Interpretation
Interpretation of these results must be prefaced by a methodological caution: with
an n of only 83 the accuracy of statistical tests may be imperfect. As mentioned above,
some mechanisms have an extremely low n, with only 4 cases of international
interventions and overwhelmings. Both of these particular mechanisms of success may
have interesting effects but the small number of cases makes regression an unsuitable
tool, as these variables tend to exhibit either quasi or complete separation of data points,
making their regression coefficients effectively meaningless. See, for example, the
coefficients for the overwhelming variable in table 3.1.

I have attempted to compensate for the small number of particular cases in part by
also performing regressions of the aggregate elections/negotiations variable, but this
aggregation, while offering utility in supporting my argument on consensus, campaign
initiative, and capacity-building, limits the ability of my analysis to directly compare the
particular effects of certain mechanisms of success which may be interesting.
Overwhelmings, in particular, are a unique political phenomenon deserving of more
study. The small number of cases, though, makes the quantitative approach less valuable.
Future work should rely more on qualitative analysis.

Having brought up these cautions one encouraging note also bears mentioning.
The combined datasets used to generate cases are at least a close approximation of the
complete global population of successful civil resistance campaigns during the period of
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examination (1900-2006). Since these 83 campaigns are the population (not a sample)
even results which do not reach standards of statistical significance may be instructive,
though of course to be accepted with caution. The summary statistics presented above do
show powerful trends, even if statistical tests using the data fail to reach robust standards
of statistical significance.

On democracy, an honest evaluation of the results provides only tentative support
for my hypothesis. The results are strongly suggestive of the positive effects of elections
and negotiations. However, while some relationships of statistical significance do
emerge, particularly when “weak” cases are excluded from the analysis, the results are
unstable. The small size of the dataset, as well as a lack of differentiation among the
covariates is the likely cause behind this instability. Yet a lack of strong, statistically
significant relationships calls for further analysis before firmly arguing for the
democratizing effects of elections and negotiations. Due to this uncertainty, the
democracy question will be the primary concern in the following chapter’s case studies.

In the future, this issue might also be dealt with by expanding the population of
cases to different types of regime transitions. This would require a theoretical re-casting
of the model, since as it is its logic is limited to successful civil resistance campaigns, but
would provide a way to expand the dataset so as to make statistical tests more stable.

The much more striking and consistent finding is on the effects of mechanisms of
success on political violence. Here the data consistently point to extremely divergent
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effects from the various mechanisms. Overwhelmings have the highest rate of political
violence (75%) while negotiated transitions and electoral victories have by far the lowest
rates (less than 15% combined). This finding is consistent with Chenoweth and
Stephan’s arguments on why nonviolent campaigns tend to lead to better civil peace
outcomes than violent campaigns. Nonviolent campaigns have these better effects
because they tend to have lower participation barriers and thus a larger, broad base of
support which is able to more easily incorporate former opponents into a post-success
political order. Consensus-based transition mechanisms are the logical extension of this
pattern.

The question of perceived political legitimacy may also be a potential explanation
for these trends in the data. There seems to be an inverse relationship between the degree
of perceived political legitimacy and future civil conflict. Overwhelmings, in which the
mass of the population simply occupies the organs of government, could be argued to be
the mechanism most alienating to former regime supporters and least politically
legitimate. Coups d’état, the category with the next highest mean rate of political
violence, are illegitimate in that they are extra-institutional, but they represent a decision
by at least a portion of the former regime elite to side with the civil resistance campaign
and thus may grant somewhat more legitimacy than overwhelmings. Resignations and
electoral victories follow institutional mechanisms and thus while they may
disenfranchise segments of former regimes they carry with them a high degree of
legitimacy. And finally, negotiated transitions are likely to be perceived as most
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legitimate because by definition they involve all the actors granting them a certain degree
of legitimacy ex ante.

The unexpectedly positive performance of resignations on both democracy and
civil peace indicate a potentially important theoretical clarification not captured in my
typology. I have argued that resignations are likely to perform poorly because the
mechanism’s initiative rests with the ancien regime. However, it is not only conceivable
but indeed highly likely that there is significant variation on both consensus and initiative
within the sample of resignations. A resignation may be a canny move on the part of an
autocrat seeking to control the terms of his departure but may also be a desperate lastditch action by a regime that is falling apart – one carefully anticipated and planned for
by the civil resistance campaign. The particular intra-regime dynamics which lead to a
resignation may also be opaque or at least difficult to determine, making a full analysis of
these dynamics highly time-consuming. More extensive research into resignations may
reveal meaningful disaggregations which further clarify this question.

Addressing Endogeneity Concerns
One central concern in my analysis was the possibility that transition mechanisms
themselves are endogenous to larger historical processes or particular structural factors
present in the cases prior to transition. It is dubious to consider transition mechanisms to
be comparable strategic choices if structural conditions preclude the exercise of particular
mechanisms of success. I considered three endogeneity arguments: that transition
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mechanisms can be explained by geographic region, the country’s level of pre-existing
democratic openness, or previous regime type.
The first argument is closely tied to the “democratic neighborhood” argument
mentioned previously which I controlled for in my democracy regressions by including
the proportion of neighboring democracies. Certain regions may be associated with more
peaceful, democratic norms due to historical circumstances. Europe and the Americas,
for example, with a relatively long history of stable democratic nation-states, might be
expected to have a higher proportion of consensus-based transition mechanisms than the
less stable regions of Africa or Asia.

As shown in Figure 3.8, the distribution of the transition mechanism categories is
far from equal across geographic regions. However the distribution does not follow the
expected breakdown outlined above. Perhaps most strikingly, Africa has more than three
times as many consensus-based as non-consensus-based mechanisms of success, and the
Americas have 50 percent more non-consensus-based mechanisms. Asia and Europe
follow the expected pattern more closely, but still not exclusively. In particular, out of 23
cases from Europe, 9 follow non-consensus-based mechanisms. The geographic
distribution of cases of successful civil resistance thus does not explain the occurrence of
particular mechanisms.
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Figure 3.8: Geographic Distribution of Mechanism
Categories (Absolute Numbers)
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The second argument is intuitively straightforward: the less authoritarian and
more democratic the country, the more likely it is that massive political changes can be
achieved through consensus-based mechanisms such as elections and negotiations.
Norms of institutionalized political contention and discourse are likely to be ingrained
deeper in more democratic countries. In contrast, authoritarian countries with hegemonic
regimes do not possess such norms and institutions. Civil resistance campaigns may not
see them as viable mechanisms of success and the regime’s “pillars of support” may not
respond to their legitimacy in achieving political change. Thus highly authoritarian
regimes are likely to only be ousted through heavily coercive transition mechanisms such
as coups or overwhelmings.

While this argument has an intuitive appeal it is not borne out in the data. As
shown in Figure 3.9, the average polity score in the year prior to transition is almost
identical across the four most common transition mechanisms. International
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interventions and overwhelmings diverge from this trend, but as mentioned above both
have an n of only four cases each, and thus play only a marginal role in my analysis.36 A
scatterplot of the prior year polity scores (Figure 3.10)37 shows a similarly random
distribution across the four most common transition mechanisms.

Figure 3.9: Average Prior Year Polity Score by
Mechanism
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Note too that both are included in my “non-consensus-based” aggregation and have
opposite average prior polity scores, thus counter-balancing one another.
37

In Figure 3.10, the transition mechanisms are signified by numerical indicators. Coup
= 1, Negotiation = 2, Election = 3, International Intervention = 4, Resignation = 5,
Overwhelming = 6.
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Figure 3.10: Prior Year Polity Score
Scatterplot
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The third argument comes primarily from the work of Barbara Geddes (1999) on
the effects of the type of authoritarian regime on the process of democratization. Geddes
divides authoritarian regimes into three major types: personalistic, military, and partybased.38 Geddes argues that out of the three, military regimes are most likely to negotiate
their way through a peaceful democratization process because of military values of force
integrity and a desire to peacefully return to the barracks. Party-based regimes are more
likely to hold onto power than military regimes but when external or domestic pressure
increases they are also likely to have a smooth, peaceful transition to democracy.

In contrast, personalistic regimes are unlikely to voluntarily give up power,
instead opting to fight to maintain political control as long as possible. This is due
primarily to the regime’s close connection to the state, with the state often being seen as

38

Geddes’ later work incorporates other types of authoritarianism such as monarchies
and oligarchies, but these three types remain the most common.
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the dictator’s personal property, and the consequent zero-sum nature of political
transition. Whereas militaries can negotiate a political exit to return to their barracks and
party-based regimes may be able to liberalize but remain a part of the political process,
personalistic regimes are unlikely to be able to integrate into a new political order and
may face reprisals, even death, once out of political power. Applying Geddes’ logic to
my mechanisms of success typology, one would expect that consensus-based transition
mechanisms would be endogenous to military or party-based regimes while highly
unlikely in personalistic regimes.

To test this question I collected data on regime type from Geddes, Wright, and
Frantz (2014). Their data covered the majority of my cases with three major exceptions:
cases prior to 1946, cases of transition from colonialism, and transition from democratic
regimes. In the first case, I performed the prior regime coding myself. As mentioned
above, this is very small number of cases, and all involved straightforward coding with
little or no ambiguity as to the prior regime type. In the second and third cases I simply
added new categories to capture these cases. Extending Geddes’ argument one would
expect in both colonialism and democracy that a higher proportion of cases would follow
consensus-based transition mechanisms. In democracies these types of transitions have
already been institutionalized while in colonial cases the post-WWII environment of
European decolonization would seem likely to incentivize consensus-based mechanisms.
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A breakdown of transition mechanisms by prior regime type is in Figure 3.11.39
The data provides a mixed answer to Geddes’ argument. Personalistic regimes have a
significantly higher number of non-consensus mechanisms, with more than three times
more non-consensus transition mechanisms as consensus transition mechanisms. Partybased regimes show an inverse relationship, with significant numbers of consensus-based
transition mechanisms relative to non-consensus based transitions.
However, Geddes’ argument holds less powerfully in relation to military regimes,
which have nearly equal numbers of both consensus-based and non-consensus transition
mechanisms. Most surprising are the cases of transitions in democracies, which have
twice as many non-consensus transitions as consensus mechanisms.

Figure 3.11: Mechanisms by Prior Regime Type
(Absolute Numbers)
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Geddes, Wright, and Frantz also code several regimes as hybrids of their major
categories. Cases coded as hybrids were incorporated into the counts of both relevant
categories.
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While these issues with military regimes and democracy do put Geddes’ argument
in question, the strong relationship shown in the party-based and personalistic regime
numbers do make the endogeneity question still salient and puts the effects of
mechanisms of success into question. Can the occurrence and effects of different
mechanisms be reduced to the influence of the prior regime type? In order to address this
question, it will be necessary to more deeply examine the causal dynamics which both
lead to and follow differing mechanisms of success. In particular the dynamics of
consensus-based transition mechanisms in personalistic regimes and of non-consensus
based transition mechanisms in party-based regimes will be critical to examine.

Conclusion
From 1900-2006, there were 83 cases of successful maximalist civil resistance
campaigns. These campaigns utilized six mechanisms of success in achieving their goals.
Out of these six mechanisms elections and negotiations (“consensus-based” mechanisms
of success) resulted in significantly higher rates of post-campaign democracy and
significantly lower rates of post-campaign political violence, supporting my argument on
the effects of mechanisms of success from the previous chapter. These relationships are
statistically significant, though in the case of post-campaign democracy the significance
is unstable. While my hypotheses were generally supported, the large-n analysis left
several significant questions. First, what are the actual causal mechanisms which link
mechanisms of success to democracy and civil peace? Second, is the mixed statistical
significance on democracy due to the small number of cases or to a weakness in the
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argument? And third, are the various mechanisms of success viable strategic alternatives
to one another or is their occurrence endogenous to the country’s prior regime type? In
order to address these questions, I now turn to my comparative case studies.
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Chapter Four: Transition Mechanisms and the Arab Spring; The Cases of Egypt
and Yemen
I have two broad objectives in this chapter: to further support my hypothesis that
mechanisms characterized by consensus, campaign initiative and political capacitybuilding, lead to more democracy and less transitional violence, and to delve more deeply
into the causal mechanisms at work which lead to the occurrence of this general trend.

I will also seek to address the endogeneity concern of regime type raised at the
conclusion of the preceding chapter. Are mechanisms of success relevant to
understanding democratization and civil peace after civil resistance campaigns or are
their effects reducible to the political opportunity structure inherent in the previous
regime? Note, however, that in many respects Geddes’ argument is in line with my own.
The positive effects which she points to from military and party-based regimes are based
on their greater likelihood of following less coercive, less violent transition mechanisms.
The causal mechanism whereby Geddes’ argument generates its effects is, in essence, a
close corollary of my own.

The endogeneity concern, however, becomes relevant if regime type can be
shown to reasonably preclude the possibility of differing types of mechanisms of success.
If certain regime types practically exclude the operation of particular mechanisms of
success then it is not meaningful to consider the independent effects of mechanisms or
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examine them as strategic equivalents. This is the argument I will seek to address in my
case studies through testing the following hypothesis:

H3: Regime type, while influencing, does not predetermine the reasonable
possibility of civil resistance campaigns pursuing varying mechanisms of
success.

Finally, I will address the geographic and temporal underrepresentation of recent
Middle Eastern cases in my quantitative analysis in order to show the global impact of
my argument. Thus, the cases I will examine are the recent “Arab Spring” revolutions in
Egypt and Yemen, cases which I fit into my mechanism of success typology as a coup
d’état and negotiation respectively.40 These two cases are optimal for my purposes for
the following reasons: their close geographic, cultural, and temporal proximity as well as
the similarity of their pre-revolutionary regimes eliminate the need to control for many
larger environmental factors, their recent occurrence means that they fall outside of my
dataset and thus are better-suited to test its findings, and the large degree of media

40

I consider Yemen’s transition mechanism to be a civil resistance campaign-regime
negotiation rather than a purely elite-based “pacted” transition because of the role of the
Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) which actually signed the agreement as a key part of the civil
resistance campaign up to the signing of the agreement. While certainly not every faction
of Yemen’s revolution took part in the negotiation process, those who did negotiate can
be rightfully categorized as a major faction of the civil resistance campaign rather than an
elite third party. This categorization was also how the JMP was perceived in Yemen both
by the government (Yemen News Agency 11/28/11) and the factions of the campaign
which did not participate in the negotiations (Yemen Times 11/17/11).
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attention given to both cases means that significant popular and scholarly resources exist
with which to examine them.
I excluded the two additional cases of successful Arab Spring regime change –
Libya and Tunisia – because the nature of their transitions makes them less optimal tests
for my hypotheses.41 In the case of Libya, while the revolution began with nonviolent
protests it quickly shifted to an armed struggle, so quickly in fact that it is doubtful if the
protests in Libya can even be meaningfully described as a civil resistance campaign. The
effects of this shift on Libya’s transitional path are doubtless an interesting avenue of
inquiry but lie outside of the scope conditions of my theory.

The Tunisian case, while clearly lying within the scope of my theory, offers less
clear distinction on my independent variable. The Tunisian revolution would fit into my
typology as a resignation. As mentioned in the previous chapter, one of the findings of
my quantitative analysis was that resignations seem to occupy a more ambiguous middle
ground between consensus-based elections and negotiations and the other non-consensusbased mechanisms of success. Tunisia’s revolution exemplifies this ambiguity. While
military defection played a key role the military did not seize power, thus events in
Tunisia were not a coup. Instead, when President Ben Ali resigned and fled the country
parliamentary speaker Fouad Mebazaa created a unity government with the opposition.
Thus the mechanism of success involved a certain degree of consensus and campaign

41

H1 and H2 formally stated in the previous chapter, page 52.
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capacity-building, unlike Egypt, where the events of February 11th, 2011 were clearly a
coup d'état, but is not a straightforward consensus-based mechanism of success, as is the
case in Yemen.

While there are many similarities between the pre-revolutionary regimes in Egypt
and Yemen, they also vary across Geddes’ authoritarian regime typology, with Yemen
under President Ali Abdullah Saleh coded as a personalistic regime and Egypt under
Mubarak a three-way hybrid of party-based, military, and personalistic. While a purely
party-based authoritarian regime would be a more optimal comparison, these differences
in regime type do make the comparison meaningful for addressing the endogeneity
question. Geddes’ approach might be uncertain on the likely trajectory of the Egyptian
transition because of the hybrid nature of the Egyptian regime. However, Yemen’s clear
personalistic regime structures would make a consensus-based transition mechanism
highly unlikely.
Furthermore, the other ways in which the two cases differ make the cases a “hard”
test for my central hypothesis. Several traditional explanations for democracy and
political violence would lead one to expect strongly better outcomes in Egypt than in
Yemen. In 2010 Egypt’s level of development was significantly higher than Yemen’s.
GDP per capita in Egypt was more than twice that of Yemen (The World Bank, 2014).
The Yemeni government relied heavily on oil revenues for its income (Revenue Watch
Institute, 2013), a factor often argued to increase the likelihood and stability of
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authoritarianism (Luciani, 2005). Egypt’s reliance on fossil fuel revenue was much more
marginal (See Figure 4.1).

Figure 4.1: Fossil Fuel Revenue as
Percentage of Government Income
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Perhaps most importantly while the Egyptian government faced no serious armed
opposition, the government of Yemen was deeply engaged in a struggle with multiple
armed insurgent groups. While the general trend in the Middle East against democracy
would perhaps not make democratization “likely” in either case, these factors and others
would indicate that political violence in Yemen would be extremely high, while the
likelihood of democracy would be extremely low.

Democratic transitions can be lengthy processes and both Egypt and Yemen are
too early in their transitions for their democratic progress to be fully evaluated. I conduct
my analysis under the assumption that significant transitional periods remain in the future
for both countries. This analysis is by no means the last word on the democratic
transitions in these countries, nor do I purport it to be so. However, the three years and
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two years respectively since the success of civil resistance campaigns in these two
countries provide a rich and fruitful ground for analysis of the effects of mechanisms of
success, and also give insight into how the continued democratic transition in both
countries may be expected to play out over the coming years.

Laying the Groundwork
Prior to 2011, the political environments in Egypt and Yemen were in many ways
similar. Long-time authoritarian presidents, Hosni Mubarak in Egypt and Ali Abdullah
Saleh in Yemen, had been in power for similar periods of time,42 held periodic
“elections” which served to legitimize their rule, and were both considered to be
grooming their sons to succeed them. While both regimes allowed limited forms of
political opposition this took the form of “liberalized autocracy” (Brumberg, 2005)
arrangements which allowed minimal public criticism but prevented opposition political
parties or other groups from achieving real political power. Saleh’s Yemen was a
personalistic regime revolving around the Saleh family and sustained through a network
of tribal patronage. In Egypt the Mubarak regime sustained itself through the allpervasive ruling National Democratic Party (NDP), an extensive mukhabarat internal
security apparatus, and a politically and economically powerful military.

42

Saleh became President of North Yemen in 1978 and continued as President when
North Yemen unified with South Yemen in 1990. Mubarak became President in 1981
after the assassination of President Anwar Sadat.
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In Egypt, an armed insurgency against the Mubarak regime by Islamists in Upper
Egypt had been successfully crushed in the late 1990s. While sporadic minor attacks
took place in the Sinai region, these were minimal and did not present a serious challenge
to the Egyptian government.

A political opening in the mid-2000s under pressure from the United States led to
Egypt’s first multi-party presidential election. However, extensive legal restrictions on
the eligibility of presidential candidates and the formation of political parties severely
tilted the playing field in favor of the ruling NDP. The election itself was characterized
by widespread electoral manipulation by the regime, the imprisonment of President
Mubarak’s most serious contender, only 22 percent voter turnout and an 88.7 percent
victory by Mubarak (International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 2005). Nonviolent
civil society groups until the mantle of the “Kefaya”43 movement led protests against
Mubarak’s rule around the time of the election but these largely faded after the election
was over.44

Government privatization and other neo-liberal policies spearheaded by President
Mubarak’s son Gamal had sparked widespread protests and strikes by workers, most
prominently in the city of Mahalla, but this labor activism remained largely contained to
non-maximalist goals and did not directly threaten the political monopoly of the regime

43

Kefaya means “enough” in Arabic.

44

For a summary of the Kefaya movement see Bisgaard-Church 2011.
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(Cook, 2012, pp. 178-79). The government also faced sporadic opposition from activist
bloggers, who advocated a diverse set of causes but primarily acted to publicize
incidences of police brutality. However, in general the political environment in Egypt
was characterized by a cognitive dissonance as the informal rules of political discourse
limited criticism of the regime to private discussions (Cook, 2012). Thus by the time of
the Tunisian “Jasmine Revolution” in late 2010, with these few exceptions there was little
visible opposition to the Mubarak regime. Political discussions in Egypt were
overwhelmingly focused on the question of Presidential succession, with two regime
insiders: the President’s son Gamal and intelligence chief Omar Suleiman, considered the
two most likely contenders.

In contrast, the regime of Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh entered the Arab
Spring confronting a wide variety of violent and nonviolent political opposition. Three
major challengers, two violent and one largely nonviolent, are particularly deserving of
attention.

First, the Yemeni government faced an ongoing insurrection in the northern
province of Saada from Zaidi rebels known as “Houthis.” The Houthi rebellion was
initiated in 2004 when the Yemeni government attempted to arrest radical preacher and
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political leader Hussein Al-Houthi. Al-Houthi, as leader of the Zaidi45 group al-Shabab
al-Moumeen (the “believing youth”) had led virulent anti-US demonstrations which the
government interpreted as covert anti-government activity. Al-Houthi was also accused
of attempting to revive the Zaidi imamate, the theocratic government which had ruled
Yemen until 1962. Al-Houthi’s followers protected their leader violently, resulting in
three months of armed clashes. Hussein al-Houthi was killed and the rebellion briefly
died down in September of 2004, but was re-initiated in 2005 by his father, Badr-eddin,
and his brother, Abdelmalik. The following years saw several cycles of violent clashes
and temporary cease fire arrangements, peaking in August of 2009, when the government
launched “Operation Scorched Earth” to eliminate the Houthis. Battles continued
through early 2010, when the two sides signed yet another cease fire agreement.
However, clashes continued between the Houthis and pro-government tribal militias
throughout the rest of the year.

Throughout the conflict, while the government accused the Houthis of seeking
regime change, the Houthis themselves painted their insurgency as much more defensive
in nature – focused on protecting the Zaidi regions of Yemen from Sunni persecution
(particularly from the increasing influence of Salafist groups) and gaining greater
autonomy for their home region.

45

Zaidis are a sect of Shi’ite Islam found most commonly in Yemen. They are a majority
in Saada Province, the heart of the Houthi rebellion, but a minority in the total population
of Yemen.
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Second, a largely nonviolent protest movement, the Hiraak al-Jenoobi,46 known
across Yemen simply as “Hiraak,” led protests and demonstrations across the formerly
independent state of South Yemen.47 The demonstrations were initiated in 2007
primarily around the issue of benefits for South Yemeni soldiers forced into retirement
after the South’s abortive civil war in 1994, but grew more radical in both their demands
and tactics as the government responded to Hiraak activity with widespread violence. By
late 2010 most Hiraak leaders were calling for full independence.

The Hiraak movement was (and is) deeply fragmented, incorporating elements of
the former ruling party of South Yemen, the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP), as well as
independent youth activists, moderate Islamists, and others. While the majority of the
movement pursued its goals through nonviolence, several armed factions regularly
clashed with police and targeted both police and government forces in hit-and-run
attacks.

Finally, the local branch of Al-Qaeda, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP), was involved in an insurgency against the government. Islamist militants had a
long-standing presence in Yemen, dating to the Yemeni government’s support for the
anti-Soviet insurgency in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Most famously, al-Qaeda associated

46

47

Meaning “Southern Movement” in Arabic.

For a history of South Yemen and background on the grievances and historical
conditions framing the Hiraak, see Brehony 2011.
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militants launched an attack on the USS Cole in the port of Aden in early 2000, killing 17
US sailors. The Cole attack’s impact was initially limited in Yemen, as militant groups
lacked popular support and were even connected to high elements in the government
(Day, 2012). However, after President Saleh’s eager adoption of the Bush
Administration’s “war on terror” and in the wake of widespread outrage over the US
invasion of Iraq in 2003, Al-Qaeda activity steadily increased.
Yemen: Compromising the Revolution? 48
When fruit seller Mohammed Bouazizi self-immolated and initiated the “Arab
Spring” the political situation in Yemen was already precarious. Under the terms of the
Yemeni constitution President Ali Abdullah Saleh was required to step down from power
at the end of his term in 2013. However, in late 2010 MPs from Saleh’s General People’s
Congress (GPC), the overwhelmingly dominant party in the Yemeni parliament,
announced a series of proposed constitutional amendments which would remove
presidential term limits and allow Saleh to remain president for life. The move enraged
both the formal opposition, led by the Islamist Islah party, and several of Yemen’s
powerful tribal sheikhs.

48

The following case studies are informed by a wide reading of primary and secondary
sources, all of which are listed in the bibliography. Since much of the narrative relies on
common-knowledge, open-source information and comes from multiple overlapping
sources I have not cited each source individually at each usage in the text. However, in a
few cases, particularly for pieces of information which are disputed or not based on
easily-available or uncontested information, I have included a specific in-text citation to
support my narrative.
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Thus, when news of President Ben Ali’s resignation and flight from Tunisia
reached Yemen the news fell on fertile ground. Students at Sana’a University held small
protests where they praised the Tunisian revolution and called for a similar uprising in
Yemen. Civil society activists and some low-level members of Islah, including future
Nobel laureate Tawakkul Karman, participated in these first protests and were briefly
detained by the authorities.

Protests escalated after the fall of President Mubarak in Egypt on February 11.
Al-Jazeera coverage played a key role as people across Yemen watched the dramatic
events unfold. When Mubarak stepped down tens of thousands came into the streets,
mobilized almost spontaneously via social media and text messages. The youth
protesters in the streets echoed the slogans and tactics of the uprisings in Tunisia and
Egypt, occupying a square near Sana’a University which they named “change square”
and refusing to leave until President Saleh stepped down.

Opposition parties attempted to capitalize on the enthusiasm of the youth and
organized their own rallies but initially remained much more moderate in their demands.
While the youth explicitly demanded that Saleh leave office immediately the opposition
instead called for political reforms and greater political inclusion.49 However, the major

49

The Islah party even attempted to shift the slogan of the revolution from “the people
want the downfall of the regime” to “the people want the reform of the regime.” This
new slogan had an intentional double-meaning in Arabic, as the word for “reform”
happens to be Islah, the party’s name.
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opposition parties, under the mantle of the “Joint Meeting Party” (JMP) alliance played a
key supportive role in maintaining protest momentum, supplying student activists with
supplies and sending their supporters into the streets and squares (Yemen Times 1/12/12).

From the beginning the street protests were violently attacked by security forces
and government supporters in plainclothes. This repression peaked on the “Friday of
Dignity,” March 18th, when pro-government gunmen attacked a protest, killing at least 45
people. This massacre was followed by waves of defections from the Saleh government.
Perhaps most importantly, three days after the massacre Major General Ali Mohsen AlAhmar, the commander of Yemen’s First Armored Division and widely considered the
second-most powerful man in Yemen, announced support for the revolution and said that
his troops would protect nonviolent protesters from attacks (BBC News, 2011).

The military and political defections, as well as the continuing size of the protests,
led Saleh to begin negotiating with the opposition. He offered significant economic
concessions, including an increase in public sector salaries and guaranteed jobs for
unemployed students (one of the largest demographics in the protests). Saleh also
promised to resign before the end of the year and that his son would not succeed him.
However, neither the formal opposition nor the street protesters considered Saleh’s offers
credible and protests continued. A process of negotiation between the opposition and
Saleh under the auspices of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) stop-started for several
months until late May, when President Saleh definitively refused to step down.
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Saleh’s refusal sparked violent clashes in the so-called “Battle of Sana’a” as
Sheikh Sadiq al-Ahmar, chief of the powerful Hashid tribal federation, declared support
for the protesters and led his supporters in attacking government forces and occupying
several government buildings. However, the clashes only lasted a few days and the
tribesmen quickly withdrew from their positions. More critically, on June 3rd a rocket
attack on a mosque where Saleh was praying critically injured him. He was forced to flee
the country for treatment in Saudi Arabia, leaving executive authority in the hands of his
vice president, Abdurabh Mansur Hadi.

Over the following months as protests continued to maintain their size and were
protected by armed tribal groups and Ali Mohsen Al-Ahmar’s first division, Hadi revived
the scrapped GCC initiative which proposed a political transition in which Saleh would
step down and hand over power to Hadi in exchange for immunity from prosecution. The
UN was also heavily involved, with special envoy Jamal Benomar facilitating dialogue
and the UN Security Council passing Resolution 2014 which called for all parties to sign
the GCC agreement. In November, ten months after the beginning of protests, President
Ali Abdullah Saleh signed the GCC agreement, officially giving up his executive power
and beginning the next stage of Yemen’s political transition.50

50

In more detail, the GCC agreement’s terms were as follows: In exchange for immunity
from prosecution for him and his family, upon signature, President Saleh would
immediately cede all executive authority to Vice-President Hadi. Vice-President Hadi
was required to call early presidential elections within 90 days of the signing of the
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This breakthrough moment was a revolutionary anticlimax. The Joint Meeting
Parties (JMP) and ruling GPC, the primary beneficiaries of the agreement, lauded it.
However, on the streets youth activists decried concessions to the regime such as the
GPC retaining half of all government ministries. In particular, the youth were outraged
that, as a condition for signing the agreement, President Saleh and his family had
received immunity from prosecution.
This sense of disillusionment led to continued mobilization in the “Change
Squares” both in Sana’a and across Yemen. Tens of thousands of activists, including
Tawakkul Karman and youth wings of many of the country’s major political groups,

agreement. Saleh would retain the title of “Honorary President” until the elections, in
which both the GPC and JMP agreed to mutually endorse Hadi as the sole candidate.
Immediately upon signing the agreement the JMP would name a Prime Minister, whom
Hadi would task with forming a government of national unity, with 50% representation
by the JMP and GPC. The government of national unity was required to make decisions
by consensus, with Hadi as a final arbiter if consensus could not be reached. Among the
primary tasks for Hadi and the national unity government articulated in the agreement
was establishing a committee to reform and professionalize the military and a conference
for national dialogue. The conference for national dialogue, which explicitly required the
participation of youth, the Houthis, the Hiraak, other political parties, and women, was
tasked with making recommendations for a new constitution, as well as discussing an
array of political problems in Yemen (Southern separatism, the grievances of the Houthis,
etc…). When the national dialogue concluded, a constitutional commission would be
tasked with implementing their recommended constitutional changes, which would then
be voted on in a referendum. Once the new constitution was in force, parliamentary and
presidential elections would be held under its auspices. Other important provisions of the
agreement included an explicit statement that the agreement superseded any provisions of
the Yemen constitution, that women were required to be included at all stages of the
transition, and that mechanisms were established for working out difference of
interpretation over the agreement. The complete text of the agreement is available in
English at http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/yemen/yemen_transition_agreement.htm.
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remained in the squares to push for more democratic opening and ensure that President
Saleh did not use the GCC agreement as a means for returning to power. While
participation in protests fluctuated the youth remained mobilized as a potent check on all
the political parties in power (Yemen Times 6/7/12). Youth organizations also shifted
tactics, building political organizations to monitor human rights and advocate for
democratic causes (Yemen Times 12/12/11).

The new unity government, while suffering from severe internal coordination
problems, moved quickly to implement the terms of the transitional agreement.
Critically, the agreement itself assumed a role in public discourse as the primary
instrument of political legitimacy. Both opposition figures and former President Saleh
himself used the rhetoric of supporting the transitional agreement as their primary tool to
defend themselves and attack political opponents. Contention was at times extremely
fierce, with both sides accusing the other of undermining the transition process for the
sake of individual political advantage. Critically, however, the “field of contention” had
moved from the all-or-nothing political struggle of 2011 to a limited range of
institutionalized political tactics, all of which, to be considered legitimate, required
adherence to the principles of an agreement which clearly laid out a path towards
democratic good governance. As President Saleh said in late 2011: “The initiative is
clear and you must not deviate from…its mechanisms, you can but seek its provisions”
(Yemen News Agency 11/28/11). The Al-Ahmar family, the heads of the Hashid tribal
federation, also said that, while they wanted all members of the Saleh family immediately
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removed from power, implementing the terms of the agreement was more important than
settling their individual grievances (International Crisis Group, 2012, p. 12). The
agreement did not eliminate political contention but framed it in a nonviolent,
institutionalized context that set the stage for greater political inclusion.

The terms of the agreement had also laid out a specific program that called for the
inclusion not just of the parties which had signed it but of all the major political forces in
Yemen; including the youth in the squares, the Houthis, and the southern separatists.
Groups which had previously been subject to intense government repression (the youth
and the southerners) or waves of outright civil war (the Houthis) were now targets of
intensive negotiation and dialogue to incentivize their participation in the transition
process. In particular, appeals were made for all parties to join the inclusive national
dialogue, conceived as the key means for working out the constitutional changes which
would determine the post-transition political order.

These political outreaches had mixed results. The Houthis, initially deeply
skeptical of the GCC agreement, agreed to participate in the national dialogue because
“dialogue is part of our culture” (Yemen Times 6/4/12). Youth as well participated in
record numbers, both as representatives of political parties and as representatives of
independent revolutionary organizations. Many factions of the Hiraak refused to
participate in national dialogue because they believed the southern issue should be
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resolved first before considering any other issues. However, several more moderate
factions did choose to participate.

At the same time, President Hadi, elected in his own right in February 2012,
began working on resolving several critical security issues. During the instability of 2011
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and its supporting organization Ansar ash-Sharia had
taken control of much of the southern province of Abyan, including the provincial capital
Zinjibar. President Hadi launched a sustained military operation that, with the
cooperation of local tribal militias, successfully ousted AQAP from its areas of territorial
control in Abyan. US military support also assisted in the successful prosecution of the
conflict, as US intelligence experts helped coordinate the operation and US unmanned
drones supported the operation from the air.

The fight against AQAP was successfully prosecuted despite continuing splits in
the Yemeni military and the presence of hostile armed camps in cities across Yemen.
The defection of the First Armored Division in March 2011 had split the Yemeni military
first into two and then into three separate armed camps: a segment loyal to ex-President
Saleh (centered on the Republican Guard, which was commanded by Saleh’s son
Ahmed), a segment loyal to Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, and later a segment loyal to President
Hadi. Attempts to reform this fragmented structure (a key part of the GCC agreement)
met with strong resistance, even open mutiny. However, the strong support for the
transitional process across all aspects of the political spectrum, even the former ruling
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party, de-legitimized attempts to undermine President Hadi’s military reforms (Alley,
2013). While the reform process was slow, major figures were eventually removed from
command and the military structure centralized in a non-partisan arrangement.

Minor violent clashes between other actors did occur throughout the transition
process. By the end of 2011, Sana’a in particular had been divided into four hostile
armed camps which only slowly withdrew from their positions. Minor clashes occurred
over territorial disputes, old grievances, and attempts to jockey control over the transition
process. However, the clashes which did occur were also quickly contained, and
decreased as the various armed factions moved out of their occupying positions in
Yemen’s major cities. Clashes also occurred between the Houthis and Salafist tribesmen
in Northern Yemen. However, this violence was widely seen as counterproductive, and
the Houthis in particular suffered politically because of it (Al-Muslimi, 2014). While
Yemen’s longstanding culture of an armed populace willing to use violence retained a
powerful influence51 the investment of all the major armed parties in the transition led to
a dramatic de-escalation of political violence.

The national dialogue was initiated in March 2013, with participation from all
major political parties, the youth, Houthis, and moderate factions of the Hiraak. A
required quota of 30% also ensured women’s participation at all levels of the dialogue.
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For example, it was only in June of 2012 that MPs agreed to stop carrying guns in
parliament (Yemen Times 6/14/12).
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Policy decisions from the conference required consensus by at least 90% of participants,
ensuring both a high-degree of buy-in for the conference’s prescriptions and extreme
difficulty in accomplishing anything. The negotiations suffered deep challenges,
particularly relating to the issue of South Yemen’s independence, a point on which most
factions of the Hiraak refused to negotiate. The issue of southern separatism was made
more problematic by rising demands for greater autonomy from the Hadramawt region of
eastern Yemen and the region surrounding the city of Aden. In the end, the national
dialogue was forced to conclude without a definitive answer to the Southern issue. Only
after the conclusion of the dialogue did President Hadi announce that a subsequent
committee had decided that the best solution was the division of Yemen into six federated
regions, two in the south and four in the north.

Perhaps the most critical aspect of the national dialogue was the chance for all
parties to be involved in a real, substantial discussion of the nature of the Yemeni state.
One of the primary problems for democratization across the Middle East has been the
artificial nature of state boundaries and a lack of coherent national identities. Yemen,
with its bifurcated history and multitude of tribal and religious identity groups, is no
exception. What it means to be Yemeni, the relationship of the people to the state, and
the acceptable modes of political discourse have all been unresolved questions. In the
national dialogue, for the first time all of Yemen’s various groups were able to come
together and work out many of these questions.
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When the national dialogue conference concluded in January 2014, it was clear to
all parties that the country was not prepared for the next stage of the GCC-planned
transition process: a referendum on constitutional changes worked out by the national
dialogue conference to be immediately followed by legislative and presidential elections.
The conference thus extended President Hadi’s mandate for a year to continue the
transition process, implement the NDC’s recommendations, and move towards
constitutional changes and new elections. As of the date of this writing the transition
process remains underway, with a committee of legal experts working to draft the
recommendations of the national dialogue conference into a new constitution. A
referendum on the constitution they produce and new presidential elections must be held
prior to January 2015.
Yemen’s prospects for both democratization and civil peace are most accurately
characterized as “uncertain” at this point. However, the GCC agreement staved off a
major political crisis, proved critical in opening the political space to new actors, and
averted an almost-certain civil war.
Egypt: The Army and the People – One Hand?
In Egypt, the immediate antecedent to the events of 2011 was the 2010 legislative
elections. A sense of hope for political change sparked by the return to the country of
former IAEA chief and potential presidential candidate Mohamed el-Baradei was crushed
as some of the most blatant government fraud in recent memory brought a legislature to
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power completely dominated by the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP), with NDP
members winning over 80 percent of the seats.

As news of the successful revolution in Tunisia came to Egypt increased attention
was placed on a protest already planned for January 25th, 2011 – Egypt’s “police day” –
by opposition groups, including the Facebook group “We are all Khaled Said”52
organized by Egyptian Google executive Wael Ghonim. The Egyptian interior ministry
attempted to suppress the protests through a massive security force deployment, but was
thwarted by innovative “flash mob” protest tactics employed by the activists.53 The
surprising turnout and new protest approach allowed the activists to reach and briefly
occupy Cairo’s symbolic Tahrir (“liberation”) square.

Over the next 18 days, protests rapidly grew as opposition political parties,
including the banned Muslim Brotherhood, joined youth protesters in Tahrir square.
While the largest protests were in Cairo additional protests took place in several cities
across Egypt, particularly in the Suez city of Port Said.54 After initial clashes in the first
few days of protests the police largely disappeared from the streets of Cairo; to such an
extent that many attributed the withdrawal to a deliberate tactic on the part of the
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Khaled Said was a young Egyptian from the city of Alexandria who was brutally
tortured and murdered by Egyptian police after publicizing incidents of police brutality.
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For an excellent description of the planning and execution of this initial protest, see
Levinson and Coker 2011.
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Where some of the most violent confrontations of the revolution took place.
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government to foment a breakdown in law and order and incentivize the protesters to
return home. The Egyptian army deployed to the streets of Cairo on January 28 but
declared its intention not to interfere with the protests and instead often operated as a
buffer between protesters and regime supporters.

While protests escalated, the Mubarak government attempted several conciliatory
tactics. Mubarak re-shuffled his cabinet and appointed intelligence chief Omar Suleiman
his first-ever vice-president. Immediately after taking office Suleiman was tasked with
negotiating with the various political factions in Tahrir Square. Several political parties
engaged in negotiation, but the majority of people in the square, predominately the many
diffuse groups of “revolutionary youth,” refused to negotiate with the regime while
Mubarak remained in power (Abaza, 2011). Prominent Egyptian “wise men” also
attempted to mediate between the two sides, pushing for a transitional plan in which
Mubarak would retain the title of “honorary president” but cede all of his authority to
Vice-President Suleiman. Suleiman would then be tasked with forming a unity
government and overseeing constitutional changes leading up to free and fair elections
(Daily News Egypt 2/4/11).

While such concessions would have been unthinkable before the beginning of
protests on January 25th, the combination of repression, condescension towards
protesters, and lack of initiative on the part of the regime both angered protesters and
convinced them that continued action could eventually achieve their most cherished goal
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of forcing Mubarak out. Protest leaders, including Mohamed el-Baradei, also called on
the military to force a solution to the conflict (Daily News Egypt 2/10/11).

As negotiations broke down on February 9 Vice-President Suleiman warned of
the likely occurrence of a coup if protests continued. Protesters largely derided this as a
bluff or intimidation tactic and expressed their intention to continue to escalate tactics
until Mubarak left office (Daily News Egypt 2/9/11). Meanwhile, a wave of solidarity
strikes by workers across Egypt pushing for both political change and labor concessions
added strength to the protest movement and continued to inflict devastating damage on
the Egyptian economy.

On February 10, widespread reports surfaced that President Mubarak was on the
verge of resigning. However, after hundreds of thousands of Egyptians gathered to hear
news of the announcement Mubarak announced that he would not step down and
reiterated his firm intention to maintain his office until the end of his term in September.
Furious protests took place across the country and opposition leaders called for
immediate military intervention. Later reports indicated that Mubarak had been prepared
to resign and had communicated such to prominent regime insiders but had changed his
mind at the last minute after his son and former presumed heir Gamal had talked him out
of it (Daily News Egypt 2/15/11).

As protesters planned increased demonstrations and other tactical escalations the
military chose to take control of the situation. Field Marshall Muhammad Hussein
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Tantawi, chief of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), held a four-hour
overnight meeting with President Mubarak. While the contents of their discussion were
not revealed, the meeting was the end of the Mubarak presidency. The following day,
February 11, as President Mubarak fled to the resort town of Sharm al-Sheikh VicePresident Omar Suleiman gave a brief statement that Mubarak had stepped down and
handed over political authority to Tantawi and SCAF.

The downfall of Mubarak was hailed both in Egypt and around the world as one
of the greatest moments in Middle Eastern history. A sense of euphoria pervaded the
country as activists hailed the victory of “people power” and eagerly anticipated a quick
transition to democracy as promised by Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi and SCAF.
SCAF actively encouraged this narrative, promising activists that all of their goals would
be met, meeting with youth leaders such as Wael Ghonim, and quickly forming a
committee to revise the Egyptian constitution. A number of businessmen associated with
the corruption of the Mubarak regime were also ousted from power and prosecuted.

However, military assets remained inviolable, reform of the military was never an
option on the table, and opposition figures, while consulted, were not given real political
power. Cabinet reshuffles undertaken to assuage protester concerns were largely
cosmetic and orchestrated to keep the old guard in power (Daily News Egypt 2/25/11).
In contrast to transitional plans which had been considered during the revolution, such as
a power-sharing arrangement between the NDP and opposition to oversee constitutional
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changes before the scheduled elections in September (Daily News Egypt 2/9/11b), the
army suspended the constitution, maintained the longstanding state of emergency, and
kept all the levers of real political power in its own hands.

Critically, this approach by the army successfully de-mobilized much of the
massive coalition which had come together to oust Mubarak. Certain more radical youth
“revolutionaries” attempted to remain in Tahrir Square advocating for greater openness
and democracy and condemning SCAF’s authoritarian tactics, and selected mass protests
continued throughout SCAF’s time in power. However, the mass of the people either
accepted the rhetoric that the army’s ouster of Mubarak represented the victory of the
revolution or simply no longer felt motivated to engage in political action. Organized
political groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood split from the young revolutionaries to
carve out their own political arrangement with the military.

Meanwhile SCAF continued to arrest, detain, and try in secret courts over 7,000
activists (Martini & Taylor, 2011). SCAF’s concern with maintaining public support and
its own air of apolitical legitimacy inclined the generals to move away from direct rule,
but they were determined to ensure that any future ruler would be unable to interfere with
their continued political independence and domination of the country’s economy. Thus,
while SCAF maintained a public face in favor of democracy, its manipulation of the
transition process, unchecked by any serious partner in power, pushed towards keeping a
non-democratic autonomous military with little or no civilian oversight.
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SCAF’s direct rule was gradually withdrawn, first with parliamentary elections in
November 2011-January 2012 and then presidential elections in June 2012. Both
elections were dominated by Islamists, with the Muslim Brotherhood taking the largest
proportion of seats in the new parliament (followed by the Salafist al-Nour party), and
Muslim Brotherhood leader Mohammed Morsi elected as Egypt’s first democraticallyelected President.
Morsi’s election was a moment of democratic hope. International observers
hailed the historic nature of the election (Egypt’s first real democratic leader in its
history). TIME magazine put Morsi on its cover with the caption: “The Most Important
Man in the Middle East.” Perhaps most stunningly, Morsi quickly forced the resignations
of SCAF Chief Muhammad Hussein Tantawi and Army Chief of Staff Sami Hafez Anan,
a move hailed by liberal activists and seen as a clear repudiation of military rule.
However, some observers cautioned that the move had been taken in consultation with
military leaders and seemed to be acceptable to the military leadership (Fahim, 2012).
Optimism about Morsi’s rule dissipated as Egypt’s economic problems continued
to worsen, public services broke down regularly, and Muslim Brotherhood and Salafist
leaders pushed moralistic policies alienating to many Egyptians. However, the key
moment mobilizing opposition to Morsi came in November 2012, when Morsi issued a
constitutional declaration granting himself sweeping executive powers. The declaration
was ostensibly made to protect the upper house of parliament and constituent assembly
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from judicial interference but its effect was to grant Morsi greater power than the
president had held at any time under Mubarak (International Crisis Group, 2013). After
widespread protests Morsi quickly scrapped the declaration, but its effect was to drive
away what limited opposition participation there was in the constitution-making process,
leading to the completion of an Islamist-tinged constitution passed in a controversial lowturnout referendum.
In early 2013, a challenge to Morsi’s rule emerged in the activist group Tamarud
(“rebellion” or “mutiny” in Arabic). Tamarud launched a petition drive, aiming to collect
at least 15 million signatures on a petition calling for Morsi’s resignation. The
campaign’s message fell on fertile soil. While Morsi still enjoyed broad support amongst
the Muslim Brotherhood’s supporters, the rest of Egyptian society had become deeply
disillusioned with him, with 95 percent or higher of those outside his support base
expressing a lack of confidence in his rule, and two-thirds saying his election was a
setback for Egypt (Zogby 2013a). While the opposition was divided on the best course of
action to take against Morsi, many favored extreme responses, with over 80 percent
calling for scrapping the constitution and 60 percent advocating for at least a brief return
to military rule (Zogby 2013a).
On June 30, 2013, the first anniversary of Morsi’s inauguration as President,
Tamarud’s long mobilizing process and simple message “Irhal!” (“get out”) paid off.
Millions, perhaps even tens of millions, joined protests across Egypt demanding Morsi’s
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immediate ouster. On July 1, the military gave both the President and the opposition 48
hours to resolve their differences or they would intervene. Morsi angrily responded in a
statement reiterating his position as Egypt’s democratically elected and legitimate
president and condemning any interference in politics by the military. His statement
failed to sway the military leadership and on July 3rd Defense Minister Abdel-Fatah alSisi deployed troops across Cairo and placed Morsi and much of the Muslim
Brotherhood’s top leadership under arrest. An interim government under the leadership
of chief constitutional court judge Adly Mansour was put in power.
Morsi’s supporters reacted to this military coup with huge demonstrations,
centered on sit-ins in Cairo’s Nahda and Raba’a al-Adawiya squares. After receiving a
“mandate” from protesters to “fight terrorism,” al-Sisi led a massive military crackdown
on the sit-ins on August 14, 2013, with at least 600 and possibly many more people killed
on that day alone. The scale of the massacres made the events of August 14 the worst
incident of mass killing in Egypt’s modern history. While the military claimed that the
protesters had been widely armed and had engaged in firefights with soldiers, evidence
from eyewitnesses suggests that, while some protesters may have carried weapons the
vast majority were unarmed or armed only with stones and other improvised weapons
(Human Rights Watch, 2013).

In the months since the military coup repression of the Muslim Brotherhood has
escalated, with the organization first banned and then declared a “terrorist organization.”
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The military-backed government has arrested thousands of Muslim Brothers and their
supporters. The crackdown, however, has not been limited to Islamists, with the military
arresting prominent youth activists and other well-known liberal opposition figures. In
one of the most prominent abuses of civil liberties, three Al-Jazeera journalists were
arrested on charges of having links to terrorism, a stiff charge whose sole source appears
to be reporting on government repression of the Muslim Brotherhood (Fahim, 2014).
The new Egyptian constitution, passed in a referendum characterized by military
intimidation and an opposition boycott, expands the definition of terrorism to create a de
facto military state, and widely expands the President’s ability to call a state of
emergency (Revkin, 2014).

This escalating crackdown on any form of popular dissent has been tied with a fall
in levels of confidence in the military. While 93% percent of Egyptians expressed
confidence in the army immediately following Morsi’s ouster, only 70% continued to
express confidence in September 2013 (Zogby 2013b). However, the military remains
the institution most trusted by Egyptians. A cult of personality has also been built up
around General al-Sisi, with widespread petition campaigns launched to push Sisi to run
for president and comparisons made between Sisi and Egypt’s still-popular second
military president, Gamal Abdel-Nasser (Carlstrom, 2014).55 The military gave Sisi its
official blessing to run for the presidency on January 27, saying that his election was a
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Abdelhakim Abdel-Nasser, son of President Nasser, went so far as to say that his
father’s spirit had been found in Sisi.
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“mandate.” Considering the low levels of confidence in all other potential political
leaders56 and the continued blanket repression of all political opponents, it is extremely
likely that Sisi will handily win the upcoming presidential election.
A disturbing rise in violence has accompanied the months since Morsi’s ouster.
While the military itself has been by far the largest propagator of violence (casualty
estimates from the crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood are upwards of 1,400 deaths),
there has also been a rise in terror attacks by the Islamist group Ansar Beit al-Maqdis
(Partisans of Jerusalem). These attacks have been denounced by the Muslim
Brotherhood but are attributed by the military to its supporters. In the immediate
aftermath of Morsi’s ouster there were also widespread attacks on churches by
Brotherhood supporters, who blamed Christians for their support for Morsi’s ouster.
Recent protests have also seen violent clashes between Sisi supporters and the “AntiCoup Alliance,” a group led by the Muslim Brotherhood which has led protests against
the military. On the third anniversary of the beginning of the Egyptian revolution more
than 50 people were killed in street clashes.
In short, the situation in Egypt is much like it was before Mubarak’s ouster, with
the main difference being an increased level of violence. Some hope remains – Egyptian
activists say the level of political engagement and awareness alone created by the
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No political party or political movement (such as Tamarod) enjoys a confidence rating
half as high as the military’s (Zogby 2013b).
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revolution and subsequent transition will prevent Egyptians from ever submitting
passively to authoritarianism again (Noujaim, 2013). However, the likelihood of a
transition to democracy remains slim at best.

The Effects of Mechanisms of Success
The disparate mechanisms of success in the Egyptian and Yemeni revolutions
have had clear and powerful impacts on their transitional processes. In the Yemeni case,
the negotiated transition by multiple major actors, characterized by consensus, initiative
on the part of the opposition, and political capacity-building led to a transitional
arrangement in which no single actor was able to impose its agenda upon the transition.
Instead all of the major political groups were forced to work together in order to achieve
their goals, creating a system of both formal and informal checks and balances which has
moved the country towards a more democratic, open political system.

Perhaps critical as well was the very anticlimax associated with the transitional
agreement. In Yemen, the pervasive sense that the revolution was incomplete led
activists and politicians alike towards continued mobilization for change, some going so
far as to say that the most difficult stage of the revolution had not even begun until
Saleh’s ouster (Yemen Times 12/12/11). Thus not only did the mechanism of success
itself demand political organization and capacity-building, but its effect even on those
who did not participate was increased nonviolent popular dissent and political capacitybuilding.
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Furthermore, the negotiated GCC agreement normalized and institutionalized an
environment of negotiated problem-solving and consensus-based governance. Actors
which had previously interacted on purely conflictual terms were integrated into a
process of dialogue which gave them political legitimacy based on their adherence to
norms of cooperation and democratization. In its initial stages this process only included
the major elite actors, but the nature of the transition is gradually expanding the political
space to include outside actors such as the Houthis. Perhaps even Yemen’s violent history
became an asset as, despite a full-fledged counterinsurgency against AQAP, concerns of
security were not considered legitimate excuses for centralization of authority (in contrast
to Egypt) and instead seen as impetus towards reforming the government and military
and completing the democratization process.

A rise in political violence did follow the breakdown in state capacity during the
revolution in 2011, in particular due to the rise of AQAP in Abyan Province. However,
the negotiated mechanism of success allowed the Yemeni state after Hadi’s election as
President to focus on re-asserting its control over the regions lost during the 2011
revolution. Had a different mechanism been followed, for instance a coup by the alAhmar family or General Ali Mohsen, the country’s armed forces would likely have been
fully engaged fighting amongst themselves at the center, and AQAP might well have
remained in control of much of southern Yemen until today. Instead, the consensus on a
transitional path which maintained state capacity and involved de-escalation by the armed
actors at the center allowed the state to refocus its strength in regaining control over the
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periphery. While AQAP remains a threat its position has been critically weakened since
the beginning of 2012 and its support is rapidly waning amongst Yemen’s tribes.57
In Egypt, the coup d’état of 2011 also followed its expected outcome. Because
the transition mechanism was not based on consensus but rather on a simple assertion of
power by regime insiders (SCAF), these authoritarian insiders were able to manipulate
the transition process for their own ends. They were also able to do so because the lack
of campaign initiative and capacity built prior to the transition mechanism left only a
fragmented, weakened opposition. The military was also able to subvert the revolution’s
message through selective prosecution of its rivals in the old regime and its narrative of
being the defender of the revolution. The military was less interested in directly ruling
Egypt than it was in maintaining its privileged reputation and economic advantages.
Hence, rather than attempting to prolong military rule it pushed for rapid changes which
prevented meaningful mobilization or discussion against it.
The combative, winner-take-all politics initiated by SCAF’s coup was evident in
the year-long administration of Mohammed Morsi as well. Morsi and the Muslim
Brotherhood attempted a full-fledged capture of the state and showed a deep
unwillingness to negotiate or compromise with their opponents. In contrast to Yemen,
where consensus is becoming the model, in Egypt whatever political actor is in power has
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Tribal defections were a key factor in AQAP’s defeat, as “Popular Resistance
Committees” left AQAP and fought alongside the Yemeni military.
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attempted to rapidly consolidate that power through any means possible. This is a lesson
which was taught powerfully by the coup in 2011 and has now been repeated through the
coup of 2013 (Pahwa, 2013). Whether it was SCAF, President Morsi, or General Sisi, a
zero-sum political game has become normalized. Since the vast majority of the political
cards remain in the hands of the military, this zero-sum game has led to military
dominance and authoritarian repression.

Furthermore, while political violence was minimal in Egypt prior to the
revolution, since the revolution it has dramatically escalated. The military has used
massive political violence first to suppress dissent from the liberal activists who critiqued
its direct rule in 2011-12 and now to essentially attempt to wipe out the Muslim
Brotherhood and any voice of domestic dissent. While such one-way violence does not
necessarily imply that other actors will also take up arms, the growing number of attacks
by Ansar Beit al-Maqdis and violent clashes between Muslim Brotherhood supporters
and supporters of the military suggest that at least a low-level insurgency is growing.

This argument is by no means deterministic or fully definitive. In Yemen,
democratization clearly remains a fragile outcome, to be hoped for but by no means
assumed. Former President Saleh remains a potent transitional “spoiler,” attempting to
sabotage the transition and retain power for himself and his family. Significant elements
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of the Yemeni military remain loyal to Saleh.58 The federal solution to Yemen’s southern
problem has been condemned by most factions of the Hiraak and continued significant
political upheaval on the north-south question is highly likely. Yemen also faces multiple
economic and environmental crises: a shattered economy, declining water table, and
highly armed populace still fragmented into hostile tribal and religious units. Any one of
these would prove a serious challenge to emerging democracy or the maintenance of civil
peace.

However, what hope there is for democratization definitively comes from the
manner of Yemen’s transition (Juneau, 2013). In late 2011, Yemen stood on the brink of
devastating, multi-front civil war. The example of Syria demonstrates the likely counterfactual scenario. Yemen remains fraught with violence and has an uncertain future, but
its salvation from Syria’s fate can be attributed to the norms and political incentives
created by its civil resistance campaign’s negotiated mechanism of success.

In Egypt, too, the return to authoritarianism is by no means predetermined. Many
activists in Egypt are re-thinking their trust in the military and the transitional structures
which were put in place by the coup d’état of 2011 (Raouf, 2014). Activists are calling
for political mobilization directed towards more consensus-based, realistic change rather
than the “negative coalition” demands which have ousted two presidents but failed to
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Though this threat has been significantly lessened since the removal of Ahmed Saleh as
the commander of the Republican Guard.
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achieve democracy (Kaldas, 2014). And while General al-Sisi enjoys broad support this
support is not monolithic. There is, on other hand, continued broad support for an
inclusive national dialogue, with nearly 80% of Egyptians expressing support for a
process of national reconciliation (Zogby 2013b). This increased political awareness on
the part of activists tied with the desire for national reconciliation has the potential for
moving Egypt away from the winner-take-all politics initiated by the coup and towards a
more democratic future. However, the effects of the coup of 2011 remain powerful.

The case studies also shed significant light on the endogeneity question raised at
the end of the previous chapter. In Yemen’s case, the possibility of various mechanisms
of success is straightforward. A coup by General Ali Mohsen might have easily taken
place, or an overwhelming as the regime’s sources of support continued to disintegrate.
If anything, the GCC agreement was the least likely option. Saleh led a personalistic
regime, which should theoretically make negotiation less likely. Sporadic and growing
armed conflict incentivized him to not deal with the opposition. However, despite these
factors the JMP faction of Yemen’s civil resistance campaign was able to reach a
negotiated transitional agreement.

The endogeneity question is also addressed by the Egyptian case.
Counterfactually, it was certainly not inevitable that Egypt’s transition process would
follow the path that it has. Egypt’s 2011 coup now has a feeling of historical inevitability
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which was certainly not there at the time. Significant factions of the protesters in Tahrir
Square were in favor of negotiations with the government.

Several alternative transition paths were proposed, including the proposition of
the “Wise Men” mentioned above, which closely resembled the arrangement reached in
November 2011 in Yemen. In exchange for immunity from prosecution for him and his
family Mubarak would remain in office as “honorary president” while transferring his
executive powers to Vice-President Suleiman. A unity government of half opposition
figures and half government figures would be instated and tasked with constitutional
revisions to pave the way free and fair presidential and parliamentary elections in
September 2011. Such an arrangement, particularly the immunity clause, would have
been unpopular among many, but might have been reasonably expected to lead to
significantly better outcomes than the ouster of Mubarak by coup d’état.
It is even possible that, had Mubarak resigned voluntarily on February 10th rather
than being pushed out by the military on February 11th the shape of the transition may
have been radically altered. A Suleiman administration, deeply unpopular, would have
had significant difficult co-opting the revolutionary narrative, and would likely have been
heavily incentivized to seek allies in the opposition through a negotiated agreement. A
number of groups unwilling to negotiate before Mubarak’s ouster, including the April 6
Youth Movement, had said they would be willing to negotiate once Mubarak left.
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Thus, these mechanisms of success were not meaningfully predetermined the
political opportunity structure of the prior regime. This supports hypothesis H3 stated at
the beginning of this chapter and addresses the endogeneity concern from Geddes.
Alternative mechanisms were realistic strategic options which the various strategic actors
carefully considered and which can be reasonably assumed to have had radically
divergent consequences.

Perspectives on the Arab Spring around the world have largely moved from
euphoria to caution to cynicism. The way in Syria and continued violence and
uncertainty across the region have convinced many that the uprising was a blip, with few
or no lasting effects on the prospects for democracy and peace for the peoples of the
Middle East. Perhaps “people power” is destined to lead to such violence and instability.

This emotional perspective, while understandable, does not match the realities on
the ground. As I have shown in this chapter, these broad strokes miss the critical
difference in mechanisms of success which have radically shaped and continue to shape
the prospects for democracy and peace across the region. The effects of these different
mechanisms of success follow the theoretical argument I made in chapter 2, formally
stated in H1 and H2, and support the large-n quantitative evidence presented in chapter 3.
Yemen’s negotiated transition has set the country on a path of decreasing, though by no
means absent, political violence and increasing political inclusion and democratic
openness. Egypt’s 2011 coup d’état has enshrined the power of the military, normalized
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a conflict-based, winner-take-all politics and will likely result in a return to authoritarian
rule as violence by security forces and Islamists opposed to this new regime continues to
escalate. In the long-term, new factors may arise which will radically change the
prediction. As Egypt and Yemen move away from their mechanisms of success the
iterative effects of the mechanisms may gradually decrease. Only time will tell.
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Conclusion: How Does Civil Resistance Win Well?
The central question of this research project is “how can civil resistance win
well?” In an era where people around the world are increasingly rising up against the
political powers that be and seeking to bring about new orders through the power of
nonviolent action, this question is critically important.

I have shown here that the answer to this question lies in the nature of their
victory. If civil resistance campaigns succeed through mechanisms which rely on broad
political consensus, utilize own initiative, and build their political capacity to push for
positive goals once their negative goals have been achieved, then their efforts are likely
to result in a stable, internally-peaceful democracy.

My work offers indications of how victory in civil resistance campaigns should be
won if the victors seek to preserve their hard-fought gains. In particular the data caution
against perhaps the most dramatic and triumphant of nonviolent victories: overwhelmings
which completely seize the reins of power. If a campaign has reached a level of power
and influence where such a victory is possible it will be deeply tempting to use such
power. But my research indicates that a wise campaign leader will hold back, not giving
in even to nonviolent hubris, and develop a method of transition which will engage and
include former regime elites to protect the future peace. In this regard the example of the
“self-limiting revolution” of Solidarity in Poland is particularly fitting. Even though the
movement had the capacity for an overwhelming victory they chose first to engage the
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opponent in roundtable talks and then to achieve victory only through the lawful,
institutional means granted through those talks. Poland’s high level of democracy and
enduring civil peace speak to the effectiveness of the “self-limiting” path these activists
chose.

For academics, this research is one step in beginning to develop a deep
understanding of the effects of civil resistance. Many questions remain unanswered.
Some of these, such as disaggregating the nature of resignations to understand their
unexpectedly positive performance, I have mentioned previously. Other case studies may
also shed light into the particular dynamics of the mechanisms of success not covered by
my two cases. The importance of strategic interaction which I have argued for here also
has powerful implications for understanding the broader population of transitions to
democracy. Do these types of incentives work similarly in cases of violent revolution or
elite-led liberalization? If so, in what ways are the dynamics similar and different? How
do structural factors affect the operation of these dynamics? All of these are fruitful
avenues of inquiry which the initial insights of this research leave unanswered.

For policymakers my research provides a more nuanced understanding of what to
expect following civil resistance campaigns and thus what interventions are appropriate.
Chenoweth and Stephan’s work has given us broad strokes both for understanding the
widespread existence and frequent success of civil resistance. My work builds on theirs
to help understand what we can expect from these campaigns when they succeed. This
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has implications both for which movements governments should seek to assist prior to
success, the shape of that assistance, and how we should relate to them after they come
into power.59 International actors, particularly the UN, played a key positive role in
helping Yemen’s negotiated mechanism of success come about through well-timed
resolutions and skillful mediation. Efforts by states and international organizations along
these lines are to be encouraged and multiplied.

There are many cautionary tales of civil resistance failure: Burma in 1988,
Tiananmen Square in 1989. But there are also cautionary tales of civil resistance success
such as Iran in 1979. But what these tales of both failure and success often fail to capture
is the deep complexity and multifaceted nature of civil resistance. Civil resistance
campaigns do not fail simply arbitrarily, they fail because they are poorly organized, or
because they lack a broad base of support, or for any number of other reasons. Similarly,
here I have argued and begun to show that when they succeed, civil resistance campaigns
do not simply arbitrarily produce good or bad outcomes. Just as there are complex
reasons for failure, so there are complex reasons for failure after success. If civil
resistance is to win well, its practitioners must understand these complexities.

59

Events unfolding in Ukraine as of this writing provide a particularly potent example of
the importance of this understanding.
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Appendix A: The Civil Resistance Mechanisms of Success Codebook
Introduction
This project represents the first systematic attempt to empirically categorize the
transition mechanisms of nonviolent civil resistance campaigns, building on the work of
Bunce and Wolchik (2011), Chenoweth and Stephan (2011), Sharp (2005) and Helvey
(2005), among others. It is also the first attempt to correlate these transition mechanisms
with future outcomes of democracy and civil peace in order to answer questions about
which transition mechanisms lead to better outcomes. Data available from the author
upon request.
Section 1: List of Variables
1. New, MEC, NAVCO 2.1, NAVCO 2.0, NAVCO 1: Dummy variable indicating
the original source of the campaign. New = author research.
2. campaign: Name of the campaign.
3. location: Country of the campaign.
4. lccode: COW country code for the country. Source:
www.correlatesofwar.org/COW_state_list.xls
5. target: Name of the target regime.
6. byear: beginning year of the campaign
7. eyear: end-year of the campaign (year of the transition mechanism)
8. Decade: Decade in which the transition mechanism took place (coded by first
year, i.e. 1990 for all campaigns ending in the 1990s).
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9. Africa, Americas, FSU, MENA, Asia, Europe: dummy variables indicating the
region of the campaign.
10. tranmech: 6-level nominal variable indicating transition mechanism. Values are
as follows: 1 = Coup d’etat, 2 = Negotiation, 3 = Election, 4 = International
Intervention, 5 = Resignation, 6 = Overwhelming. (author’s coding, see sections
2 and 4 below for more details on this variable and sources for all coding
decisions).
11. trangood: Dummy variable indicating if the transition mechanism was a
negotiation or election.
12. traninst: dummy variable indicating whether transition mechanism was
institutional (author’s coding, see sections 2 and 4 for more information and
sources on coding decisions).
13. trancoerce: dummy variable indicating whether transition mechanism was
directly coercive (author’s coding, see sections 2 and 4 for more information and
sources on coding decisions)
14. transharp: 4-level nominal variable indicating which mechanism of success from
Sharp (2005) matches the case most closely (author’s coding, see sections 2 and 4
for more information and sources on coding decisions).
15. tpop5, tpop10: country’s population (in thousands) 5 years and 10 years after the
transition mechanism (Source: All country-years prior to 2008 Correlates of War
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National Material Capabilities Dataset v.4.0, www.correlatesofwar.org. 20082013 World Bank Databank, www.data.worldbank.org)
16. lpop5, lpop10: natural logarithm of tpop5 and tpop10 respectively.
17. GDPpercap0, GDPpercap5, GDPpercap10: GDP per capita in the year of, 5
years after, and 10 years after the transition mechanism (Source: World Bank
Databank, www.data.worldbank.org)
18. logGDPpercap0, logGDPpercap5, logGDPpercap10: natural logarithm of
GDPpercap0, GDPpercap5, and GDPpercap10 respectively.
19. propdem5, propdem10: proportion of neighboring countries which are
democracies 5 and 10 years after the end of the campaign (Source: Rivera
Celestino and Gleditsch 2013).
20. prewar: dummy variable indicating whether a major episode of political violence
took place in the five years prior to the end of the campaign (Source: Center for
Systemic Peace, Major Episodes of Political Violence dataset,
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm)
21. predemoc: dummy variable indicating whether the country was a democracy
(Polity IV score ≥ 6) prior to the campaign (Source: Center for Systemic Peace,
Polity IV dataset, http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm)
22. postwar5, postwar10: dummy variables indicating whether a major episode of
political violence took place in the five years and ten years after the end of the
campaign respectively (Main Source: Center for Systemic Peace, Major Episodes
135

of Political Violence dataset, http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm. See
Source Note below for special sources).
23. postwar5tot, postwar10tot: sum of major episodes of political violence in the
five and ten years after the end of the campaign (Source: Center for Systemic
Peace, Major Episodes of Political Violence dataset,
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm).
24. logpostwar5tot, logpostwar10tot: natural logarithm of postwar5tot and
postwar10tot respectively.
25. postpolity5, postpolity10: Country’s Polity IV score 5 and 10 years after the end
of the campaign (Source: Center for Systemic Peace, Polity IV dataset,
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm)
26. politychange5, politychange10: Change in the country’s Polity IV score from the
end of the campaign to 5 years and ten years after the campaign (Source: Center
for Systemic Peace, Polity IV dataset,
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm)
27. postdemoc5, postdemoc10: Dummy variable indicating whether the country was
a democracy (Polity IV score ≥ 6) 5 years and 10 years after the end of the
campaign (Source: Author’s calculation based on Polity IV dataset).
28. tranmech1, tranmech2, tranmech3, tranmech4, tranmech5, tranmech6:
Dummy variables indicating the country’s tranmech category.
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29. uncertainty: Dummy variable indicating whether the author is uncertain about
the coding of tranmech, traninst, or trancoerce.
30. Exclusion: Dummy variable indicating whether the case is considered a “weak”
case, i.e. whether the transition in question can truly be considered regime change
or the influence of civil resistance on the transition is unclear.
Section 2: Description of Unique Variables
TRANMECH
Nominal variable describing the empirical transition mechanism by which the
civil resistance campaign achieved success. These six empirically discrete categories do
capture all of the 83 transitions in my dataset with relative accuracy. Critically, the
coding of this variable indicates the mechanism whereby the civil resistance campaign
succeeded, not merely the empirical occurrence of one of these events. Sometimes the
coding decisions are not immediately clear and require careful study of the events
themselves. In all my coding I attempt to be as strictly empirical as possible. For
explanations of all coding decisions see the transition narratives in Section 4.
Possible values for TRANMECH
1. Coup d’etat.
The civil resistance campaign achieves success when the military or other
former regime elites independently seize power and, when in power, grant
the demands of the campaign.
2. Negotiated Transition.
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The campaign achieves success through a process of negotiation whereby
the campaign and its opponent come to a mutual agreement.
3. Electoral Victory.
The campaign achieves success through an election or referendum which
removes its opponent from power. Electoral victory may be ensured
through popular civil disobedience but the election itself must be critical
to the campaign’s success for this variable to be coded as a 3.
4. International intervention.
The campaign achieves success through the intervention, military or
political, of an international third party (a foreign state or international
organization).
5. Resignation.
The campaign achieves success when its opponent resigns or otherwise
steps down from power. This category is distinct from category 3 in that
category 5 transitions do not involve an election or other popular vote.
The opponent simply leaves office.
6. Overwhelming.
The campaign achieves success through a complete overwhelming and
disintegration of the organs of government. The opponent regime simply
ceases to function and the campaign takes over.
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TRANSHARP
Nominal variable which assigns the mechanism of nonviolent success the campaign
followed. Since Sharp’s definitions are more theoretical with unclear empirical
components, coding decisions demanded some speculation and are somewhat arbitrary.
Possible values for TRANSHARP.
1. Conversion.
“The opponent, as a result of the actions of the nonviolent struggle group
or person, comes around to a new point of view which embraces the ends
of the nonviolent actor.” (Sharp 2005, 415-16)
2. Accommodation.
“The opponents decide to yield on an issue rather than risk a still more
unsatisfactory result.” (Sharp 2005, 417)
3. Nonviolent Coercion.
“Shifts of social forces and power relationships produce the changes
sought by the resisters against the will of the opponents.” (Sharp 2005,
418)
4. Disintegration.
“The opponents’ regime or group falls completely apart…opponents’
power is dissolved.” (Sharp 2005, 419).
TRANCOERCE
Dummy variable which captures whether a transition mechanism was categorized by a
high degree of direct coercion. While all mechanisms by their nature involve some
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degree of coercion, this variable captured whether the coercion was direct, explicit, and
central to campaign success.
0. Non-coercive mechanism.
1. Coercive mechanism.
TRANINST
Dummy variable that measures whether the method of transition followed pre-existing
legal institutions. For example: leaders voted out according to constitutional mechanisms
or elections or resigning and being succeeded by constitutionally-mandated successor.
0. Non-institutional mechanism
1. Institutional mechanism
Section 3: Special Coding Decisions
Notes on Data Sources
All data on conflict in country-years from 1946-2008 comes from the MEPV
dataset from the Center for Systemic Peace. Data on conflict in country-years prior to
1946 comes from Gledistch 2004 war list. Data on conflict from 2008-2012 comes from
the Uppsala Conflict Data Program
Upon individual case examination, several end-years from the NAVCO database
did not capture the true year in which the mechanism of success occurred. Any
discrepancies between my end-year coding and Chenoweth and Lewis (2013) thus arise
from my re-coding to define the end-year as the year in which the mechanism of success
took place.
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Specific Coding Special Decisions
PREDEMOC for Cedar Revolution in Lebanon. Polity score not given. PREDEMOC
coded as 0 based on “not free” rating of 5.5 from Freedom House for 2004-2005. See
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2005/lebanon
PREDEMOC for Ghana, Malawi, Zambia all coded as 0 due to all nations being British
colonies prior to transition.
PREDEMOC and POLITYCHANGE for Anti-Balaguer. 1962, year of Balaguer’s
overthrow, Polity codes Dominican Republic as an 8. However, Balaguer’s regime was
still in transition at the time, and was in essence a continuation of the Trujillo regime
which came before it and was consistently coded a -9. Thus, for PREDEMOC and
POLITYCHANGE I use the -9 number for Trujillo’s regime.
POSTPOLITY5, POSTPOLITY10, POLITYCHANGE for Anti-Huong. Polity IV codes
the years 1965-1972 in South Vietnam as “Interruption,” i.e. a period where an occupying
power terminates the existing polity and re-establishes a new one when it leaves and thus
has no polity score. This coding seems strange considering the South Vietnamese
government continued to function during the entire period of US occupation in the
country and engaged in political struggle, political activity, etc… South Vietnam’s Polity
IV score for every other year of its existence is a -3, thus I have extrapolated a -3 score
for the years of “interruption” in order to generate values for these variables.
PROPDEM5 for Anti-Alkatiri. Rivero Celestina and Gleditsch (2013) do not include
East Timor in their dataset. In 2011, the country-year for PROPDEM5, Indonesia, the
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only country bordering East Timor, had a score of 8 from Polity IV, making East Timor’s
neighbors 100% democratic; hence PROPDEM5 was coded “1.”
PROPDEM10 for Anti-Diouf: Rivero Celestina and Gleditsch (2013) do not include
Senegal after 2007. PROMDEM10 (0.5) is author’s calculation based on Polity IV
scores of six neighboring countries in 2010 in which 3 were 6 or higher).
PROPDEM10 for Sierra Leone Defense of Democracy: Rivero Celestina and Gleditsch
(2013) do not include Sierra Leone after 2007. PROMDEM10 (0.5) is author’s
calculation based on Polity IV scores of two neighboring countries in 2008 in which 1
was 6 or higher.
POLITYCHANGE5 and POLITYCHANGE10 for Active Voices: I base these values on
the 1990 Polity score since this is the last one consistent with the Ratsiraka regime and
not contaminated by the success of the civil resistance campaign at the end of 1991.
All dependent variables for Velvet Revolution: Since the Velvet Revolution took place
in Czechoslovakia, a country which ceased to exist shortly after the revolution, I use the
mean of the scores of both the Czech Republic and Slovakia to inform these variables.
All independent variables related to country-year data prior to the transition (PREWAR,
PREDEMOC, POLITYCHANGE) in USSR countries is coded with the relevant values
for the USSR.
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Section 4: Transition Narratives and Sources
In many cases the coding of the transition mechanism is fairly straightforward.
However, in some cases coding required significant research and the coding transition
mechanism is open to interpretation. In all of these cases I have included a
“methodological note” (signified: MN) to explain my coding decision in more detail.

Name: The Ruhrkampf
Country: Germany
End Year: 1923
Transition Mechanism: International Intervention
Secondary Codes: Non-coercive, institutional.
Summary: The Ruhr region was annexed by France in an attempt to force Germany to
pay exorbitant reparation rates. The German government denounced the occupation as
illegal and attempted to organize “passive resistance” against it to prevent the French
both from gaining economic benefit from the occupation and to prevent them from
annexing the region. While “passive resistance” was initially unsuccessful, the English
and Americans intervened, pressuring the French to agree to an international commission
to re-negotiate Germany’s post-war reparations and withdraw from the Ruhr.

Sources


Roosevelt, Nicholas. “The Ruhr Occupation.” Foreign Affairs 4 (1925): 112-122
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Name: Anti-Ibanez Revolution
Country: Chile
End Year: 1931
Transition Mechanism: Resignation
Secondary Codes: Coercive, institutional.
Summary: After a student-initiated uprising which was styled a “civil revolution,”
President of Chile Carlos Ibanez resigned. He was succeeded initially by Pedro Opazo,
the president of the Chilean Senate, a succession mandated by the Chilean constitution.
Opazo almost immediately resigned after continued demonstrations against his rule
convinced the Chilean senate that he could not restore order, and was succeeded by the
premier of the cabinet, Esteban Montero – another succession following guidelines in the
Chilean constitution. While the military and civilian political leadership did support the
new regime there is no evidence that Ibanez’s resignation was the result of a military or
civilian elite coup.

Sources


Rector, John Lawrence. 2003. The History of Chile. Westport, CT: Greenwood
Press. 148-150.



Special to The New York Times. “Revolt Wins in Chile as President Quits; Many
Killed in Riots.” The New York Times (1931, July 27).
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Name: Guatemalan October Revolutionaries against Ubico dictatorship
End year: 1944
Transition Mechanism: Coup D’etat (Military)
Secondary Codes: Coercive, Non-Institutional
Summary: A civil resistance campaign, led by students, rejected attempts by the Ubico
government to negotiate transition. Instead, Ubico abruptly resigned, a move which
created a constitutional crisis. Ubico’s resignation, however, was not the critical moment
of success as the military infrastructure which had run the country during Ubico’s tenure
remained in place, and a junta of close Ubico supporters was left in charge of the country.
The real transition was initiated in October when junior officers, appealed to by the civil
resistance campaign, staged a coup d’etat which overthrew the junta and established a
brief interim administration which organized the election of campaign leader Juan Jose
Arevalo as the next president.

Sources


Cable to The New York Times. “Guatemala Under Military Junta as Unrest
Forces President Out.” The New York Times (1944, July 2).



Cable to The New York Times. “Ubico’s Men Kept Control.” The New York
Times (1944, October 21).
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Grieb, Kenneth J 1976. “The Guatemalan Military and the Revolution of1944.”
The Americas 32, 524-543.

Name: Strike of Fallen Arms
End Year: 1944
Transition Mechanism: Resignation
Secondary Codes: Coercive, Institutional
Summary: The general strike initiated by students and later coordinated by the “National
Reconstruction Committee” achieved success through the resignation of President
Maximiliano Martinez. The NRC had attempted to negotiate a transition path with
Martinez, but while the negotiations had an effect on the later transition they ultimately
failed to reach agreement on the terms of Martinez’s departure – Martinez wanted to
remain in power for another month to oversee the transition, while the NRC demanded
his immediate departure. As the prospects for a violent clash between the campaign and
the military increased, Martinez finally agreed to resign after being urged to do so by
members of his cabinet to avoid bloodshed.

Sources


Ackerman, Peter and Jack DuVall. A Force More Powerful



Parkman, Patricia. 1988. Nonviolent Insurrection in El Salvador: The Fall of
Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez. Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press.
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Name: Anti-Lescot Revolution
Country: Haiti
End Year: 1946
Transition Mechanism: Coup D’etat
Secondary Codes: Coercive, non-institutional.
Summary: A student-initiated five-day general strike in Haiti was aimed at overthrowing
authoritarian president Elie Lescot. When Lescot ordered military leaders to use
whatever force necessary to repress the strike they refused and instead, in consultation
with the American ambassador, staged a coup d’etat, ordering Lescot to resign through
threats to his life. Lescot fled the country and the coup leaders assumed control of the
state, promising to hold free elections.

Sources


Smith, Matthew J. 2004. “VIVE 1804!: The Haitian revolution and the
revolutionary generation of 1946.” Caribbean Quarterly 50 (4): 25-41.



Global Nonviolent Action Database. 2009. “Haitians Overthrow a Dictator.”
Accessed 10/18/13 at http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/haitiansoverthrow-dictator-1946

Name: Anti-Magloire Revolution
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Country: Haiti
End Year: 1956
Transition Mechanism: Resignation
Secondary Codes: Coercive, institutional.
Summary: After several months of student protests a nonviolent campaign against
Haitian dictator Paul Magloire expanded to include a general strike by business leaders.
When Magloire was unable to break the strike through intimidation, and fearing the
consequences if he attempted a broader violent crackdown, he resigned and fled the
country.

MN: Sources indicate that the resignation was Magloire’s decision, and not one initiated
by the army, hence this is coded a resignation rather than a coup. However, there are
some indications that the army at least pressured Magloire or perhaps “requested” his
resignation. Further research might indicate that a “coup” coding is more appropriate.

Sources


Parkman, Patricia. 1990. Insurrectionary Civic Strikes in Latin America: 19311961. Cambridge, MA: The Albert Einstein Institution. Accessed 11/9/13 at
http://www.aeinstein.org/organizations/org/InsurrectionaryCivicStrikesinLatinAm
erica1931-1961-E.pdf
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Global Nonviolent Action Database. 2009. “Haitians Strike and Overthrow a
Dictator, 1956.” Accessed 11/9/13 at
http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/haitians-strike-and-overthrow-dictator1956

Name: Anti-Rojas Revolution
Country: Colombia
End Year: 1957
Transition Mechanism: Coup D’etat
Secondary Codes: Coercive, Non-institutional.
Summary: Initial protests by students over the arrest of an opposition presidential
candidate quickly escalated to include workers’ strikes and a number of other nonviolent
tactics. Transition occurred when a three-member military junta withdrew support from
Rojas and demanded that he step down. While Rojas resigned, this transition is a coup
d’etat rather than a resignation because of the initiatory influence of the junta which took
power when Rojas stepped down.

Sources
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Global Nonviolent Action Database. 2009. “Colombians Overthrow Dictator, 1957.”
Accessed 10/17/13 at http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/colombians-overthrowdictator-1957

Name: Convention People’s Party Movement
Country: Ghana
End Year: 1957
Transition Mechanism: Election
Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, Institutional.
Summary: The Convention People’s Party of Kwame Nkrumah organized opposition to
British colonialism through a campaign of “positive action” which successfully pressured
the British first to allow elections which brought CPP figures into power and eventually,
through a UN referendum and a vote in the newly-created parliament, led to full
independence.

Sources


de Smith, S. A. 1957. “The independence of Ghana.” The Modern Law Review 20
(4): 347-63.



Global Nonviolent Action Database. “Ghanaians campaign for independence
from British rule, 1949-1951.” Accessed 10/18/13 at
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http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/ghanaians-campaign-independencebritish-rule-1949-1951.

Name: Anti-Jimenez Revolution
Country: Venezuela
End Year: 1958
Transition Mechanism: Coup d’etat
Secondary Codes: Coercive, Non-Institutional.
Summary: After an abortive coup in early January shook confidence in the government, a
coalition of underground political parties organized a general strike and mass
demonstrations in Caracas with the aim of ousting dictator Marcos Perez Jimenez. The
coalition directly appealed to the military to intervene on behalf of the people. The
military did so, ousting Jimenez in a coup d’etat and guaranteeing free elections.

Sources


Szulc, Tad. 1958. “Venezuela is Set for Strike Today.” The New York Times
(1958, January 21).



Szulc, Tad. 1958. “Caracas Revolt Ousts Dictator: Dead Exceed 100.” The New
York Times (1958, January 23).

Name: Congolese Independence Movement
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Country: Congo-Kinshasa
End Year: 1960
Transition Mechanism: Negotiation
Secondary Codes: Non-coercive, institutional.
Summary: Political parties in the Belgian Congo, primarily ABAKO and the Parti
Solidaire Africain organized demonstrations against Belgian rule and a massive boycott
of elections for local Congolese authorities (which would remain under Belgian control).
The political disturbance, along with a number of other factors, convinced the Belgians to
hold a roundtable negotiation where they agreed to grant the Congo independence.

MN: While this transition mechanism is certainly clear, this case is somewhat suspect
because it is doubtful to what extent the mobilization by ABAKO and PSA genuinely
represents a civil resistance movement. Civil resistance activities seem to be limited,
possibly only including encouraging Congolese to boycott the Belgian-organized
elections. It may be more appropriate to simply code this transition as an elite-led pacted
transition.

Sources


Lemarchand, Rene. 1964. Political Awakening in the Belgian Congo. Berkeley,
CA: University of California Press.
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Weiss, Herbert F. 1967. Political Protest in the Congo: The Parti Solidaire
Africain During the Independence Struggle.” Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.

Name: Anti-Rhee Student Movement
Country: Ghana
End Year: 1960
Transition Mechanism: Resignation
Secondary Codes: Coercive, Institutional.
Summary: After a rigged election sparked popular discontent against the authoritarian
regime of South Korean president Syngman Rhee students in Seoul initiated a massive
campaign of protests against Rhee’s rule. The protests continued to grow in scope
despite government repression, eventually leading to Rhee’s resignation.

Sources


Kim, Quee-Young. “From Protest to Change of Regime: The 4-19 Revolt and the
Fall of the Rhee Regime in South Korea.” Social Forces 74 (1996); 1179-1208.



Pyo, Yein. “South Korean Students Force Dictator to Resign, New Elections,
1960.” Global Nonviolent Action Database (2012, June 10). Accessed 11/29/13
at http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/south-korean-students-force-dictatorresign-new-elections-1960.
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Name: Nyasaland African Congress
Country: Ghana
End Year: 1960
Transition Mechanism: Negotiation
Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, Institutional.
Summary: The Nyasaland African Congress, led by Dr. Hastings Banda, led agitation for
independence for several years against the British, peaking in 1959 with a widespread
organized civil disobedience campaign, during which time Hastings Banda was placed
under arrest. In 1960, under pressure from the continued disturbances by the NAC, the
British released Banda and held a series of constitutional negotiations with the NAC
which gave Africans rule in Malawi and led to Malawi’s eventual independence.

MN: While Malawi did not become formally independent until several years later, the
constitutional negotiations of 1960 marked the critical turning point in which the balance
of power shifted to Banda and the Congress. Thus I consider the negotiations of 1960 to
be the critical transition mechanism.

Sources


McCracken, John. A History of Malawi, 1859-1966. Suffolk, England: James
Currey.
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Power, Joey. Political Culture and Nationalism in Malawi: Building Kwacha.
Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press.

Name: Zambia Anti-Colonial Struggle
Country: Zambia
End Year: 1962
Transition Mechanism: Election
Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, Institutional.
Summary: In 1961, as the British government was attempting to disengage from its
African colonies, the white minority in Zambia attempted to impose a constitution which
would ensure white minority rule. A widespread civil resistance campaign led by Dr.
Kenneth Kaunda and the United National Independence Party pressured the British to reopen the constitution and change the rules to allow Africa-majority governments. The
constitutional changes, civil resistance, and tireless electioneering by Kaunda, led to the
election of the first African-majority government in Zambia.

MN: While Zambia did not become formally independent until 1964, the election of
1962 was the critical turning point where the British and European settlers in Zambia
capitulated to African demands for political self-determination and African parties moved
from semi-legal opposition to a major role in government. The remaining two years of
ostensible British rule are better considered as a part of the transition.
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Sources


Hall, Richard. Zambia 1890-1964: The Colonial Period. London, England:
Longman Group, Ltd.

Name: Anti-Balaguer Revolution
Country: Dominican Republic
End Year: 1962
Transition Mechanism: Coup d’etat
Secondary Codes: Coercive, Non-Institutional.
Summary: President Joaquim Balaguer of the Dominican Republic was a holdover from
the brutally authoritarian regime of Dictator Rafael Trujillo. Civil society groups
mobilized strikes and demonstrations against Balaguer because of this, demanding he
step down and allow for free elections. After several months of protests Balaguer
negotiated a transitional process with the opposition, but before this process could truly
begin Balaguer was removed from office in a military coup orchestrated by the head of
the air force. The coup was vigorously and vocally opposed by the United States, and a
group of junior officers, supported by the United States, staged a counter-coup a few days
later which brought the opposition into power.
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Sources


“Dominican Junta Ousted; Chief and 4 Aides Seized; Council Again in
Control.” The New York Times (1962, January 19).



Global Nonviolent Action Database. “Dominican citizens general strike for free
democratic elections, 1961-1962.” Accessed 10/18/13 at
http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/dominican-citizens-general-strike-freedemocratic-elections-1961-1962

Name: Anti-Karamanlis “Unrelenting Struggle.”
Country: Greece
End Year: 1963
Transition Mechanism: Election
Secondary Codes: Non-coercive, Institutional
Summary: in 1961, a group of right-wing politicians and military figures engaged in
widespread electoral fraud in Greece to ensure the victory of Conservative leader
Constantine Karamanlis. The fraud led to an outcry across the country and the initiation
of an “unrelenting struggle” by opposition parties, student groups, and labor unions to
oust the Conservatives, a civil resistance campaign of strikes, demonstrations, and
nonviolent occupations. This struggle was a major factor first in Karamanlis resignation
in June 1963, and finally led to victory in parliamentary elections in November of the
same year.
157

MN: While Karamanlis did resign in June, his resignation did not spark a real transition
of power, as the transitional government which ruled until the election in November
remained completely controlled by the Conservatives. The real transition did not occur
until George Papandreou and liberal Center Union party won the election in November.
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Close, David H. Greece Since 1945: Politics, Economy and Society. London,
England: Pearson Education Limited (2002) .
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1821. Chichester, England: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, (2009).

Name: Anti-Huong Campaign
Country: South Vietnam
End Year: 1965
Transition Mechanism: Coup d’etat
Secondary Codes: Coercive, Non-Institutional.
Summary: Buddhist monks demanded that Prime Minister Tran Van Huong step down
after several members of his cabinet were chosen from loyalists to former dictator Ngo
Dinh Diem. Campaign tactics included demonstrations, symbolic hunger strikes, and
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general strikes across several areas of Vietnam. On January 27th, the Vietnamese
military deposed Huong in a bloodless coup and the Buddhists ended their campaign.

Sources


Grose, Peter. “Buddhists spurn Vietnam regime and urge ouster.” (1964, 24
November). The New York Times.
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December) The New York Times.



Topping, Seymour. “Khanh names civilian premier; Buddhists halt
demonstrations.” (1965, 28 January) The New York Times.

Bangladesh Independence Movement
Location: East Pakistan/Bangladesh
End Year: 1971
Transition Mechanism: International Intervention
Secondary Codes: Coercive, Non-Institutional
Summary: Beginning in March, 1971, hundreds of thousands of East Pakistani protesters,
led by Awami League leader Mujibur Rahman, marched in Dhaka demanding
independence for East Pakistan. Local government officials refused to follow orders
from West Pakistani authorities and instead followed a series of directives from the
Awami League leadership, almost immediately making the Awami League the de facto
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government of East Pakistan. After the West Pakistani military attempted to brutally reassert control of East Pakistan through mass slaughter of civilians, with tens of thousands
massacred in the first 48 hours of the attack, Bengali military units defected to the Awami
League and the nonviolent campaign shifted to a military conflict. After a military
intervention by India, East Pakistan became the independent nation of Bangladesh.

Sources:


“Rally Urges PM to Step Down.” The Times of India (1975, June 24).
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March 22).
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1948-1971.” in ed. Maciej J. Bartkowski. Recovering Nonviolent History: Civil
Resistance in Liberation Struggles. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.
(2013).
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New York Times.

Anti-Tsiranana Campaign
Location: Madagascar
End Year: 1972
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Transition Mechanism: Resignation
Summary: Student protests against the Tsiranana government in Madagascar emerged as
early as January 1972, when youths around the country began denouncing deteriorating
economic conditions. On May 12, 1972, protestors organized a strike involving as many
as 100,000 secondary-level students, and many were arrested as the protests spread
beyond the capital of Antananarivo into the provinces and other cities. By May 19,
students were calling for the immediate resignation of President Tsiranana. Though he
did not formally resign for several months, he ceded power to the military the following
day.
Sources:
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Hoagland, Jim. 1972. “Malagasy Demonstrators Quietened After Power is
Transferred to Army,” The Washington Post, Times Herald, May 22.

Thai Student Protests
Location: Thailand
End Year: 1973
Transition Mechanism: Coup D’etat
Secondary Codes: Coercive, non-institutional
Summary: In October of 1973, students in Thailand less mass protests, initially
demanding the release of imprisoned student union leaders but later increasing their
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demands to include constitutional reform and the expulsion of Thailand’s military
dictators. After the military began violently repressing the protests, Thailand’s king
Bhumibol Adulyadej, working through Deputy Army Commander Krit Sivara,
orchestrated the ouster of the military dictators.

Sources:


Handley, Paul. The King Never Smiles: A Biography of Thailand’s Bhumibol
Adulyadej New Haven, CT: Yale University Press (2006).
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Carnation Revolution
Location: Portugal
End Year: 1974
Transition Mechanism: Coup D’etat
Secondary Codes: Coercive, non-institutional
Summary: In April of 1974, a small group of younger leftist military officers, aided by
mass mobilization of civilians, overthrew Portugal’s authoritarian regime in a coup
d’etat.

Sources:
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Revolutionary Process) 1974-1976.” Global Nonviolent Action Database
(11/30/11). Accessed 11/20/13 at
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Greek Protests Against Military Rule
Location: Portugal
End Year: 1974
Transition Mechanism: Coup D’etat
Secondary Codes: Coercive, Non-Institutional
Summary: Uprisings by students, workers and others in 1973-74 along with a disastrous
military adventure in Cyprus and threat of war with Turkey, led insiders in the Greek
military to oust junta leader Ioannidis and return Greece to civilian rule, bringing former
Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis back into power.
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Close, David H. Greece Since 1945: Politics, Economy and Society. London, UK:
Pearson Education Limited (2002).
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Greece, 1967-1974.” Political Science Quarterly 98 (1983): 483-506.

Name: Anti-Bhutto Campaign
Location: Pakistan
End Year: 1977
Transition Mechanism: Coup d’etat
Secondary Codes: Coercive, non-institutional
Summary: After elections in March of 1977, a wide variety of civil society and
opposition groups began a campaign to depose the government of Prime Minister
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. The campaign was sparked by accusations that Bhutto had rigged
the election to favor his Pakistan People’s Party. Demonstrations, nonviolent
interventions, and day-long general strikes were widespread across Pakistan, with
broadbased diverse support. Demonstrations were violently repressed, with scattered
incidents of protesters being shot and tens of thousands of opposition leaders
arrested. Bhutto also attempted to appease the opposition by offering new elections or a
referendum on his rule but his opponents refused, insisting instead that he leave office
immediately. When final negotiations between Bhutto and the opposition in July broke
down, Bhutto was deposed in a military coup by General Mohammed Zia ul-Haq.
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Anti-Indira Campaign
Location: Portugal
End Year: 1977
Transition Mechanism: Election
Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, Institutional
Summary: Anti-corruption activists led a campaign to oust Prime Minister Indira Gandhi
after she was found guilty of election fraud and ordered by a court to step down. Prime
Minister Gandhi responded by declaring a year and a half long emergency in which civil
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liberties were suspended and tens of thousands of opponents arrested. When the
emergency was unexpectedly lifted in January 1977 and Indira Gandhi called for an
election to validate her rule the activists which had opposed her joined together in the
Janata party and successfully ousted her from power.

Sources:
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Name: Iranian Revolution
Country: Iran
End Year: 1979
Transition Mechanism: Overwhelming
Secondary Codes: Coercive, Non-Institutional
Summary: A year and a half-long campaign of protests, strikes, and demonstrations
against the dictatorship of the Shah of Iran peaked in February 1979 when the Shah’s
appointed Prime Minister, Shapour Bakhtiyar, allowed religious and dissident leader
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini to return from exile in France. Millions welcomed
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Khomeini and supported his desire to establish an Islamic government. While Bakhtiyar
maintained his government’s legitimacy, two years of revolution had so shifted the
balance of public support that Bakhtiyar’s regime ceased to function and Khomeini’s new
Islamic government assumed rule over Iran.
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Daneshvar, Parviz. Revolution in Iran. New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, Inc.
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Name: Anti-Junta Struggle
Country: Bolivia
End Year: 1982
Transition Mechanism: Negotiation
Secondary Codes: Coercive, Institutional
Summary: Popular opposition to the series of military juntas which had ruled Bolivia for
several years peaked in 1982, when various civil society groups including unions,
employers’ groups, and the Catholic Church all came together in a unified civil resistance
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campaign. The military, which had tired of rule and was looking for “una salida” to leave
power, accepted a negotiated transition process whereby an opposition government voted
into power in an annulled election in 1980 assumed power.

Sources


Kim, Rosanna. “Bolivians Successfully Oust Military Regime, 1982.” Global
Nonviolent Action Database (2012, September 23). Accessed 12/2/13 at
http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/bolivians-successfully-oust-militaryregime-1982.

Name: Pro-Democracy Movement
Country: Argentina
End Year: 1983
Transition Mechanism: Election
Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, Institutional
Summary: Popular resistance to the Argentine military dictatorship and its brutal “dirty
war” against its own people, spearheaded by the “Mothers of the Disappeared” protest
group, blossomed into a full-scale civil resistance campaign after the Argentine
government’s defeat by Great Britain in the Falklands war. The military, seeking to
extricate itself from rule, agreed to hold free and fair elections. The elections
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successfully ousted the military and gave power to the strongest opponents of military
rule, the Radicals.
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Tedla, Aden. “Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo Campaign for Democracy and the
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September 23). Accessed 12/4/13 at
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Name: Diretas Ja
Country: Brazil
End Year: 1985
Transition Mechanism: Election
Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, Institutional
Summary: A campaign of protests and demonstrations for direct presidential elections in
Brazil unified opposition parties, unions, and civil society groups to launch a united
challenge against Brazil’s retreating military dictatorship. This challenge, bringing on
board many moderate defectors from the military regime, successfully ousted the regime
in the 1985 election which brought a non-military president to power.
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Mainwaring, Scott. “The Transition to Democracy in Brazil.” Journal of
Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 28 (1986): 149-179.

Name: Uruguay Anti-Military
Country: Uruguay
End Year: 1984
Transition Mechanism: Election
Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, Institutional
Summary: Protests and strikes by labor unions and opposition parties successfully
pressured the Uruguayan military dictatorship to abide by an earlier agreement to hold
elections in November of 1984. The opposition successfully won the election, bringing
an end to military rule and restoring democracy.

MN: A process of negotiation between the regime and opposition did lead to the
elections, thus the transition mechanism may be classified as negotiation. However,
since the fundamental breakthrough in power dynamics occurred through the election I
consider the election to be a better transition mechanism classification.

Sources
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Finch, Henry. “Democratization in Uruguay.” Third World Quarterly 7 (1985):
594-609.

Name: Anti-Nimeiry Protests
Country: Sudan
End Year: 1985
Transition Mechanism: Coup D’etat
Secondary Codes: Coercive, Non-institutional
Summary: A massive wave of strikes and demonstrations organized by students,
professional organizations, and other opposition political parties against the regime of
President Jaafar Nimeiry took place while Nimeiry was on a trip to the United States.
Protest leaders convinced the military leadership not to repress the protests and instead
stage a coup when Nimeiry returned to Sudan. The coup succeeded, ousting Nimeiry.

Sources


Abbass, Samia. “Sudanese General Strike Against Numeiri Dictatorship, 1985.”
Global Nonviolent Action Database (2010, October 31). Accessed 11/20/13 at
http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/sudanese-general-strike-againstnumeiri-dictatorship-1985.

Name: Anti-Duvalier Protests
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Country: Haiti
End Year: 1986
Transition Mechanism: Resignation
Secondary Codes: Coercive, Non-institutional
Summary: Beginning in October 1985, widespread protests against the government of
Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier called for his ouster and asked the army to assume
power in Haiti. The protests were largely leaderless and spontaneous, though the bishops
of the Catholic Church played a key role. Duvalier attempted to violently repress them
by the army largely refused to attack protesters, and the US government, one of
Duvalier’s primary benefactors, threatened to withhold aid. Finally, in February 1986,
with the army refusing to follow orders and preparing to assume control of the country,
the US explicitly calling for Duvalier’s exit, and little or no government control in most
of the country, Duvalier fled the country. A military junta assumed power.

MN: This transition mechanism is difficult to code because of the secretive nature of the
relationship between the Duvalier, the Haitian army, and the United States. Pressure
from both of these parties means that the mechanism could conceivably be coded as a
coup or international intervention. The wide breakdown of government control also
indicates at least partially towards an overwhelming. The key factor in my decision to
code “resignation” is the indication that Duvalier departed when he did largely under his
own choosing, and that he also named the military junta members who succeeded him.
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This level of initiative and ability to shape the post-transition order makes “resignation”
the most accurate coding of this transition.
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Name: “People Power.”
Country: Philippines
End Year: 1986
Transition Mechanism: Overwhelming
Secondary Codes: Coercive, Non-institutional
Summary: In 1986 Ferdinand Marcos blatantly rigged a presidential election, sparking
the beginning of a civil resistance campaign against him by the opposition, led by
Corazon Aquino. However, just as the campaign was beginning a group of Marcos
insiders staged an abortive coup. When the coup failed, the coup plotters declared their
support for Aquino and asked for her protection. Millions of Filipinos then gathered
around the camps where the coup plotters were stationed. With monks and nuns in the
front lines, Marcos’ troops refused to attack the nonviolent protesters. As the coup
plotters engineered high-level defections from within Marcos’ ranks, rank-and-file
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soldiers and security forces defected en masse. Marcos, his regime collapsing around
him, fled the country in an American helicopter.

Sources


McCoy, Alfred W. Closer Than Brothers: Manhood at the Philippine Military
Academy. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999.
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1999.

Name: South Korea Anti-Junta
Country: South Korea
End Year: 1988
Transition Mechanism: Election
Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, institutional.
Summary: A burgeoning pro-democracy movement against military dictator Chun DooHwan organized protests to push Chun to allow direct presidential elections. After rallies
grew increasingly powerful, Chun eventually agreed to hold direct elections. While a
split in the opposition meant that Chun’s successor, Roh Tae-Woo, was elected to the
presidency, the election marked a critical turning point for South Korea and
fundamentally changed the character of the South Korean regime.
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Name: Anti-Pinochet Campaign
End Year: 1988
Transition Mechanism: Election
Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, Institutional Transition
Summary: A unified opposition campaign successfully defeated authoritarian president
Augusto Pinochet in a national plebiscite on the continuation of his rule. After Pinochet
lost the plebiscite the military refused to support him any longer and Pinochet was
replaced by a democratically-elected president.
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Regime, 1983-1988.” Global Nonviolent Action Database (2008, October 31).
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Name: Solidarity
End Year: 1989
Transition Mechanism: Negotiation
Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, Institutional Transition
Summary: The Solidarity trade union movement waged a nearly ten-year nonviolent
struggle against the Communist government of Poland, first pushing for independent
trade union rights and later pushing for democratization. A wave of strikes in 1988
pressured the Polish government to agree to engage in “Round Table” negotiations with
Solidarity. These negotiations successfully initiated a political transition in which
Solidarity first entered parliament and eventually elected its leader, Lech Walesa, to the
presidency.

Sources



Garton Ash, Timothy. The Magic Lantern: The Revolution of ’89 Witnessed in
Warsaw, Budapest, Berlin, and Prague. New York, NY: Random House (1990).
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Movements in the Soviet Bloc.” in Stephen Zunes, Lester R. Kurtz, and Sarah
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Beth Asher (eds.) Nonviolent Social Movements: A Geographical Perspective.
Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, Inc. (1999).

Name: Pro-Democracy Movement, East Germany
End Year: 1989
Transition Mechanism: Resignation
Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, Institutional Transition
Summary: The East German transition involved three major mechanisms: an intra-party
elite coup which ousted party leader Erich Honecker, the mass resignations of the
remaining SED government which followed Honecker’s ouster, and the eventual election
which followed the SED’s resignations. However, the elite coup only provided the initial
major opening for the pro-democracy movement while keeping SED rule intact, and the
election followed several months after the regime had effectively ceased to function.
Thus, the critical transition mechanism in the East German case were the final wave of
SED resignations in December 1989.
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Late 20th Century, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 38-55.
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Name: Pro-Democracy Movement, Hungary
End Year: 1989
Transition Mechanism: Negotiation
Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, Institutional Transition
Summary: Liberalization by moderates within the Hungarian Communist party sparked
mass civil resistance mobilization recalling past Hungarian nonviolent uprisings and
calling for democracy. These changes led the Communists to hold a series of
negotiations with the united Opposition Round Table which fundamentally restructured
Hungary into a democracy.
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Name: Velvet Revolution
End Year: 1989
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Transition Mechanism: Negotiation
Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, Institutional Transition
Summary: Inspired by the successful nonviolent revolutions in Poland, Hungary, and
East Germany, students and dissidents in Czechoslovakia sought to oust their Communist
rulers “in ten days.” While the revolution did take slightly longer, after three weeks of
continuous mass demonstrations and general strikes the Civic Forum, an alliance of
opposition groups, held negotiations with the Communist party which led to a new
interim government led by dissidents.
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Name: Bulgaria Anti-Communist Campaign
End Year: 1990
Transition Mechanism: Negotiation
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Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, Institutional Transition
Summary: Civil resistance in Bulgaria was largely initiated after an intra-Communist
party coup, where long-time leader Todor Zhivkov was ousted from power by Foreign
Minister Petar Mladenov. While Mladenov began instituting reforms, opposition groups
joined together to push the pace of reform and held protests and demonstrations
demanding an end to Communist single-party rule and the institution of multi-party
democracy. After months of increasingly powerful protests and strikes the Communists
agreed to hold roundtable negotiations with the opposition. As a result of the
negotiations (backed by continuing external protests) the Communist party relinquished
its constitutional sole hold on power and control over the military, and agreed to allow for
multi-party elections.

MN: Some sources (Roberts 1991) consider the “palace coup” against Zhivkov to be the
breakthrough point in this campaign. However, Mladenov’s coup was prior to the central
stages of the campaign, and did not grant protesters essential demands. These demands
were instead granted as a result of the negotiations sparked by protests after Mladenov’s
coup. Therefore I consider the negotiations to be a more accurate coding of the transition
mechanism.
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.pdf.

Name: Latvia Anti-Communist Campaign
End Year: 1990
Transition Mechanism: Election
Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, Institutional Transition
Summary: Several pro-independence organizations in Latvia organized protests, strikes,
and various forms of creative nonviolent resistance to push for democratic rule and
independence. Their agitation led to the first free election to the Latvian Supreme Soviet
in 1990, in which pro-independence candidates assumed control of the government.
While Latvia did not finalize its independence from the Soviet Union until after the
Soviet coup the following year, this election represented the critical breakthrough point
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where the civil resistance campaign achieved its goals of democracy and de facto
independence.

Sources
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Name: Singing Revolution
End Year: 1990
Transition Mechanism: Election
Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, Institutional Transition
Summary: Estonian civil society organizers led a nonviolent civil resistance campaign for
democracy and independence in the Soviet republic of Estonia. Their efforts, along with
liberalizations by Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev, led to the election of the Congress
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of Estonia in 1990, an alternate governing body that orchestrated Estonia’s independence
from the USSR by August of 1991.

MN: As with Latvia and Lithuania, Estonia did not achieve formal independence from
the USSR until 1991 and civil resistance continued against attempts by the USSR to
reassert its control over Estonia. However, the election in 1990 was the critical
breakthrough point where political authority and de facto independence largely passed to
the civil resistance campaign.

Sources


Tedla, Aden. “Estonians Campaign for Independence (The Singing Revolution),
1987-1991.” Global Nonviolent Action Database (2011, July 14). Accessed
12/7/13 at http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/estonians-campaignindependence-singing-revolution-1987-1991.

Name: Sajudis
End Year: 1990
Transition Mechanism: Election
Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, Institutional Transition
Summary: Lithuanian civil society groups, led by the Sajudis group, led protests
declaring the illegality of Soviet rule in Lithuania and demanding democracy and
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independence, as well as a number of other creative nonviolent resistance tactics. Their
efforts led to a number of organizations, including the Lithuanian Communist Party,
ending their relationships with the USSR and the election of Sajudis to a massive
majority in the Lithuanian Supreme Council in February 1990. Sajudis declared
independence a few months later and successfully nonviolently repelled attempts by the
USSR to re-assert its authority.

MN: As with Latvia and Estonia, Lithuania did not achieve formal independence from
the USSR until 1991 and civil resistance continued against attempts by the USSR to
reassert its control. However, the election in 1990 was the critical breakthrough point
where political authority and de facto independence largely passed to the civil resistance
campaign.
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Name: Kyrgyzstan Democratic Movement
End Year: 1990
Transition Mechanism: Election
Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, Institutional Transition
Summary: Violent ethnic clashes between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in early 1990 sparked a
nationalist movement in the Kyrgyz oblast of the USSR demanding greater democracy
and independence. After protests peaked with a mass hunger strike in Bishkek, the
Supreme Soviet in Moscow allowed the Kyrgyz Supreme Soviet to create the post of
President and hold elections for it. The elections were won by reformer Askar Akaev,
who began a rapid process of democratization and declared full independence from the
USSR after the Communist hardliner coup in August of 1991.

MN: This case only weakly meets inclusion criteria since it is not clear whether the
protests were directly calling for democracy/independence (and were thus maximalist) or
were simply in response to unemployment and mistreatment of ethnic Kyrgyz. Thus it is
possible that this case may be better considered an elite-led transition rather than a
transition initiated by a successful civil resistance campaign. Statistical tests were run
with this case included and excluded.
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Name: Slovenia Anti-Communist Movement
Country: Nepal
End Year: 1990
Transition Mechanism: Election
Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, institutional.
Summary: A wide range of alternative groups arose in the 1980s in Slovenia, pursuing a
wide range of liberalizing agendas. In response to repression by Yugoslavian authorities,
Slovenian alternative groups came together through protests and demonstrations to push
the sympathetic Slovenian Communist government to liberalize and move away from
Yugoslavia. These protests led to Slovenia’s first democratic elections in 1990, in which
a coalition of opposition parties was brought into power with a mandate to get Slovenia
out of Yugoslavia. Slovenia achieved full independence within a year.
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MN: This case only weakly meets inclusion criteria – the evidence for an organized civil
resistance campaign, while it might show itself to be more extensive after further
research, is quite limited. However, the existence of the semi-organized “alternative” and
their activities pushing for democratization and independence are certainly strong
indications of organized civil resistance. As with similar post-Communist cases I
consider the transition mechanism to be the election whereby liberal oppositions first
came into power, rather than the formal declaration of independence a year later. As with
other cases whose inclusion in the dataset is weak, statistical tests were run which both
included and excluded this case.
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Prunk, Janko. “The Origins of an Independent Slovenia.” in Danica Fink-Hafner
and John R. Robbins (eds) Making a New Nation: The Formation of Slovenia.
Brookfield, VT: Dartmouth Publishing Company (1997).



Silber, Laura and Allan Little Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation. New York, NY:
Penguin Books (1997).

Name: Benin Anti-Communist Campaign
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End Year: 1990
Transition Mechanism: Negotiation
Secondary Codes: Coercive, Institutional Transition
Summary: A year of civil resistance, primarily strikes by students and labor unions, with
support from the church and civil society institutions, forced long-time Communist leader
Mathieu Kerekou to agree to hold a national dialogue. The national dialogue concluded
by declaring its own sovereignty, stripping Kerekou of his powers, and creating a multiparty democracy in Benin.

Sources


Bierschenk, Thomas “Democratization Without Development: Benin 1989-2009.”
The International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 22.3 (2009) 337-57.

Name: Mongolia Anti-Communist Campaign
End Year: 1990
Transition Mechanism: Resignation
Secondary Codes: Coercive, Institutional Transition
Summary: The politburo of the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party (MPRP), the
Communist party which had ruled Mongolia for almost 70 years, resigned after the
Mongolian Democratic Union organized larger and larger street demonstrations
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demanding an opening of the Mongolian political system. While the resignation was
followed by a process of negotiations and eventually multiparty elections, the transition
mechanism itself is best identified as the resignation, while what followed was essentially
part of the later political transition.

Sources


Rossabi, Morris. 2005. Modern Mongolia: From Khans to Commissars to
Capitalists. Berkeley: University of California Press. 21-28.

Name: Anti-Ershad Campaign
End Year: 1990
Transition Mechanism: Resignation
Secondary Codes: Coercive, Institutional
Summary: An alliance of major political parties, along with student groups, organized a
series of paralyzing strikes to demand that dictator Hussein Muhammad Ershad step
down and hand over power to a Vice President selected by the opposition. Ershad
attempted to suppress the uprising through force, but his violent tactics sparked broader
mobilization against his regime. The leadership of the military, believing that Ershad’s
actions were tarnishing the military as an institution, decided that they could no longer
support Ershad as president. Upon receiving news of the military’s defection, Ershad
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acceded to the opposition’s demand, resigned, and handed power over to the candidate
selected by the opposition.

Methodological note: The central role of the military defection in Ershad’s resignation
might lead some to code this transition as a coup. The key distinction is that, while the
military did defect, they did not attempt to independently seize power, nor did they
themselves initiate the transition. Ershad, rather, chose to resign and himself took the
iniating step. Power was also handed over to the candidate selected by the united
opposition, not taken up by the military. Thus it is more appropriate to code this
transition mechanism as a resignation.

Sources


Maniruzzaman, T. 1992. "The Fall of the Military Dictator: 1991 Elections and
the Prospect of Civilian Rule in Bangladesh." Pacific Affairs 65(2): 203-224.

Name: Movement for the Restoration of Democracy
Country: Nepal
End Year: 1990
Transition Mechanism: Negotiation
Secondary Codes: Coercive, institutional.
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Summary: In 1990 the Nepali Congress, along with a constellation of other political
groups, students, and others led strikes and demonstrations demanding an end to
monarchical rule and a move towards a constitutional monarchy. When neither cooptation nor violent repression succeeded in suppressing the movement the king issued a
proclamation allowing for the drafting of a new constitution. Through a process of
intensive negotiation between the king and the opposition an new constitution was
promulgated making Nepal a constitutional monarchy.

Sources


Schock, Kurt. 2005. Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements in NonDemocracies. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. 120-125.

Name: Niger Anti-Military Campaign
Country: Nepal
End Year: 1991
Transition Mechanism: Negotiation
Secondary Codes: Coercive, institutional.
Summary: In 1991, protests by students and independent labor unions successfully
pressured Col. Ali Saibou, military ruler of Niger, to begin a transition to democracy.
The campaign demanded that Saibou allow a “national dialogue” group of government
and civil society leaders to determine how to transition the country to democracy. Saibou
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agreed, and the national dialogue was put in place. After three months of negotiations the
national dialogue dissolved the government and put in place a transitional administration.

MN: The establishment of the National Conference and its process of putting in place a
transitional government does fit the general profile of a mechanism of success. However,
it would also not be unreasonable to code the transition as occurring when Niger
officially voted on a democratic constitution in 1992 or when the first democraticallyelected government assumed office in 1993. These different codings effect how Niger’s
future outcomes are coded because Niger suffered a brief return to authoritarianism from
1996-98. According to PolityIV, Niger was a robust democracy for three years after the
negotiated transition, and returned to at least weak democracy after the coup of 1996 led
to that brief period of authoritarianism. Thus the particular timing of Niger’s transition
process may have outsized effects on how it appears in the data.

Sources


“Niger’s Pro-Democracy Conference to Start on Monday.” Reuters News (1991,
July 27).



“Niger Conference Dissolves Government, Dismisses Army Chief.” Reuters News
(1991, September 10).



“Niger’s National Conference Elects Prime Minister.” Reuters News (1991, 27
October).
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Name: Albania Anti-Communist Campaign
Country: Albania
End Year: 1991
Transition Mechanism: Resignation
Secondary Codes: Coercive, institutional.
Summary: Civil resistance to the Albanian Communist regime, which had begun in 1989,
peaked in May-June of 1991, when a general strike organized by students and labor
groups along with the recently-formed Democratic Party paralyzed the country for four
weeks. Along with economic demands the strikers called for an end to Communist rule.
Unable to end the strike, the Communist government resigned. I consider the resignation
to be the key transition mechanism for two reasons: although Albania did have a previous
democratic election, the election failed to unseat the Communists, and the leadership of
the country remained largely unchanged. After the strike while the Communists did not
fully depart from power they only remained in power in a coalition transitional
government along with the Democratic Party until new elections were held. The
Communists who remained also purged much of their former leadership and completely
changed their platform to move from being a Communist party to a Democratic Socialist
party. Thus the period of interim government is more appropriately considered as part of
the transition, rather than part of the civil resistance campaign.
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Sources


Vickers, Miranda and James Pettifer. 2000. Albania: From Anarchy to a Balkan
Identity. New York, NY: New York University Press.

Name: Zambia Pro-Democracy
Country: Zambia
End Year: 1991
Transition Mechanism: Election
Secondary Codes: Non-coercive, institutional.
Summary: Powerful Zambian labor unions spearheaded a civil resistance campaign
beginning in 1989 against the one-party rule of long-time authoritarian President of
Zambia Kenneth Kaunda, demanding a change in Zambia’s constitution to allow multiparty rule and oust Kaunda from power. The campaign gained momentum in June when
the government raised the price of Maize, sparking riots, and when massive celebrations
when reports were issued that Kaunda had been ousted in a coup publicly revealed the
extent of popular opposition to President Kaunda. As protests grew larger President
Kaunda agreed to allow multi-party elections and created a commission to draft a new
constitution. Multi-party elections in 1991 successfully ousted Kaunda and brought the
opposition, under the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) into power.
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Sources


Bratton, Michael. “Zambia Starts Over.” Journal of Democracy 3.2 (April 1992),
81-94.

Name: Russian Anti-Coup Protests
Country: Russia/USSR
End Year: 1991
Transition Mechanism: Overwhelming
Secondary Codes: Coercive, Non-institutional.
Summary: In August of 1991 a group of Soviet “hardliners” attempted to stage a coup
against the leadership of reformist Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. However, mass
popular uprisings against the coup, initiated but only partially led by Russian President
Boris Yeltsin, led to mass military defections and the disintegration of the coup leaders
incipient regime.

MN: I code this transition mechanism as “overwhelming” because of the disintegrative
nature of the campaign’s success against the coup leaders. The coup’s organizational
structure quite literally fell apart as the campaign sparked widespread military defections.
Thus while physical overwhelming may not have occurred, the disintegrative mechanism
is best coded as overwhelming.
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Sources


Nakhoda, Zein. “Defense of Soviet State Against Coup, 1991.” Global Nonviolent
Action Database (2011, May 14). Accessed 12/9/13 at
http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/defense-soviet-state-against-coup-1991.



Sharp, Gene and Bruce Jenkins. The Anti-Coup. Boston, MA: The Albert Einstein
Institution (2003). Accessed 12/9/13 at http://www.aeinstein.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/09/TAC-1.pdf.

Name: Belarus Pro-Democracy Movement
Country: Belarus
End Year: 1991
Transition Mechanism: Coup d’etat
Secondary Codes: Coercive, institutional.
Summary: Democratic and nationalistic opposition had been building in Belarus for
several years, with protests and demonstrations supporting demands for a break from the
Soviet Union and a more open political system. In 1990, despite election rules which
heavily weighted allocation of seats towards the Communist Party members of the
opposition were elected to the Belarussian Supreme Soviet. In the following year the
Belorussian Communist party quickly lost members, so that, when the August 1991
attempted coup occurred in Russia, the Belorussian Communists were severely
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weakened. With demonstrators gathering outside the parliament demanding
independence and an end to Communist rule, the Supreme Soviet held a two-day
extraordinary meeting. In this meeting more liberal members of the Communist party
allied with the opposition, forced the resignation of the President of the Supreme Soviet
and declared Belarus independent. A few days later the entire cabinet declared that they
had “suspended” their membership in the Communist party, officially ending Communist
rule.

MN: Belarus is a difficult case to code because the transition lacks very clear, distinctive
transition points. However, when understood from the POV of the goals of the campaign
(independence and an end to Communist rule) the August declaration seems to be the
clearest transition moment. The mechanism I consider to be an elite coup because it was
essentially a rebellion and assumption of power within the ranks of the Belorussian
Communist party. However, a plausible argument could be made for coding the
transition as either a resignation or a negotiation. Resignation I find less plausible
because of the aspect of pressure from other members of the Communist party on the top
leadership. Negotiation is more plausible but also problematic because sources indicate
that the primary actors were intra-Communist, with the opposition merely playing a
pressuring role. However, additional research might lend greater credence to coding this
transition as a negotiation. In my statistical tests I run separate regressions coding
Belarus both ways, with no significant effects on my results.
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Sources


Zaprudnik, Jan. Belarus: At a Crossroads in History. Boulder, CO: Westview
Press (1993).

Name: Thailand Pro-Democracy Movement
Country: Thailand
End Year: 1992
Transition Mechanism: Election
Secondary Codes: Coercive, institutional.
Summary: The Campaign for Popular Democracy, an umbrella group of opposition
parties, students, and other civil society groups organized mass demonstrations in
Bangkok and other cities around Thailand to demand an end to military rule and promote
a more democratic constitution. The protesters also called specifically for the resignation
of Prime Minister Suchinda, who was from the military. Suchinda resigned in May of
1992 after several days of bloody protest suppression by the military, but protests and
other political activism continued until an election in September, when a coalition of prodemocracy parties was voted into office, thus the election, not the resignation of
Suchinda, is the key moment of success in this campaign.

Sources
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Schock, Kurt. 2005. Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements in NonDemocracies. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. 120-125.

Name: Active Voices Campaign
End Year: 1991
Transition Mechanism: Negotiation
Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, Institutional Transition
Summary: The unified “Active Voices” opposition staged a six-month general strike in
1991 that forced authoritarian president Didier Ratsiraka to agree to a negotiated powersharing arrangement that put opposition figures in most major positions of power and led
to a new constitution and Ratsiraka’s eventual final ouster from power in a presidential
election in 1993.

MN: I consider the breakthrough to be the negotiations of late 1991 because these
resulted in the fundamental shift of the opposition from civil resistance to a position of
power shaping the transition process. While Ratsiraka retained some power throughout
the following two-year transition his power was largely subordinated to the opposition.
Thus the negotiation is a better coding of the transition mechanism than the election.

Sources

199



“Madagascar Opposition Wins Key Posts in Transitional Rule.” Reuters News
(1991, November 1).



“National Unity Government Takes Office in Madagascar.” Reuters News (1991,
December 19).



Randrianja, Solofo. “’Be not Afraid, Only Believe;: Madagascar 2002.” African
Affairs 102 (2003) 309-329.



Ruyter, Elena. “Madagascar Citizens Force Free Elections, 1990-1992.” Global
Nonviolent Action Database (2011, October 12). Accessed 12/5/13 at
http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/madagascar-citizens-force-freeelections-1990-1992.

Name: Anti-Hoyte Protests
Country: Guyana
End Year: 1992
Transition Mechanism: Election
Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, Institutional
Summary: Protests in the early 1990s successfully pressured authoritarian Socialist leader
Desmond Hoyte to hold free and fair elections in Guyana. The elections successfully
ousted Hoyte.
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MN: The role of civil resistance in this case was unclear based on the research
performed. This case may be better considered an elite-led transition. Statistical tests
were run both including and excluding this case.

Sources


French, Howard W. “Guyana Marxist, Mellowed, Makes a Comeback.” The New
York Times (1991, July 5).



Wilkinson, Bert. “Jagan Defeats President Hoyte in Violence-Wracked Election.”
The Associated Press (1992, October 7).

Name: People Against Violence
Country: Slovakia
End Year: 1992
Transition Mechanism: Negotiation
Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, Institutional
Summary: People Against Violence, a Slovak dissident group, was a critical force in the
1989 “Velvet Revolution” which ousted the Communist government of Czechoslovakia.
Over the following three years Slovak activists continued to push for an independent
Slovakia. A series of negotiations between Czech and Slovak leaders, backed by
continuing pressure from the streets in Slovakia, led to Slovakia’s peaceful secession in
November of 1992.
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Sources


Innes, Abby. Czechoslovakia: The Short Goodbye. New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press (2001).



Kirschbaum, Stanislav J. A History of Slovakia: The Struggle for Survival. New
York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

Name: Mali Pro-Democracy Movement
Country: Mali
End Year: 1991
Transition Mechanism: Coup d’Etat
Secondary Codes: Coercive, Non-Institutional
Summary: Students, opposition groups, and labor unions led a massive civil resistance
campaign against Mali’s military dictator: General Moussa Traore. When violent
repression backfired and the campaign continued to grow the military defected en masse
and joined protests. A group of officers, led by Lieutenant Colonel Amadou Toumani
Toure staged a coup, arrested General Traore and promising to initiate a transition to
multi-party democracy.

Sources
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Passanante, Aly. “Malians Defeat Dictator, Gain Free Election (March
Revolution), 1991. Global Nonviolent Action Database (2011, February 20).

Name: Malawi Multi-Party Democracy Movement
Country: Malawi
End Year: 1993
Transition Mechanism: Election
Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, Institutional
Summary: Strikes and demonstrations by students, labor unions, and the Catholic Church
successfully pressured long-time authoritarian President Hastings Banda to hold a
referendum on moving Malawi from a one-party state to a multi-party democracy. The
civil resistance campaign, with help from UN observers, successfully won the
referendum, initiating a process of constitutional reform which ended with a free and fair
election in 1994 which finally ousted President Hastings Banda from power.

MN: An argument could be made that either the election or the referendum are the
critical mechanism of transition in this case. This does not affect how the transition
mechanism is coded, since both would fall under my category of “elections,” but does
change whether the end year of the campaign is considered to be 1993 or 1994, and thus
has effects on the values of the control variables. I consider the referendum to be the
transition point because it placed multi-party election advocates in significant authority
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and initiated the constitutional reform process. Changing the end-year does not cause
significant changes in the values of Malawi’s post-campaign variables.

Sources


Carpenter, Lindsay. “Malawians Bring Down 30-Year Dictator, 1992-1993.”
Global Nonviolent Action Database (2011, August 2). Accessed 12/11/13 at
http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/malawians-bring-down-30-yeardictator-1992-1993.

Name: South African Defiance Campaign
Country: South Africa
End Year: 1992
Transition Mechanism: Negotiation
Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, Institutional
Summary: A series of nonviolent mass uprisings, including boycotts of white businesses,
creation of alternative institutions, and labor strikes, as well as an international
divestment and sanctions campaign, led the government of apartheid South Africa to
engage in a negotiated transition process, under the auspices of the Convention for a
Democratic South Africa (CODESA). While it faced significant challenges, CODESA
eventually led to an agreement in late 1992 to hold national elections and a five-year
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national unity government. The election, held in 1994, led to the election of freedom
fighter Nelson Mandela as South Africa’s first black president.

MN: South Africa’s transition presents a significant coding challenge. There are three
significant points which can be argued as the mechanism of success: de Klerk’s decision
to legalize the ANC and free Nelson Mandela in 1990, the CODESA negotiations which
concluded in 1992, and the election in 1994. CODESA is the best choice for the
following reasons:


The 1990 decisions by de Klerk, while they significantly opened the ability of the
ANC to shape the future of South Africa, did not lead to a real shift in power, thus
they are not significant enough to be considered the mechanism of transition.



The 1994 election, while groundbreaking, took place under an already agreedupon negotiated framework. When the election took place, the ANC was already
in the position of strenuously pushing its agenda through its own political
influence and was guaranteed at least some role in the post-election government
(because of the agreements on forming a government of national unity made at
CODESA). The election thus determined primarily how big the ANC’s power in
the government would be, not whether they would have a role.



The negotiated agreement from CODESA thus represents the best coding of the
transition mechanism. It gave the ANC and other African groups significant
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political influence, and critically shaped how South Africa’s future transition took
place.

Sources


Davenport, T.R.H. The Birth of a New South Africa. Toronto, Canada: University
of Toronto Press (1998).



Jackson, John. “The 1994 Election: An Analysis.” In F.H. Toase and E.J. Yorke
(eds) The New South Africa: Prospects for Domestic and International Security.
New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press (1998).



Schock, Kurt. Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements in
Nondemocracies. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press (2005).

Name: Anti-Suharto Protests
Country: Indonesia
End Year: 1998
Transition Mechanism: Resignation
Secondary Codes: Coercive, Non-Institutional
Summary: A massive civil resistance campaign, primarily led by students and fueled by a
major economic crisis, led to mass defections from the regime of Indonesian dictator
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Suharto. As his regime increasingly lost cohesion Suharto resigned, handing over power
to his vice-president, B.J. Habibie, who initiated a democratic transition.

Sources


Boudreau, Vincent. Resisting Dictatorship: Repression and Protest in Southeast
Asia. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press (2004).



Noble, Sarah. “Sierra Leone Citizens Defend Democracy, 1997-1998.” Global
Nonviolent Action Database (2009, June 10). Accessed 12/11/13 at
http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/indonesians-overthrow-presidentsuharto-1998.

Name: Sierra Leone Defense of Democracy
Country: Sierra Leone
End Year: 1998
Transition Mechanism: International Intervention
Secondary Codes: Coercive, Non-Institutional
Summary: After a military coup ousted Sierra Leone’s first multi-party democracy labor
unions, teachers unions, and student groups organized protests and strikes against the new

207

military government. The campaign ended successfully when an African peacekeeping
force invaded the country and ousted the coup leaders, restoring democratic governance.

Sources


Lakey, George. “Sierra Leone Citizens Defend Democracy, 1997-1998.” Global
Nonviolent Action Database (2008, January 10). Accessed 11/12/13 at
http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/sierra-leone-citizens-defenddemocracy-1997-1998.

Nigerian Anti-Military Rule
Location: Nigeria
End Year: 1999
Transition Mechanism: Election
Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, Institutional
Summary: Civil society organizations in Nigeria launched civil resistance throughout the
rule of military dictator Sani Abacha to demand an end to military rule and a return to
multi-party democracy. Domestic resistance, tied with a declining economy and the
death of Abacha in 1998 led to a rapid liberalization under General Abubakar and finally
an election in 1999 which was won by Olusegun Obasanjo.
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MN: Initial research puts only limited links between the civil resistance which took place
in Nigeria and the transition away from military rule. A better understanding may be to
look at this case as an elite-led transition from a reluctant ruling military following
Abacha's death. Thus this case is considered to only weakly meet inclusion
criteria. Statistical tests were run which both included and excluded this case.

Sources


Edozie, Rita Kiki. People Power and Democracy: The Popular Movement
Against Military Despotism in Nigeria, 1989-1999. Trenton, NJ: Africa World
Press, Inc.



Falola, Toyin and Matthew M Heaton. A History of Nigeria. Cambridge, England:
Cambridge University Press.

Name: Timorese Resistance
Country: Indonesia/East Timor
End Year: 2000
Transition Mechanism: International Intervention
Secondary Codes: Coercive, Non-institutional.
Summary: After a long struggle against Indonesian occupation involving both guerrilla
warfare and nonviolent resistance the citizens of East Timor voted overwhelmingly for
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independence from Indonesia in a 1999 referendum. However, immediately after the
referendum Indonesian-backed militias invaded East Timor to reassert Indonesian rule.
Independence was only achieved the following year when an Australian-led UN force
invaded East Timor and established East Timor as an independent state.

MN: I do not consider the referendum to be the mechanism of success in this case
because it was followed by a de facto invasion to reassert Indonesian authority. Thus,
while the referendum was no doubt central to how future events played out the key
mechanism of success was the international military intervention.

Sources


Jones, Hannah. “East Timorese Activists Campaign for Independence from
Indonesia, 1987-2002.” Global Nonviolent Action Database (2011, February 16).
Accessed 12/12/13 at http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/east-timoreseactivists-campaign-independence-indonesia-1987-2002.



Stephan, Maria J. “Fighting for Statehood: The Role of Civilian-Based Resistance
in the East Timorese, Palestinian, and Kosovo Albanian Self-Determination
Movements.” Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 30.2 (Summer 2006).

Name: Anti-Fujimori
Country: Peru
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End Year: 2000
Transition Mechanism: Resignation
Secondary Codes: Coercive, institutional.
Summary: Discovery of evidence implicating a top advisor of Peruvian President Alberto
Fujimori of corruption sparked mass protests demanding Fujimori’s resignation. The
protests, tied with continuing investigations into corruption in Fujimori’s administration
led to his resignation.

Sources


Munoz, Aurora. “Surinamese Protest Against President, 1999.” Global Nonviolent
Action Database (2011, February 6). Accessed 12/8/13 at
http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/peruvians-campaign-overthrowdictator-alberto-fujimori-march-four-directions-2000.

Name: Anti-PRI Campaign
Country: Mexico
End Year: 2000
Transition Mechanism: Election
Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, institutional.
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Summary: Several waves of protest, as well as economic challenges and elite-led
liberalization, led to the successful ouster of the long-time authoritarian PRI party in
Mexico in the 2000 Mexican presidential election.

MN: Initial research revealed a minimal civil resistance role, thus the case is considered a
weak example. Statistical tests were run both including and excluding this case.

Sources


Kirkwood, Burton. The History of Mexico. Santa Barbara, CA: Greenwood Press.

Name: Croatia Democratic Opposition
Country: Croatia
End Year: 2000
Transition Mechanism: Election
Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, institutional.
Summary: An alliance of opposition parties and civil society activists came together to
challenge the rule of Croatia’s semi-authoritarian nationalist government. Protests,
innovative campaigning, and the unexpected death of Croatian President Franjo Tudman,
all came together for the opposition to win a majority in parliament and the presidency
and initiate democratic reforms.
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Sources


Bunce, Valerie J. and Sharon L. Wolchik. Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in
Postcommunist Countries. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.



Fisher, Sharon. Political Change in post-Communist Slovakia and Croatia: From
Nationalist to Europeanist. New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan (2006).

Name: Bulldozer Revolution/Otpor
Country: Yugoslavia
End Year: 2000
Transition Mechanism: Election
Secondary Codes: Coercive, institutional.
Summary: The Serbian student movement Otpor spearheaded a campaign of civil
resistance against Serbian dictator Slobodan Milosevic, engaging in creative protests to
undermine the narrative of Milosevic’s inevitable rule and successfully unifying the
fragmented Serbian opposition into the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS). Due in
large part to Otpor’s efforts, DOS’s presidential candidate, Vosislav Kostunica, defeated
Milosevic in the 2000 Yugoslavian presidential election. When Milosevic falsely
claimed that Kostunica had received less than 50% of the vote and thus a second round of
elections was called for Otpor and opposition activists engaged in a wave of massive
demonstrations, occupying central Belgrade, while outside of Belgrade workers at the
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Kolubara coal mines (which supplied half of the country’s electricity) went on strike.
Faced with increasing resistance and with police largely refusing to obey orders to
disperse protesters the constitutional court reversed its ruling claiming a second round
was required, Milosevic renounced his claim to the presidency, and Kostunica was made
President of Yugoslavia.

MN: Coding the transition mechanism in this case is challenging because of different
possible interpretations of the importance of the election. An argument could be made
for this case being an example of negotiation (because the court reversed its decision and
Milosevic stepped down after meetings with Kostunica), or of overwhelming (since after
the election the massive protests, strikes, and defections by police and local government
officials were crucial in ending Milosevic’s rule). However, while the largest
mobilization took place after the election itself, I consider the election to be the crucial
transition mechanism for X reasons


Winning the election was clearly a necessary component for the mobilization
which took place afterwards.



The protests were explicitly focused on ensuring the government honored the
terms of the election rather than seeking a different route to power, e.g. through
negotiation or extra-institutional seizure of power.



The final victory took the form of the constitutional court reversing its stand on
the election and Milosevic acknowledging the results of the election.
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Postcommunist Countries. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
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and Postcommunist Colored Revolutions.” Perspectives on Politics 5, no. 3
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Name: Anti-Rawlings Campaign
Country: Ghana
End Year: 2000
Transition Mechanism: Election
Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, institutional.
Summary: After almost 20 years of continuous rule by authoritarian leader Jerry
Rawlings (first as an un-elected coup leader and later as Ghana’s President), Ghana’s
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democratic opposition launched a successful campaign to prevent Rawlings’ successor,
Vice President John Atta Mills, from succeeding him. The political campaign, backed by
pro-democracy protests, successfully defeated Mills and consolidated Ghana’s
democratic transition.

MN: Initial research only revealed a tenuous role for civil resistance, and the case may be
better considered as an elite-led transition followed by a traditional election rather than a
civil resistance-led transition. Statistical tests were run both including and excluding this
case.
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Times (2000, December 10).
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Associated Press Newswires (2000, December 28).

Name: Surinam Anti-President Movement
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Country: Surinam
End Year: 2000
Transition Mechanism: Election
Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, institutional.
Summary: Labor unions in Surinam organized protests and demonstrations against
President Jules Wijdenbosch. The unions, along with opposition parties, unsuccessfully
attempted to oust Wijdenbosch through parliamentary procedures. However, as protests
continued, Wijdenbosch agreed to hold early elections if the unions would temporarily
call off their disturbances. The campaign shifted tactics to ousting Wijdenbosch
electorally and successfully defeated him in the early election.

Sources


Becker, Meghan Auker. “Surinamese Protest Against President, 1999.” Global
Nonviolent Action Database (2010, April 18). Accessed 10/27/13 at
http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/surinamese-protest-against-president1999.

Name: Anti-Diouf Movement
Country: Senegal
End Year: 2000
Transition Mechanism: Election
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Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, institutional.
Summary: An alliance of opposition parties and defecting figures from the long-time
ruling Socialist Party organized a concerted challenge to long-time ruled Abdou Diouf.
The opposition organized successful protests against plans by the Socialist Party to rig
the vote, and successfully defeated Diouf in the second round of the presidential election.

Method Note: While the mechanism of success is very clear, whether this case should be
considered civil resistance or simply regular election politics is unclear. I consider it civil
resistance for two reasons: first, the one-party authoritarian nature of the regime which
preceded the election and second, the real and effective use of demonstrations and the
threat of mass civil disobedience by the opposition to pressure the regime into holding a
free and fair election.

Sources


“New Senegalese President Sworn In, Ending 40 Years of One-Party Rule.”
Agence France Presse (2000, April 1).



Galvan, Dennis Charles. “Political Turnover and Social Change in
Senegal.”Journal of Democracy 12(3) (July 2001), 51-62.



McKenzie, Glenn. “Senegal Elections: Peaceful Change or Violent Renewal?”
Associated Press Newswires (2000, March 18).
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Name: Anti-Chaudhry Campaign
Country: Fiji
End Year: 2000
Transition Mechanism: Coup d’etat
Secondary codes: Coercive, non-institutional
Summary: Fiji’s first Indo-Fijian prime minister, Mahendra Chaudhry, was elected in
May of 1999. The election was widely resented by ethnic Fijian nationalists, particularly
activists in the Takuei Movement, a Fijian nationalist group which had participated in
agitation prior to the Fijian coups of 1987 (See Anti-Coalition Government Protests). On
April 28, 2000, the Takuei movement and other Fijian groups organized a protest march
to demand the resignation of Chaudhry’s government. In response to the march the
government banned any additional protest marches. The nationalists ignored the ban and
planned a march on May 19th, the one-year anniversary of Chaudhry’s installation. As
the protest march was underway Fijian nationalists led by failed businessman George
Speight staged a coup, taking captive Prime Minister Chaudhry and announcing the
overthrow of the government. The police and military initially declared the coup
illegitimate but wavered in cracking down on the plotters. The Takuei Movement
declared its support for Speight’s coup and thousands of supporters descended on the
parliament building to show their support for Speight. After a ten-day standoff and riots
around the Fijian capital by Speight supporters on May 29th the army announced that
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they had assumed executive authority to resolve the crisis, permanently overthrowing the
Chaudhry government.

Sources:


“Fiji Government Bans Protest Marches.” Agence France Presse (2000, May 5).



Keith-Reid, Robert. “Thousands Take to Streets to Protest Fiji’s Government.”
The Associated Press (2000, April 28).



“Fiji PM Overthrown, Held by Armed Men in Parliament.” Agence France Presse
(2000, May 19).



Field, Michael. “Army Takes Power in Fiji, Declares Martial Law.” Agence
France Presse (2000, May 29).

Name: Second People Power Movement
Country: Philippines
End Year: 2001
Transition Mechanism: Coup D’etat
Secondary Codes: Coercive, institutional.
Summary: In 2001, outrage over political maneuvering to save Philippine President
Joseph Estrada from conviction in a corruption investigation resulted in a call for mass
demonstrations to oust Estrada from office. Over four days, millions of protesters
gathered in Manila in echoes of the 1986 “people power” revolution against Philippine
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dictator Ferdinand Marcos. The mass uprising sparked quick defections from the head of
the military and the supreme court, which issued a declaration denying Estrada
legitimacy and installing his vice-president, Gloria Arroyo, as president.

Sources


Mydans, Seth. “’People Power II’ Doesn’t Give Filipinos the Same Glow.” The
New York Times (2001, February 5).



Seigel, Jessica. “Philippine Citizens Overthrow President Joseph Estrada (People
Power II), 2001.” Global Nonviolent Action Database (2013, March 3). Accessed
12/1/13 at http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/philippine-citizensoverthrow-president-joseph-estrada-people-power-ii-2001.

Name: Anti-Chiluba Protests
Country: Zambia
End Year: 2001
Transition Mechanism: Resignation
Secondary Codes: Coercive, institutional.
Summary: In 2001, Zambian President Frederick Chiluba was set to step down due to a
two-term limit in the Zambian constitution. However, early in the year Chiluba
expressed his unwillingness to step down and instead began putting in place mechanisms
to remain in power for a third time. In response students, civil society groups, and
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churches launched mass protests to demand that Chiluba give up power. In response to
the protests, Chiluba agreed to not run for a third term.

MN: Confidence in including this case in the data is limited – while civil resistance did
play a role in motivating Chiluba to not seek a third term, whether this qualifies as
seeking “regime change” and thus being maximalist is questionable. Statistical tests were
run which both included and excluded this case with no significant difference in the
results.

Sources


Phiri, Isabel Apawo. “President Frederick J.T. Chiluba of Zambia: The Christian
Nation and Democracy.” Journal of Religion in Africa 33.4 (2003, November),
401-428.

Name: Madagascar Pro-Democracy Movement
Country: Madagascar
End Year: 2003
Transition Mechanism: Negotiation
Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, institutional.
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Summary: After an election filled with widespread fraud, supporters of opposition
candidate Marc Ravalomanana held daily protests to demand the annulling of the election
and the ouster of long-time president Didier Ratsiraka. When the Madagascar High
Constitutional Court (under pressure from Ratsiraka) refused to acknowledge the fraud
and claimed that neither candidate had received more than 50% of the vote, thus
requiring a second round, Ravalomanana’s supporters nonviolently occupied government
buildings in the capital, Antananarivo, while Ratsiraka retreated to his demographic base
on the coasts. After several months of standoff, the two parties were brought to Senegal,
where, under the auspices of the OAU, they reached a negotiated settlement which put an
interim government in place and recounted the votes from the election. The recount gave
Ravalomanana an absolute majority, and thus the victory.

MN: The election itself was clearly an important mechanism of success for the
Ravalomanana campaign, however, as the narrative above shows, victory in the election
was only a preliminary for true victory. The major phase of the campaign took place
after the election. Victory was only achieved after the process of negotiation put the
interim government in place which recounted the vote and issued the new High
Constitutional Court verdict. Thus I consider the negotiation to be the most accurate
coding of the transition mechanism.

Sources
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Randrianja, Solofo. “’Be not Afraid, Only Believe; Madagascar 2002.” African
Affairs 102 (2003) 309-329.

Name: Rose Revolution
Country: Georgia
End Year: 2003
Transition Mechanism: Resignation
Secondary Codes: Coercive, institutional.
Summary: Opposition and civil society groups in Georgia, led by Mikhail Saakashvili,
joined together to contest parliamentary elections against Georgian President and former
Soviet official Eduard Shevardnadze. When widespread electoral fraud gave
Shevardnadze’s supporters the victory, Saakashvili and his supporters organized civil
resistance in Tbilisi. The campaign peaked with Saakashvili and thousands of protesters
storming the opening session of the new Georgian parliament and demanding
Shevardnadze’s resignation. Shevardnadze resigned from office within weeks.

Sources


Bunce, Valerie J. and Sharon L. Wolchik. Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in
Postcommunist Countries. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.



Radnitz, Scott. “The Color of Money: Privatization, Economic Dispersion, and
the Post-Soviet ‘Revolutions.’” Comparative Politics 42, no. 1 (2010): 127-146.
224



Tucker, Joshua A. 2007. “Enough! Electoral Fraud, Collective Action Problems,
and Postcommunist Colored Revolutions.” Perspectives on Politics 5, no. 3
(2007): 535-551.

Name: Orange Revolution
Country: Ukraine
End Year: 2004
Transition Mechanism: Election
Secondary Codes: Coercive, institutional.
Summary: The 2004 presidential election in Ukraine pitted opposition candidate Victor
Yushchenko against the handpicked successor of authoritarian President Leonid Kuchma,
Victor Yanukovich. After Yanukovich attempted to steal the election through
widespread public fraud, Yushchenko’s supporters began protests which eventually
pressured the country’s constitutional court to acknowledge the widespread fraud and
demand a new run-off election. In the second election, monitored closely by domestic
and international observers, Yushchenko defeated Yanukovich.

Sources


Kuntz, Philipp and Mark R. Thompson. “More Than Just the Final Straw: Stolen
Elections as Revolutionary Triggers.” Comparative Politics 41, no .3 (2009): 253272.
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(2007): 535-551.

Name: Forajido Rebellion
Country: Ecuador
End Year: 2005
Transition Mechanism: Coup D’etat
Secondary Codes: Coercive, institutional
Summary: A widespread popular civil resistance campaign organized protests in Quito
against the regime of President Lucio Gutierrez. The campaign was based around a
number of grievances, most particularly Gutierrez’ replacement of supreme court justices
with his own followers. As the movement grew, the military became unwilling to
continue repressing nonviolent protesters and announced they would no longer support
President Gutierrez. As soon as the military withdrew its support the Ecuadorian
congress voted 60-2 to remove Gutierrez from office on the grounds that he had
“abandoned his post.”

MN: The coding of this transition is problematic because it contains both
institutionalized elements and non-institutionalized elements. I code it as a coup for two
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reasons: first, the action by the Ecuadorian congress voting Gutierrez out was clearly in
response to the military defection. Second, the vote, rather than being a carefully
legislated process, was rather more of an institutional front to a rapid independent seizure
of power by elites. Thus the transition is best-coded as a coup.

Sources


Palazzolo, Nick. “Ecuadorians Oust President Gutierrez (Rebellion of the
Forajidos), 2005.” Global Nonviolent Action Database (2013, February 17).
Accessed 11/14/13 at http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/ecuadorians-oustpresident-guti-rrez-rebellion-forajidos-2005.

Name: The Gas Wars
Country: Bolivia
End Year: 2005
Transition Mechanism: Resignation
Secondary Codes: Coercive, institutional
Summary: A protest campaign in favor of nationalizing Bolivia’s natural gas reserves
from 2003-2005 led by Socialist leader Evo Morales among others led to the ouster of
President Sanchez de Lozada in 2003 and later to the ouster of Sanchez de Lozada’s
successor, Carlos Mesa. As protests continued to grow and reformist measures failed to
placate them Mesa resigned in June 2005.
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MN: I code this as a single successful campaign rather than two successful campaigns
(one against President Sanchez de Lozada and one against President Mesa) for two
reasons. On the data side, including a unit of analysis for both campaigns would skew
the data as the outcome years are close to the same. Thus, even if both were included in
the dataset any analysis would have to exclude one. Since protests continued after
Sanchez de Lozada’s resignation it therefore made sense to me to analyze this as a single
campaign ending with Mesa’s resignation in 2005, which was followed by a brief
transitional period and the election of Evo Morales as president soon afterwards.

Sources


Hirschel-Burns, Danny. “Bolivians Win Democratic Control of the Country’s Gas
Reserves, 2003-2005.” Global Nonviolent Action Database (2011, April 24).
Accessed 11/12/13 at http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/bolivians-windemocratic-control-countrys-gas-reserves-2003-2005.



Painter, James. “Why is Bolivia in Turmoil?” BBC News (2005, June 3).
Accessed 11/12/13 at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4604173.stm.

Name: Tulip Revolution
Country: East Timor
End Year: 2005
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Transition Mechanism: Overwhelming
Secondary Codes: Coercive, Non-Institutional
Summary: After local opposition leaders were defeated in parliamentary elections in
Kyrgyzstan, widespread protests erupted almost spontaneously across the south of the
country against the rule of long-time authoritarian President Askar Akaev. As protests
(some but not all under the control of the opposition) grew, various government
ministries stopped obeying Akaev’s orders. As protesters massed in Bishkek, scattered
attempts to repress them failed as police defection grew. As protesters occupied the
Kyrgyz “white house” Akaev fled the country.

Sources:


Bunce, Valerie J. and Sharon L. Wolchik. Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in
Postcommunist Countries. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.



Tucker, Joshua A. 2007. “Enough! Electoral Fraud, Collective Action Problems,
and Postcommunist Colored Revolutions.” Perspectives on Politics 5, no. 3
(2007): 535-551

Name: Cedar Revolution/Independence Intifada
Country: Lebanon
End Year: 2005
Transition Mechanism: Resignation
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Secondary Codes: Coercive, Non-Institutional
Summary: In early 2005, after popular Lebanese politician Rafiq Hariri died in a car
bombing widely attributed to Syrian intelligence services opposition parties in Syria
organized mass demonstrations demanding an end to the occupation of Lebanon by
Syrian troops. At the peak of the campaign over 1.2 million people (more than 25% of
Lebanon’s population) protested against Syrian occupation. As a result of the protests,
all Syrian troops were withdrawn from Lebanon by April of 2005.

MN: I code the transition mechanism in this case as “resignation” because Syrian
President Bashar Assad unilaterally decided to withdraw Syrian troops. This initiative
aspect makes resignation the best coding, though of course no formal political resignation
on the part of the Syrians took place.

Sources:


Schlotterbeck, Markus. “Lebanese Campaign for Democracy (Independence
Intifada or Cedar Revolution), 2005.” Global Nonviolent Action Database (2009,
February 25). Accessed 12/8/13 at
http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/lebanese-campaign-democracyindependence-intifada-or-cedar-revolution-2005.

Name: Anti-Alkatiri Campaign
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Country: East Timor
End Year: 2006
Transition Mechanism: Resignation
Secondary Codes: Coercive, Institutional
Summary: After Prime Minister Alkatiri’s dismissal of 600 soldiers who claimed they
had been discriminated against sparked violent unrest thousands of protesters began
holding demonstrations in Dili demanding that Alkatiri take responsibility for the unrest
and step down. They asked President Gusmao to dissolve the government. As protests
continued, on June 20th President Gusmao threatened to resign if Alkatiri did not step
down. On June 26th Alkatiri resigned, allowing Gusmao to form an interim government.

Sources:


“Pressure mounts on ETimor PM to resign after protest rally.” Agence France
Presse (2006, Jun 6).



Smith, Tanalee. “East Timor’s embattled prime minister quits, raising hopes for
end to violence.” Associated Press Newswires (2006, Jun 26).

Name: Nepalese Anti-Government
Country: Nepal
End Year: 2006
Transition Mechanism: Election
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Secondary Codes: Coercive, Institutional
Summary: Years of agitation by pro-democracy forces in Nepal culminated in a massive
general strike in April of 2006 demanding an end to emergency rule, the return of the
elected parliament, and the ouster of King Gyanendra, who had essentially ruled by
decree since 2002. In late April Gyanendra agreed to allow parliament to reconvene, and
on May 18th parliament voted to officially strip him of his monarchical powers. While
the political transition in Nepal continued in an uncertain fashion after this moment (and
in still in a great deal of flux today) this vote represents the critical transition mechanism
when the king lost his power as an absolute monarch and the balance of power shifted to
the elected parliament.

MN: I code this transition mechanism as an “election” because of its democratic process
nature - an institutional process by an elected parliament.

Sources:
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Figurehead Leader.” The Wall Street Journal (2006, May 19).
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Sengupta, Somini. “Nepal Legislators Move to Curb the King’s Power.” The New
York Times (2006, May 19).

Name: Anti-Thaksin Campaign
End-Year: 2006
Transition Mechanism: Coup D’etat
Secondary Codes: Coercive, Non-Institutional
Summary: In 2005 and early 2006 the People’s Alliance for Democracy, a “royalist”
protest movement led by middle and upper class residents of Bangkok began a protest
campaign against Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, who was popular in rural areas of
Thailand but widely despised in Bangkok. The protesters repeatedly appealed to the king
to remove Thaksin, but he refused to do so. In 2006, the military ousted Thaksin in a
coup.

Sources



Anto, Meiri. “Urban Thais Overthrwo Prime Minister Thaksin, Thailand, 20052006.” Global Nonviolent Action Database (2013, February 26). Accessed
11/20/13 at http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/urban-thais-overthrowprime-minister-thaksin-thailand-2005-2006.
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